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Abstract 
This thesis looks into ways of developing a new approach for fault tree automation. 
Initially an extensive literature survey was undertaken to try and identify if any 
methods contained useful features that might warrant further development. The two 
methods that were chosen were the decision table method and the digraph method. 
The new hybrid method is based on the flexibility of the decision table method but 
incorporates a way of detecting, classifying and analysing control loops, similar to the 
use of operators in the digraph approach. As well as using operators to deal with 
control loops new operators are introduced that deal with current and no current in 
electrical circuits. These new operators have been developed to be able to handle 
components that are common to multiple circuits. The advantages of applying 
operators during fault tree construction is to reduce the number of repeated and 
inconsistent events that may occur in the tree, and to significantly reduced the size of 
the constructed fault tree. Thus producing a tree logic that can easily be followed by 
an analyst and is in an appropriate format for direct input to an fault tree analysis code. 
The new method has been automated and successfully applied to three railway safety 
systems obtained from London Underground Ltd. To test the ability of the Automatic 
Fault Tree Construction Code (AFTCC) the complexity of each of the three systems 
increased. The first system, the Train Stop system, did not contain any circuits; the 
second, the Train Detection system, contained simple circuits and lastly the Train 
Braking system, contained multiple nested circuits. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction to Automatic Fault Tree Construction 
1.1 Introduction 
Reliability is an important characteristic for safety systems which are designed to 
protect against hazardous events whose consequences may be catastrophic. Reliability 
is also an important factor affecting the economic viability of industrial processes. The 
most common technique used for system reliability assessment is fault tree analysis. 
Fault tree analysis is a formal deductive procedure for determining combinations of 
component failures and human errors that could result in the occurrence of a specified 
undesired event. The fault tree method was initially developed by Bell Telephone 
Laboratories in the early 1960's in connection with a US airforce contract to study the 
Minuteman Missile launch control system. The quantification techniques known as 
Kinetic tree theory was supplied nearly ten years later by Vesely [45]. Industries 
which have made extensive use of fault tree analysis include the nuclear industry, 
power generation industries, the chemical process industry and aerospace industry. 
Many safety studies employing fault tree analysis have incurred high costs in terms of 
the many man years of effort taken to complete them. The synthesis of fault trees is a 
difficult task that requires skills beyond those normally possessed by process engineers 
or designers. It is also a process which is prone to error. As a result, the construction 
of fault trees is time consuming and is frequently marred by errors. 
These two factors: time and quality are the main driving forces behind attempts to 
automate the fault tree construction process. Advantages of an effective and efficient 
fault tree synthesis algorithm implemented on a computer are: 
1. The large amount of time that could be saved in carrying out the fault tree 
construction. 
2. The consistent approach taken to construct fault trees which are free from 
errors. 
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1.1.1 Background 
All work to date in the automation of fault tree construction has mainly been aimed at 
nuclear and chemical process plants. London Underground Ltd and many other 
companies involved in the railway industry are currently using fault tree analysis for 
their safety case work. As railway safety systems have very different features than 
nuclear or chemical process systems, London Underground Ltd wanted to investigate 
the feasibility of producing an automatic fault tree construction package specifically for 
application to their railway safety systems. 
1.2 General Description of the Fault Tree Analysis Method 
1.2.1 Fault Tree Symbols and Construction 
Fault tree analysis is a deductive logic approach used to identify the causal 
relationships leading to a specific system failure mode. The initial step in the fault tree 
analysis of a system is to identify the system failure mode of concern. This becomes 
the top event of the fault tree. Systems may have many different failure modes that 
need to be analysed, in this case a separate fault tree needs to be constructed for each 
one. The top event of the fault tree is developed by branches leading down from this 
event to other sub-events which show its possible causes. These sub-events are 
continually redefined in terms of lower resolution events until the branches are 
terminated with component failures. The terminating events in the development are 
classified as basic events. 
Each fault tree is built up from gates and events, the gates link the events together 
depending upon their causal relationships. The main two types of gates used are the 
'AND' and 'OR' gate. Other gate types exist [41 ] but these only reduce the size of the 
fault tree diagram and have to be expressed in terms of 'AND', 'OR' and NOT logic 
prior to analysis. The minimal set of gates to represent all logic operators which are 
used in the automatic fault tree construction methods described in this thesis are shown 
in table 1.1. 
2 
Gate Symbol Gate Type Causal Relation 
Output event occurs if all 
AND Gate input events occur 
simultaneously 
Output event occurs if at 
OR Gate least one of the input 
events occur 
Output event occurs if the 
NOT Gate input event does not 
Table 1.1 Common Gate Symbols and Types 
Also a restricted minimal set of the event type symbols used in the automatic fault tree 
construction are shown in table 1.2. Again a more detailed list of symbols in general 
use can be found in [41]. 
Table 1.2 Common Event Symbols 
To date no set of rules have been determined that if followed will guarantee the 
construction of a correct fault tree for any system failure event. There are however, 
guidelines to ensure that the fault tree is developed in a methodical manner. These 
guidelines were developed by Hassl et al [42] and are: 
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1. Write the statements that are entered in the event boxes as faults, state 
precisely what the fault is and when it occurs. 
2. If the fault in the event box can be caused by a component failure classify the 
event as a "state-of-component" fault. If the fault cannot be caused by a 
component failure, classify the event as a "state-of system" fault. 
If the fault event is classified as "state-of-component" then the event should be 
developed as in figure 1.1. If the fault event is classified as "state-of-system" 
then the event is developed to its immediate, necessary and sufficient causes. 
Component 
Failure 
(state-of-component) 
Command 
Primary Fault Secondary 
Failure Failure 
Figure 1.1 Development of a "State-of-Component" Event 
A primary failure is defined as any failure of a component that occurs under 
conditions for which the component was designed to work or that occurs from natural 
ageing. 
A secondary failure is defined as any failure of a component that occurs as a result of 
the component experiencing conditions, either in the past or present, for which it was 
not designed. This could, for example, be due to the failure of other components in the 
system. 
A command fault is defined as the component being in the non-working state due to 
improper control signals or noise. It is causes of this type which are generally traced 
back through the system. 
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3. If the normal functioning of a component propagates a fault sequence, then it is 
assumed that the component functions normally. 
4. All inputs to a particular gate should be completely defined before further 
development of any one of them is undertaken. 
5. Gate inputs should be properly defined, fault events described using the 
rectangular boxes and gates should not be directly connected to other gates. 
System Failure Modes 
A cut set is a collection of basic events such that if they all occur then the top event 
also occurs. A minimal cut set is the smallest combination of component failures, 
which if they all occur will cause the top event to occur. Implicant sets are 
combinations of both failure and success events that cause the top event and prime 
implicants are implicants where this combination is minimal. 
Once a fault tree has been constructed a qualitative assessment which produces 
minimal cut sets can be performed. There are various methods of finding the minimal 
cut sets from a fault tree structure, the method explained here is the "Bottom Up" 
approach, which is demonstrated by its application to the fault tree shown in figure 1.2. 
Figure 1.2 Example Fault Tree for the Calculation of the Minimal Cut Sets 
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With the "Bottom Up" method each gate is defined in terms of the occurrence of lower 
level events and expressed in terms of Boolean variables. Boolean variables are 
assigned to represent the occurrence of each basic event. Then the Boolean algebra 
laws are used to remove redundancies in the expressions. The rules used are given 
below, where '+' represents 'OR' and '. ' represents 'AND'. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Commutative Laws 
A+B =B +A, 
Associative Laws 
A. B = B. A 
(A+B)+C=A+(B+C), (A. B). C=A. (B. C) 
Distributive Laws 
A+ (B. C) = (A+B) . (A+C), 
Identities 
A+O=A A. 1 =A 
5. Idempotent Laws 
A+A=A 
6. Absorption Laws 
A+A. B=A 
7. Complementation 
A+A=A 
8. De Morgans Laws 
(A+B)=A. B 
A. A=A 
A. (A+B)=A 
A. A=O 
(A. B) =A+B 
A. (B +C) = A. B + A. C 
(A)=A 
To find the minimal cut sets for the example fault tree in figure 1.2 begin at the bottom 
of the left branch G3. G3 is an "'OR"' gate with two inputs, B and C, therefore G3 can 
be expressed as B+C. Proceeding up the branch the next gate is G1 which is also an 
"'OR"' gate with inputs, G3, A and D, which gives the expression B+C+A+D for 
G1. The next gate up the branch is the top gate TOP which has inputs G1 'AND' G2. 
To develop TOP, G2 has to be written in terms of basic events which means starting at 
the bottom of this branch. Using the method described above the expression for G2 is 
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(C . A) + B. As the TOP gate is an 'AND' gate the complete expression for the top 
gate defined in terms of basic events is: 
TOP= (B +C+A+D). (C. A+B) 
Expanding and then applying Boolean reduction gives: 
TOP=B. C. A+B. B+C. C. A+C. B+A. C. A+A. B+D. C. A+D. B 
=B. C. A+B+C. A+C. B+C. A+A. B+D. C. A+D. B 
=B+C. A 
Obtaining this minimal disjunctive form of the logic equation enables the minimal cut 
sets to be extracted. There are only two minimal cut sets one of order one (containing 
one basic event) and the other of order two (containing two basic events). The 
minimal cut sets are B, C 'AND' A. Other commonly applied methods of deriving the 
minimal cut sets are based on the "Top Down" manipulations of the fault tree. 
Top Event Probability 
The general method used to calculate the probability of the top event utilises the 
previously determined minimal cut sets. 
If a fault tree has nc minimal cut sets Ci, i=1, ...., nc then the top event exists 
if at 
least one minimal cut set exists. 
i. e. T= C1 + C2 + .... +Cnc 
nc 
= uci (l. l) 
i=l 
nc 
since P (T) =PUC this gives: 
i=l 
) 
nc nc i-i 
P(T)=ýP(CC)-ýy P(CCnC; )+....... (-1)nc-'P(Cl nC2n..... nC, c) (1.2) 
i=1 i=2 j=t 
This expansion is known as the inclusion-exclusion expansion. 
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The full evaluation of each term in the inclusion-exclusion expansion for calculating the 
probability of the top event is not practical for fault trees with many minimal cut sets. 
Therefore approximations that produce acceptably accurate results are required. The 
inclusion-exclusion expansion adds successive odd numbered terms and subtracts 
successive even numbered terms, where each term is numerically less significant than 
the proceeding term. Therefore truncating the series at an odd numbered term will 
provide an upper bound and truncating the series after an even numbered term will 
provide a lower bound for the exact probability. 
Upper and Lower Bounds for System Unavailability 
Consider the first two terms in the inclusion-exclusion expansion. This gives: 
nc i-i nc 
P(Cº) -yY, P(Ci n C; ) <_ Qs(t)<_ P(Ci) 
t=t i=2 j=i i=i 
lower bound exact upper bound 
(1.3) 
The upper bound for the top event probability used here is known as the "rare event 
approximation" since it is itself accurate if the component failure events are rare. 
Minimal Cut Set Upper Bound 
A more accurate upper bound is the minimal cut set upper bound which is developed 
as follows: 
P(system failure) = P(at least 1 minimal cut set occurs) 
=1 - P(no minimal cut sets occurs) 
since 
nc 
P(no minimal cut sets occur) _ 
fJ 
i=1 
P(minimal cut set i does not occur) 
(equality being when no event appears in more than one minimal cut set in which case 
the minimal cut sets are independent). 
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Therefore: 
nc 
P(system failure) < 1- [ P(minimal cut set i does not occur) 
i. e. 
nc 
QS(t) ý 1-fl(1- P(CB)) (1.4) 
It can be shown that: 
ne nc 
QS(t) ý 1-fl(1- P(CB)) P(CB) (1.5) 
exact min cut set rare event 
upper bound approximation 
Importance Measures 
An importance analysis is a sensitivity analysis which can be used to identify any weak 
areas of the system. For each component its importance is a numerical value which 
signifies the role that it plays in either causing or contributing to the occurrence of the 
top event. 
Importance measures can be categorised in two ways: 
1. Deterministic 
2. Probabilistic 
Deterministic Measures 
Deterministic measures asses the importance of a component to the system operation 
without considering the components probability of failure. One such measure is the 
structural measure of importance which is defined for a component i as: 
I= number of critical system states 
for component i 
total number of states for the (n -1) remaining components 
A critical state for component i is a state for the remaining n-1 components such that 
failure of component i causes the system to go from a working to a failed state. 
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Probabilistic Measures 
The most commonly used probabilistic measures for importance assessment are listed 
below: 
1. Birnbaums Measure of Importance 
Birnbaums measure of importance is also known as the criticality function. The 
criticality function for a component i is denoted by Gi(q) and is defined as the 
probability that the system is in a critical system state for component i. Therefore it is 
the sum of the probabilities of occurrence of the critical system states for component i. 
2. Criticality Measure of Importance 
This importance measure is defined as the probability that the system is in a critical 
state for component i and i has failed given that the system has failed. 
Ii = 
Gi (q(t))gi(t) 
Qsys(q(t)) 
(1.6) 
3. Fussell-Vesely Measure of Importance 
This measure is defined as the probability of the union of the minimal cut sets 
containing i given that the system has failed. 
P( VCk) 
kli Ek X1 7) 
Qsys(q(t)) 
4. Fussell-Vesely Measure of Minimal Cut Set Importance 
The previously defined importance measures ranked component failures in order of 
their contribution to the top event. This measure provides a similar function except 
that the minimal cut sets are themselves ranked. The importance measure is defined 
simply as the probability of occurrence of minimal cut set i given that the system has 
failed. 
Ii = 
P(Ci) (1.8) 
Qsys(q(t)) 
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1.3 Description of the Types of Systems where the Automatic Fault Tree 
Construction Package is Applied 
The project required the development of an automatic fault tree construction package 
that could cope with two distinct types of problem. The main application of the 
package would be the automatic fault tree construction for railway safety systems. 
These engineering systems are defined in terms of the components which comprise the 
system and a system schematic which shows how the components link to form the 
system. In this situation the development of the fault tree is performed by tracing fault 
conditions through the system. The second application is for the construction of 
hazard trees which have the same structure as fault trees. These diagrams represent 
logical combinations of events and conditions for each hazard. They are very similar 
for each line or station on the underground system to which they relate. For this 
application a database is created which contains information on the logical structure for 
all of the hazardous events on all of the lines on the underground from the safety case. 
Then if any of the logical conditions are changed or any components in the systems are 
changed the new hazard trees can be automatically generated saving many hours in 
manual construction. 
1.4 Objectives of the Project 
This thesis is concerned with the development of an automatic fault tree construction 
code which is applicable to railway safety systems. The objectives of the work 
programme were to: 
1. Review existing fault tree construction algorithms which have been applied to 
applications in other industries. 
2. Identify the deficiencies of the current methods and also the features each 
method processes which would be retained in any future developed method 
aimed at railway safety systems. 
3. Consider the way in which models to represent component functionality/failure 
can be formulated. 
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4. Develop an algorithm to trace faults through a system using the system 
connectivity and the component models. 
5. Automate the algorithm in a computer code and test the fault trees it produces 
for different trial systems. 
6. Extend the developed algorithm to incorporate features identified for accurate 
modelling by application to other actual railway safety systems. This would be 
performed to demonstrate the viability of the algorithm. 
7. Investigate the potential for the developed methodology to be applied in 
industries other than the rail industry. Such systems are expected to contain 
control loops. 
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Chapter 2 
Methods for Automatic Fault Tree Construction 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the last fifteen years a great deal of work has been carried out in defining a 
formal approach to fault tree construction. In this thesis the main methods have been 
grouped into four different categories namely: Digraph, Decision Table, other 
Component Model Methods and Expert Systems. The aim of the project is to create a 
fault tree construction methodology that can be automated which has the capability to 
deal with the features that are common to railway safety systems. With this in mind 
the main approaches are described and reviewed in detail in this chapter looking at the 
positive and negative features for each method. Even though negative feedback and 
negative feedforward control loops do not usually appear in railway safety systems 
these are factors which have been considered. It is envisaged that the new approach 
should have the ability to detect, classify and deal with control loops in order to 
demonstrate its capacity for expansion beyond the application to railway safety 
systems. 
2.2 The Digraph Method 
The digraph method was first introduced in 1977 by Lapp & Powers [1] as a method 
for fault tree construction. The method is split into two distinct steps, the first step is 
the construction of the digraph (directed graph) and the second is the use of an 
algorithm to transform the digraph to the completed fault tree. 
A digraph consists of nodes and directed edges. The nodes represent process 
variables, and are connected by directed edges. The direction of the directed edges are 
decided by considering the relationship between the variables it joins, if a deviation in a 
variable A produces a deviation in variable B then the direction of the edge 
is from 
variable A to variable B. An edge may be either a normal edge, which 
indicates that 
the relationship is normally true, or a conditional edge which indicates that the 
relationship holds only when a certain condition is satisfied. When several edges 
connect the same pair of nodes then only one relationship is in operation at any one 
time, i. e. the connecting edges are mutually exclusive. A number is assigned to the 
edge depending on the rate of change of the second deviation relative to the first. The 
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values that can be assigned are +10, -10, +1, -1 and 0. For deviations that cannot be 
controlled by the system a number with the magnitude of 10 is associated with the 
edge. Similarly for moderate deviations a number with the magnitude 1 is associated 
with the edge, the sign of the numbers depends on whether the deviations in the 
dependent variable increase or decrease when the independent variable increases. A+' 
indicates an increase and a '-' indicates a decrease. The number associated with 
directed edges is termed the gain and can be thought of as the partial derivative of the 
first variable with respect to the second variable. If there is no relationship between 
any two nodes then no edge connects the two nodes. Failures that alter the usual 
relationship are modelled using conditional edges between the appropriate variables. A 
gain of 0 is only used with conditional edges and is assigned if changes in the first 
process variable do not have any effect on the second process variable due to some 
specified condition. 
The same five numbers, -10, -1,0, +1, +10 are used in the digraph to represent the 
disturbances in the process variables. Disturbances are the deviations that the process 
variable has made from its normal, expected value. As before moderate disturbances 
are represented by +1 or -1 depending whether the deviation is above or below that of 
the normal. Similarly disturbances that can not be controlled by the system take the 
values +10 or -10. 
To illustrate how the process variables are joined by a directed edge consider a spring 
action air-to-close control valve as shown in figure 2.1 
'3 
Pneurm 
air to close 
A/C 
Figure 2.1 Air-to-Close Control Valve 
Each variable has a two parameter label consisting of a letter to define the physical 
variable e. g. P for pressure, M for mass and T for temperature, and a number 
representing its location in the system. Therefore from figure 2.2, P3 is the air 
pressure to control the valve and M2 is the mass flow rate of the fluid through the 
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valve. On a digraph the relationship between the variables would be represented by 
figure 2.2. 
P3 
1 
M2 
Figure 2.2 Digraph Representation of Control Valve 
As a positive deviation in the pressure P3 closes the valve and causes a negative 
deviation in M2 the directed edge is in the direction P3 to M2 and the gain associated 
with the edge is -1. If the valve was a slam shut valve then a positive deviation in the 
pressure P3 would cause fast change M2 when the valve closes and the gain associated 
with the edge would be -10. The dynamics of a slam shut valve give the relationship 
DM2 
_+10. 3P3 
Disturbances propagate through the digraph in the following way. The value of the 
dependent variables (node M2 in figure 2.2) is obtained by taking the product of the 
independent variable disturbance (node P3 in figure 2.2) and the gain. When 
disturbance and gain are of magnitude 10 it must be recognised that 10 is the output 
disturbance magnitude in this situation. 
One advantage of using digraphs to help construct fault trees is that in order to 
complete the digraph an engineer must fully understand the system. To help make sure 
that the correct edges and gains are added to the digraph each component is 
considered separately and an input-output model is constructed. An example for a 
temperature controller is shown in figure 2.3. This table consists of all the input and 
output process variables listed against one another, the gain between two variables 
is 
entered in the row and column corresponding to the input and output variables 
respectively. The direction of the edge is from the row variable to the column variable. 
There are two ways in which failure events are incorporated onto a digraph, they either 
change the relationship between variables or cause a 
deviation in some other process 
variable. The incorporation of these failures in the model 
is discussed later. 
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OUT 
IN P7 
6 P6 +1 
FAILURE: EXTERNAL 
+1 FIRE 
TEMPERATURE 
7 CONTROLLER LOW AIR -1 PRESSURE 
INSTALLED WITH CHANGE P6 TO P7 
REVERSE ACTION GAIN TO -1 
CONTROLLER BROKEN CHANGE P6 TO P7 
GAIN TO O(ZERO) 
Figure 2.3 Example of a Input-Output Model for a Temperature Controller 
One important advantage that the digraph method has over most other automated fault 
tree construction methods is the ability to identify and deal with control loops. There 
are two main types of control loops: the negative feedforward loops (NFFL) and 
negative feedback loops (NFBL). To illustrate a negative feedback control loop 
consider the simple control system in figure 2.4. 
valve 
A/O 0 
sensor 
controller < air supply 
0 
Figure 2.4 Simple Control System 
The system has been divided into discrete sections with each section being numbered. 
Usually the portions of the systems that are numbered are the connections between 
components such as pipes or wires which are passive components and in general do 
not themselves cause changes in the process variables. In the diagram the control loop 
senses the flow at location 2 and adjusts the air-to-open valve to maintain the flow at a 
pre-set value. The digraph is dependent upon the top event that is traced. The digraph 
constructed to represent the functioning of this system with the top event M3 (high) is 
shown in figure 2.5. 
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The system is translated into the digraph by starting from the system output in this case 
section 3 and finding all causes for an increase in the mass flow M3. From figure 2.4 
the only cause is an increase in M2, therefore M2 and M3 are connected by an edge 
joining the independent variable M2 to the dependent variable M3. Since the rate of 
change W31 W2 = +1 a gain of +1 is placed on this edge. The next step is to 
consider causes of an increase in M2, which is either an increase in M1 the mass flow 
into the system or an increase in P5 which opens the valve. Therefore both edges have 
a gain of +1. The controller provides the corrective action for the loop, so the gain 
between P5 and P4 is -1 and finally the cause of an increase in P4 is an increase in M2 
so the gain is +1. 
A negative feedback loop can be identified on a digraph by a path which starts and 
ends at the same node and for which the product of the normal gains is negative. It 
can be seen from the digraph which represents the functioning system (figure 2.5) that 
a loop starts and ends at the node M2 and the product of the normal gains is -1, 
therefore the loop is a negative feedback loop. If the net gain on the above loop was 
positive instead of negative the loop may be classified as either a positive feedback 
loop (PFBL) which would have the effect of amplifying the deviations of the process 
variables, or as an electrical circuit. 
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As an example of a negative feedforward loop consider the simple heat exchanger 
system shown in figure 2.6. 
constant flow 
of coolant valve 
hot 
O 
Temp 
O A/C 
4 
fluid Sensor Heat Exchanger 
Controller 
Figure 2.6 Heat Exchanger System 
A negative feedforward loop can be identified on a digraph when two or more paths 
connect one node to another node and the sign of the product of the normal gains on 
one path must differ from that on the other paths. The path with the net positive gain 
is called the causative branch as disturbances can propagate along this path and the 
paths with the net negative gain are called the corrective branches as this can correct 
the disturbances. 
Figure 2.7 Digraph for the Heat Exchanger System 
A digraph of the heat exchanger system is shown in figure 2.7. From the digraph it is 
clear that the above loop is a negative feedforward loop with T1, T2, T3 representing 
the causative branch and T1, S5, S6, M3, T3 representing the corrective branch. 
The second part of the digraph method is to transform the digraph to a completed fault 
tree. When a negative feedforward or feedback loop is encountered in the digraph 
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there is a generalised operator which is applied. The structure for a negative feedback 
loop operator is illustrated in figure 2.8. This is applied when any node on the loop is 
encountered while tracing causes of the top event back through the digraph. 
Loop Output 
Deviation/Disturbance 
OR 
AND 
External Disturbance 
Enters Loop 
Figure 2.8 
Large Disturbance Loop Variable 
Enters Loop Causes Disturbances 
Loop Variable Fails 
To Cancel Disturbance 
Negative Feedback Operator 
The structure of a negative feedforward loop operator is shown in figure 2.9 and is 
applied when the output node which terminates the causative and corrective branches 
is reached while tracing the top event causes. 
Loop Output 
Deviation/Disturbance 
AND 
Disturbance Which Disturbances On 
Propagates Down Both Alternate Paths Fail 
Loop Paths To Cancel One Another 
Figure 2.9 Negative Feedforward Operator 
If the system does not contain any negative feedforward or feedback loops and there 
are no conditional edges between process variables, the fault tree will only contain 
"OR" gates. If there are conditional edges the output event being traced is caused by 
the condition on the edge being "ANDED" with the appropriate process variable 
deviation at the input node. It is very important to check for inconsistency in the logic 
of the fault tree, this means that two mutually exclusive events cannot occur at the 
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same time. (Lapp & Powers[ I] say there is no need to check all generated events for 
consistency against all events which have been developed because inconsistency only 
occurs where feedback or feedforward loops are involved). 
The Fault Tree Synthesis Algorithm is: 
1. Generate system digraph and identify all negative feedback and feedforward 
loops. 
2. Select node representing variable whose deviation is the fault tree top event. 
3. Determine local causes of the top event by noting the inputs to the relevant 
node on the digraph. 
4. Delete any local causes which violate logical consistency. 
5. If negative feedback or feedforward loops pass through the current node select 
the appropriate operator. Use this operator to logically connect the remaining 
local causes. If negative feedback or feedforward loops are involved, store the 
appropriate event for later consistency checks. 
6. Select a node corresponding to an undeveloped event in the fault tree structure 
and return to step 3. If only primal events remain, stop. 
A method [1] was developed for converting the information in the digraph and storing 
it for use with a computer program, the program has been used on problems with 120 
nodes and 135 edges. 
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Lapp & Powers Digraph Method Applied to a Nitric Acid Cooler 
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Figure 2.10 Nitric Acid Cooler 
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To illustrate the detail of the Lapp and Powers digraph method of fault tree 
construction it has been applied to the nitric acid cooler system shown in figure 2.10 
[1]. The system works by the temperature sensor monitoring the outlet acid 
temperature from the heat exchanger and the temperature controller adjusting the flow 
rate of cooling water entering the heat exchanger. If the cooling water pump fails, the 
safety valve is closed and the system shuts down. 
The first step in the construction of the fault tree is to construct the input-output 
models of the components in the nitric acid cooler. The 6 components are numbered in 
the square boxes on the diagram. The models are constructed by considering how the 
process variables are related and which component failure modes occur. Shown in 
figure 2.3 is the component model for the fourth component, the temperature 
controller. The component only has one input and one output. The input is pressure 
from the temperature sensor P6 and the output P7. The entries in the table are derived 
as follows: if the pressure in the input stream was to increase, the pressure in the 
output stream would also increase hence a gain of +1 is entered in the table. The next 
two entries are from failures which cause a deviation in the output process variable. 
Lastly failures are added which change the relationship between the variables. Once all 
such component tables have been formulated the system digraph can be constructed. 
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Each component is considered in turn and the complete digraph is constructed. Note 
that when two variables are normally unrelated i. e. the gain between them is zero, then 
no directed edge is drawn between the variables unless it is a conditional edge. The 
completed digraph for the nitric acid system is shown in figure 2.11. 
For this system it was required to develop a fault tree for the top event "high nitric acid 
temperature from the heat exchanger". To achieve this the fault tree construction 
algorithm is applied to the digraph. The top event is expressed as a deviation in a 
process variable. The node representing the top event is found from the digraph and 
then all the events which can influence this event are located by tracing back along the 
directed edges. In this case the top event is high nitric acid temperature from the heat 
exchanger (T4 (+l)). The problem now arises which operator to use to connect the 
causes of T4(+1). If an "OR" gate was used it means that any of the input events 
above can cause the output event. It is very important at each stage to check the 
qualification that nothing else happens to cancel the original effect. The cause for 
T4(+ 1) is T3 (+ l) which can in turn be traced to M2(+ 1), T2(+ 1), M8(-I), T8 (+ 1) and 
External Fire. If any one of these is to cause T3(+l) then none of the other variables 
can deviate in such a manner as to cancel out the cause, therfore an "OR" gate can be 
used for T3(+1) but the inputs have to be considered carefully. 
Take for example M2(+1) this will cause T3(+1) if the situation M2(+1) "AND" (NOT 
(T2(- 1) "OR" M8(+1) "OR" T8(-1)) occurs. Now the NOT events can be replaced by 
their Boolean equivalent. So NOT T2(-1) = T2(+1) "OR" T2(0), as T2(0) can be 
traced on the digraph to T 1(0) which is a normal primal event. As one of the branches 
of the "OR" gate is normally always true the NOT T2(-1) can be eliminated from the 
tree. The same argument applies to NOT M2(-1) and NOT T8(-1). Consider now 
M8(0) this is not normally true as it is part of the control loop and the mass flow rate is 
usually either increasing or decreasing depending on the temperature. As event T3 (+ 1) 
is true M8 will increase due to the control loop, so NOT M8(+1) is normally not true 
and remains on the "AND" gate, NOT M8(+1) can be written in its equivalent form 
M8(-1) "OR" M8(0). The event M8(-1) is not part of the "AND" gate, it indicates that 
the control loop causes the disturbances. The tree developed for the event T3(+1) can 
be generated without the need to consider the contradictory conditions by treating the 
loop in its entirety and applying the generalised operator for negative feedback loops. 
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Figure 2.11 Digraph for Nitric Acid System 
The events are then considered with disturbance values of magnitude 10 in which case 
the control loops cannot cancel out the large disturbances. No "AND" gates are 
necessary because all the NOT events associated with the value 10 are normally true. 
This is how the fault tree is constructed from the digraph manually. 
For this example the algorithm used to construct the fault tree from the digraph is 
stepped through to illustrate its initial structural development use for the first couple of 
events. All the control loops are first identified, in this case there is one negative 
feedback loop and one negative feedforward loop. The feedback loop comprises of 
the process variables T3-->P6->P7-3M84T3, and for the feedforward loop, pump 
shut down->P1 1->M2-T3 (corrective branch), pump shut down-P9->M8->T3 
(causative branch). The process variable T3(+1) has already been analysed in the 
previous section. If we now develop the next event M8(-1), M8 has three inputs, two 
from node P7 and one from node P9. P9 is not on the feedback loop, therefore it is an 
external cause. As this is only the second stage in the fault tree only one event needs 
to be checked for consistency that is T3 (+ 1). This means that T3(+1) can not be 
traced to T3(-1) nor to T3(0), i. e. these can not appear on the same branch of a fault 
23 
tree. Also none of the local causes P9(-1), P7(-1) or reversed valve action invalidate 
the consistency criterion. The negative feedback operator is used to obtain the correct 
subtree for the event M8(-1) see figure 2.12. The "EOR" (exclusive "OR") gate is 
included in the subtree because if P7(-1) and reversed valve action occur at the same 
time they have the affect of cancelling each other out. 
M8(-1) 
Gate 7 
OR 
I Aý 
/ 
AND P9(-10) FOR P7(-10) 
1 
P9(-1) OR P7(-1) REVERSED VALVE 
ACTION 
P7(0) 1 
Figure 2.12 Subtree for Event M8(-1) 
Following the publication of Lapp and Powers 1977 [1] paper in which they developed 
a fault tree for the nitric acid system using the digraph method, Henley & Kumamoto 
[2] expressed concern over the correctness of the fault tree produced. The main 
disagreement being the cut sets obtained for gate 7, the "EOR" gate in figure 2.12. 
Subsequently there were three papers [3], [4], [5] commenting on [1] all published in 
1979. Locks [3] looks at gate 7 and derives the minimalized logic equations for the 
success or failure of the gate. From this he does not prove or disprove the correctness 
of Lapp and Powers tree but indicates there is a need for a better understanding of how 
the gate 7 subsystem works. In the second paper Lambert [4] suggests changes to the 
Lapp and Powers fault tree synthesis algorithm in order to make the process simpler 
and more understandable. 
The changes being: 
1. Modelling noise in the negative feedback loop operator 
2. Dropping the use of the "EOR" operator 
The modified NFBL operator considers all external disturbances entering the loop. 
The sign of the external disturbance is determined by finding the net normal system 
gain from the disturbance to the loop variable being developed. The simplified 
operator cannot describe failures of nested NFBL's or multiple NFBL's affecting the 
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same variable. In most engineering applications the cut sets generated using an "OR" 
gate are basically the same as those for the "EOR" gate since the complemented events 
are true with high probabilities and therefore reduce from the final minimal cutsets. 
The last paper to solely comment on [1] is Yellman [5] who puts forward a similar 
argument as the previous papers that gate 7 should have been an "OR" gate instead of 
a "EOR" gate. Andow [6] points out difficulties that can arise in the use of Lapp and 
Powers algorithm. For example in systems where reverse flow occurs: 
1. Feedback loops appear in the digraph but are not control loops in the usual 
sense 
2. Digraphs can contain loops within loops. Lapp and Powers refer to this 
problem but do not define a solution 
Andow [6] also comments that none of the published algorithms to date are good 
enough for widespread use, indicating there is still a need for further testing and 
improvement. 
Allen and Rao 1980 [7] suggest that to simplify the construction of the digraph only 
the direction of the gains be considered instead of both the direction and magnitude as 
used in [1]. Also, that the gains be restricted to the values +1, -1 and 0. An algorithm 
for the fault tree synthesis similar to previous algorithms was introduced. The new 
algorithm laid down more complete rules on how failure events can only take the value 
0 and 1, thus preventing meaningless failures being present in the fault tree. The 
algorithm does not allow for the inclusion of the "EOR" gate, these gates have to be 
added to the fault tree after it has been constructed. 
Cummings, Lapp and Powers 1983 [8] showed how the digraph method could be 
applied to an electrical power distribution network. They compared the amount of 
effort needed to construct the fault tree using the digraph method with the reliability 
graph method. As the development of the reliability graph is non-algorithmic it 
requires a very good knowledge of the system as well as that of reliability engineering. 
On the other hand the digraph method is a structured method with specialised 
operators. So the fault tree is constructed by following well defined rules. 
Allen 1984 [9] proposed that if the rules given in [1] for constructing a digraph are 
rigidly followed, artificial descriptions of systems can be obtained. To show this, a 
simple example was given that produces a digraph with a spurious negative 
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feedforward loop. To avoid this problem he treats the digraph as an information flow 
diagram where nodes can represent deviations in state variables. The paper concludes 
by suggesting that to reduce time and expense a series of computer programs could be 
used to transform directly from the digraph to the cut sets without the drawing of the 
fault tree but offers no complete algorithm to do the task. 
Kumanoto and Henley's paper 1986 [10] concentrates more on loop disturbances and 
how they propagate through the system. However their developed algorithms for one 
NFBL and one NFFL are identical to those of Lambert. They also developed 
algorithms for digraphs with two or more NFBL and digraphs with NFBL's and 
NFFL's. The operator for two NFBL's was developed by considering four types of 
Global Disturbances (GLD) that pass through the two loops : (L, L), (L, M), (M, L) 
and (M, M). Where L denotes large, M denotes moderate, and the global disturbances 
are written as (L, M) which implies that the global disturbances is large for loop 1 and 
moderate for loop 2. To illustrate the use of the two loop operators a simple two loop 
system was considered, which is shown in figure 2.13. 
FC5 FC9 
00 
(4 8 
O1 O2 O3 © 10 
Air-to-close Air-to-close 
Figure 2.13 System with Two Control Loops 
The method used in this paper is to create a disturbance table using disturbance 
analysis and the digraph. Disturbance analysis is carried out by classifying each event 
as a Global Disturbance (GLD) or a LCD (Local Disturbance :- Zero-gain events 
which do not effect the controlled variable in a NFBL, or zero-gain events or reversed- 
gain events in the corrective branch). Then classify each of these GLD's as moderate 
or large for each loop. For each moderate GLD in a loop, identify every Zero Gain 
Event (ZGD), such as valve stuck, which makes the loop inactive for the moderate 
GLD. Shown in figure 2.14 is the digraph for the system in figure 2.13, the two 
negative feedback loops can clearly be seen. 
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Figure 2.14 Digraph of Two Loop Control System 
Using the disturbance analysis the disturbance table for the two negative feedback loop 
control system is constructed to give table 2.1. 
device failure mode label NFBL1 NFBL2 
GLD flow line PI high GL I M(1) M(2) 
controller 5 high set point GL2 L M(2) 
controller 9 high set point GL3 M(1) L 
valve 5 reversed GL4 L M(2) 
valve 9 reversed GL5 M(1) L 
LCD valve 5 stuck Z1 
valve 9 stuck Z2 
Table 2.1 Disturbance for Negative Feedback Control System 
From the table it can be seen that there are five GLD's and two LCD's. Also that the 
second disturbance GL2 is large for loop 1 but moderate for loop 2, which means that 
loop 1 is automatically failed by GL2, but the resulting controlled variable deviation 
can be corrected by loop 2. In table 2.1 the numbers in the parentheses for each 
moderate GLD are the LCD's which inactivate the loop. 
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Figure 2.15 Operator for a Two NFBL System 
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The Kumamoto & Henley [10] operator for a two NFBL system is shown in figure 
2.15, using this operator and the disturbance table, a fault tree can be constructed for 
the simple system as shown in figure 2.16. 
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Figure 2.16 Fault Tree for the Two Loop NFBL System 
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The fault tree has nine minimal cut sets, eight of order two and one of order three. 
The cut sets are: [GL2, Z2], [GL2, GL31, [GL2, GL5], [GL4, Z2], [GL4, GL3], [GL4, 
GL5], [GL3, Zl], [GL5, Zl], [GLI, Z1, Z2]. An actual schematic operator was not 
explicitly given for digraphs with NFBL's and NFFL's a set of rules were given instead. 
1. If a GLD is a large loop disturbance, the GLD cannot be corrected by the loop. 
2. If a GLD is a moderate loop disturbance, some other disturbances must coexist 
to make the loop incapable of correcting the GLD. There are two cases: 
(i) If the loop is a NFBL, the additional disturbance required is either a 
large GLD or a ZGD. The ZGD should not be located downstream of 
the moderate GLD. 
(ii) If the loop is a harmful GLD or a ZGD or a RGD (reversed gain event 
i. e. controller reversed) in the corrective branch. The harmful GLD is 
defined as a biased disturbance to the corrective branch between the 
starting node (exclusive) and the controlled variable (inclusive). 
In the paper the approach was demonstrated on the nitric acid cooler problem 
introduced by Lapp and Powers [1]. The digraph is different to that of Lapp and 
Powers, firstly only the direction of the gains and not their magnitude is considered, 
secondly the digraph includes a representation of the response of the operator to 
abnormal temperatures. Also details of the effects of instrument malfunction is 
considered. Disturbance analysis is carried out on the system and a disturbance table is 
constructed, showing three NFBL's and one NFFL. Then using the disturbance table 
and the rules for the operator the fault tree for the nitric acid cooler is constructed. 
The fault tree produces 27 minimal cut sets of which two are incorrect. The cut sets 
are corrected by associating the disturbance that fails the corrective branch of the loop 
operator with the failure of the pump. 
The paper concludes that it is not possible to produce simple, unambiguous, computer 
algorithms to transform digraphs into fault trees. In order to use the synthesis 
operators that can be coded it is necessary check all control loops in the digraph and 
classify them as NFFL or NFBL, then to classify each failure mode as GLD, LCD, 
large, moderate, zero gain, and reverse gain. Automated methods should only be used 
in conjunction with manual techniques and at this stage no automated method can be 
completely relied upon to always give the correct minimal cut sets. 
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Koda and Henley 1987 [111 introduce a method for obtaining all minimal combinations 
of conditions which cause a specified deviation at a node. In general these 
combinations will be the minimal cut sets of the system. The main difference with this 
method is that the fault tree is never constructed, the minimal cut sets are calculated 
from the digraph. The main steps of the basic algorithm are: 
1. Identify all control loops 
2. Identify all possible disturbance situations 
3. Find abnormal conditions for corrective control loops to obtain the object 
conditions in the form of logical "AND" combinations of a disturbance 
situation and its necessary corrective-related control loop malfunction 
4. To find the minimal combination of conditions select minimal combinations 
of abnormal conditions among the condition list obtained in (3) 
Each of these steps is split down further in to a number of rules. 
The main drawback of this method is that it is based on the digraph approach and 
therefore has all the difficulties of the digraph method, the method is also complicated 
to apply. 
Andrews and Brennan 1989 [12] applied the digraph method to a gas regulation 
system which had a complex nested control structure. When conventional operators 
are applied to complex nested control loops, the fault trees created are not always 
logically correct and therefore do not give the correct minimal cut sets. Therefore two 
new methods were discussed to tackle complex nested control loops. 
The first method was based on engineering knowledge of the system and the 
information on the digraph. The usual approach was taken at the start, i. e. all loops on 
the digraph were found and classified. The fault tree was constructed in the normal 
manner until a control loop was encountered. Now as process variables can only be 
manipulated or changed by the control devices, the control devices were considered as 
opposed to the whole loop structure. The control device whose action contributes to 
the top event is identified and the causes of this action are then traced. This method 
creates an expanded operator applied to the loops nested on each control device. The 
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development of each of the branches is completed by tracing the deviations in the 
process variables which manipulate the control device. 
In the second method the operator was in terms of the failure modes of each control 
loop structure as opposed to the loop components in conventional methods. Therefore 
when the operator is applied the tree contains failure modes for each control loop, 
which are tackled using the conventional operators developed by Lambert. The two 
methods produced identical minimal cut sets for each top event. 
The paper concludes that the digraph is a good structured manual technique but is not 
yet ready for automatic fault tree construction. The main problems occur in the 
following areas: 
1. The limitation on the five states do not allow the distinction between a zero 
level and a very low level of a process variable. 
2. The distinction between controllable and uncontrollable disturbances is difficult 
to define in a consistent manner. 
3. It is difficult to ensure the correct identification of loops in the digraph. 
Chang and Hwang 1992 [13] developed new operators for different configurations of 
control loops. Also as the identification of loops in a digraph becomes increasingly 
difficult the more complex the system, a preliminary computer algorithm has been 
introduced to overcome this difficulty. The generalised operator for feedforward loops 
is shown in figure 2.17. 
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Generalised Operator for Feedforward Loops 
To describe the special behaviour of NFBL more accurately two extra states are 
introduced in addition to the usual 5 states. The definition of the new states is the state 
of the variable which would have a value +1 (or -1 depending) without feedback but 
does not appear abnormal at the new steady state due to the regulatory action. New 
operators have been introduced for NFBL's and also for when the NFFL and the 
NFBL have common nodes. There are different operators for when the starting node 
of the NFFL is on the NFBL and when the terminal node is on the NFBL but the 
starting node of the NFFL does not he on the NFBL. These operators have not been 
included. 
Shafaghi, Lees and Andow [14] 1984 described a method for fault tree synthesis based 
on the control loop structure. The proposed method is broken down into the following 
steps : 
From the flow diagram of the system the controlled variables are identified and 
the control loops are defined. 
2. A digraph is created for each control loop and for the system as a whole. 
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3. A connection table is created from the system digraph putting the information 
in tabulated form. 
4. For each loop the disturbances and faults are listed in a loop analysis table. 
5. The fault tree is created for a specified top event by creating a generalised 
fault tree for the control loop from the connection table. Then the specific fault 
tree is derived from the generalised fault tree and the loop analysis tables. 
This method differs from most as it is based on modelling the system structures rather 
than units and the method is only a manual one. 
2.3 Decision Table Based Methods 
The use of the decision table method for the construction of fault trees was introduced 
by Salem et al. [27], [28]. A computer package called CAT (Computer Automated 
Tree) [29] was produced in 1978 that implements the decision table approach to 
produce automated fault tree construction. In the package numbers represent the 
system and failure states, which are broken down into distinct categories. An example 
of this is shown in table 2.2 and table 2.3. 
State Definition 
-1 Don't care (signal state irrelevant or 
undefined) 
0 No signal, or signal too low 
1 Normal signal 
2 Overload (signal too high) 
3 Low signal (used if separate states are 
desired for 'no' and 'low' signals) 
101 Ground (zero) or short to ground 
102 Floating (open, undefined) 
Table 2.2 Representative Systems States 
Table 2.2 shows the numbering scheme that represents the system states and table 2.3 
shows the numbering of the general failure categories. 
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State Definition 
-1 Don't care (internal mode irrelevant) 
0 Good 
1-1000 General faults 
1001-2000 Electrical (shorts, surges, etc. ) 
2001-3000 Mechanical 
3001-4000 Fluid (leak, rupture, plugged, etc. ) 
4001-5000 Electronic (logic errors, etc. ) 
5001-6000 Human 
6001-7000 Environmental (temperature, pressure, etc. ) 
Table 2.3 General Failure State Categories 
Two methods of developing decisions tables are described in the papers. The first 
method of construction generates the decision table by systematically enumerating all 
possible combinations of input states and internal modes and then finding the 
appropriate output state for each combination. This method creates a complete but 
complex decision table. 
Row 
Input 1 
Main Flow 
Input 2 
Power 
Internal 
Mode Output 
1 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 4 0 
3 0 0 5 0 
4 0 1 0 0 
5 0 1 4 0 
6 0 1 5 0 
7 1 0 0 0 
8 1 0 4 0 
9 1 0 5 0 
10 1 1 0 1 
11 1 1 4 0 
12 1 1 5 0 
Table 2.4 Original Decision Table of Pump 
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The second method considers all possible output states and traces these back to all the 
possible inputs states. This method although not as simple as the first allows the 
analyst to concentrate on the outputs of most interest. The main disadvantage of the 
method is that as it is not as systematic as the first, so some important entries may be 
left out of the completed table. Therefore if this method is to be used it is important 
that a completeness check is made. 
As an example of how a decision table is constructed using the inductive method, the 
decision table for a pump is constructed in table 2.4. The first step is to identify all 
possible input states and internal modes for the component. In the case of the pump, 
there are two inputs, one internal mode and one output. 
Input 1: main flow (pressure) input 
0= no / low pressure 
1= normal pressure 
Input 2: power input 
0= no power in 
1= power in 
Internal mode : condition of pump 
0= pump in good condition 
4= pump fails to start 
5= pump fails to run normally 
Output : main flow output 
0= no / low pressure out 
1= pressure out 
The initial decision table is constructed by listing each combination of input states and 
internal modes, along with the output state that results. For example row 10 shows 
that if there is normal pressure in, the power is on and the pump is in working order 
then there is normal pressure out. The rest of the rows in the table can be explained in 
a similar manner. The decision table in its present form can be used as input to the 
CAT code, but to save extra computer time and calculations it is better to reduce the 
table using don't care states. The rule for the reduction of the decision table using 
don't care states is, if several rows have identical output, input and internal states 
except for one input or internal mode, and if the exception 
includes all possible states 
that can occur, then the rows can be combined into a single row with a don't care state. 
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Row 
Input 1 
Main Flow 
Input 2 
Power 
Internal 
Mode Output 
1 0 -1 -1 0 
2 -1 0 -1 0 
3 1 1 0 1 
4 -1 -1 4 0 
5 -1 -1 5 0 
Table 2.5 Decision Table for the Pump 
Using don't care states the complete decision table for the pump is shown in table 2.5, 
where -1 in the table denotes the don't care state. If the event to be considered is no 
output from the pump, then this event is found in the output column of the table. In 
this case rows 1,2,4 and 5. Now as any of these rows can cause the desired output, 
they are connected by an "OR" gate. If there is more than one entry in any of the 
rows, not counting the don't care state, then these entries are connected using an 
"AND" gate. When if there is only a single row entry this is added to the fault tree and 
may be a primal event or an event that needs to be expanded later if it is an output 
event from another component. In this case the 4 rows of interest only have one entry 
each (other than -1) so they are just added to the fault tree using an "OR" gate. On the 
other hand if the output of interest was pressure out, then from the table there is only 
one entry in the output column and this row has three inputs. So these inputs would 
be connected together using an "AND" gate. 
A deficiency with the computer package CAT is that it has not got the facility to find 
and deal with control loops. 
Han, Kim, Choi and Yoo, 1988 [30], extended the work carried out by Salem et al. 
[29] using the CAT methodology. The features that they added included the 
following: 
1. Small systems modelled by a super component concept 
2. Common cause failure (CCF) modelling 
3. Modularization scheme for fault tree construction 
4. Reliability data base 
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The AFTC package which they developed has a decision table library for all the most 
commonly used components. The format of the decision tables that are stored in the 
library is shown in table 2.6. 
LIB VV 
IN VV OUT 
1 -1 0 
-1 3 0 
1 0 1 
VV 3 1. OE- 
3 
END 
LIB OR 2 
IN1 IN2 OUT 
1 -1 1 
-1 1 1 
0 0 0 
END 
Table 2.6 
1113 
our 
10 Valve closed 
013 
IN1 
OUT 
IN2 
Examples of Decision Tables 
The first part of the table shows the decision table for a valve, while the second section 
introduces an "OR" type junction. Line 1 describes the name of the library, number of 
inputs, internal states of component, outputs and number of lines in the actual decision 
table. Line 2 gives comments on inputs, internals and outputs. Then the usual format 
of the decision table follows. The numbers in the decision table define the states as 
follows: 
Input 0- no Input/Output 
Output 1- Input/Output exists 
Internal 0- Normal state 
>0- Fault/Failure of component 
_1 Don't 
Care 
The fault tree can then be constructed from the decision table in the usual manner. 
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To input the topology of the system under consideration to the AFTC code a flow 
diagram is used. An example of the structure of the flow diagram is shown together 
with the system in figure 2.18. 
2 
4 
vi 
Jl 
3 
V2 
Flow diagram for the system 
31 OR 231 
V1 VV 42 
V2 VV 43 
Figure 2.18 Flow Diagram for a Sample System 
The flow diagram stores the information that JI is "OR" type and receives two inputs 
from nodes 2 and 3, and produces output to node 1. Node 2 receives input from node 
4 through valve V 1, similarly with node 3 and valve V2. 
The procedure for the construction of the fault tree from the flow diagram is as 
follows: 
1. Start from the top node, which is node 1 
2. Find the component which produces output to node 1, which is J1 
3. Check the decision table for J1 
4. Develop the subtree for J1 
5. Check the input nodes for J 1, which are nodes 2 and 3 
6. Repeat procedures 1-5 for input nodes 2 and 3 of J1 
The method also introduces the idea of the super component model, which is similar to 
a flow diagram of a small subsystem. Basically the super component 
is for a group of 
components that occur regularly in systems. So instead of modelling each of the 
components separately they are modelled by a one component model, which reduces 
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time and effort. An example of the format of a super component is shown below in 
table 2.7. 
Super Component Library 
SUPER PAR-VV 1 
IN OUT 
OR -1 -2 
VV 1 -1 
VV 1 -2 
END 
Flow Diagram using Super Component 
PAR PAR-VV 12 
Table 2.7 Super Component 
Where 
Line 1- name and number of inputs and outputs 
Line 2- comments on the inputs and outputs 
The next 3 lines are the flow diagram description for the super component 
PAR-VV. 
The negative number represent nodes only used inside the super component and the 
positive numbers represent input and output nodes. 
The AFTC method is good for constructing fault trees which have many similar types 
of components because of the super component facility. However throughout the 
method there has been no mention at all on the subject of control loops. Individual 
control loops could be modelled as a super-component though nested loops would 
then not be catered for. 
Wang and Liu 1993 [44] built on the decision table method introduced by [27] using 
extended decision tables to model component functions. The extended decision tables 
appear to have no facility for detecting control loops or circuits. 
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2.4 Other Methods that use Component Models 
2.4.1 Failure Transfer Functions 
The component failure functions used by Fussell 1975 [40] describe one mode of 
failure for a component. The method is solely aimed at dealing with systems that 
contain electrical circuits, and has not been used to deal with control loops. The 
failure functions may consist of as many as seven parts and can be represented as mini- 
fault trees that are not system dependent. Fault tree construction is obtained by linking 
together the failure transfer functions. 
2.4.2 Functional Relationships 
Kelly and Lees 1986 wrote four papers [15], [16], [17], [18] introducing and applying 
the method of functional relationships to various system examples. Hunt et al 
continued the work and produced a further five papers [35], [36], [37], [38], [39]. 
The method creates mini-fault trees from propagation equations, initiating statements 
and modified decision tables for each component or unit. Then the fault tree for any 
top event is produced by linking together the appropriate mini-fault trees. 
A propagation equation describes the relationship between an output variable of a unit 
and the input and other output variables of the unit similar to the gain definition on a 
digraph. For example if z is an output variable and x and y are the two input variables 
which affect z such that an increase in x or a decrease in y causes z to increase, the 
function equation is: 
z=f (x, -y) 
The initiating statement represents the effect of a fault which initiates a sequence of 
disturbances. The form of the initiating statement is 
Fault : Variable deviation 
Decision tables are used instead of initiating statements if the system is complex. The 
decision table only gives the successful outcomes, for example the decision table for 
the relationship z= (A "AND" B) "OR" (C "AND" D) is shown in table 2.8. 
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ABCD OUTPUT 
TT**Z 
**TTZ 
Table 2.8 Decision Table for Relationship z= (A "AND" B) "OR" (C "AND" D) 
Where T= true and *= don't care 
In the method presented it is assumed that any event which is omitted from the 
decision table is a don't care event. 
The mini-fault tree is created from the propagation equation, if the mini tree is not 
complete the extra information is obtained from the initiating event statements and the 
decision tables. A mini tree obtained from the propagation equation will contain an 
"OR" gate, as "AND" gates can only be generated from initial event statements or 
decision tables. To illustrate how the mini-fault trees are obtained from the 
propagation equation consider the simple pipe shown in figure 2.19. 
Figure 2.19 Diagram of Pipe 
If we just consider one of the principal propagation equations for the pipe we may 
have: 
Q2oUT =f (GI IN, G2ouT) 
Where GLN and G20 T are the pressure gradients at the pipe end points and Q2ouT is the 
flow at output port 2. If we consider the top event Q2oUTLO in the pipe model then in 
the propagation equation as the two RHS variables are positive the input deviation 
must also be LO giving the mini-fault tree shown in figure 2.20. 
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Figure 2.20 Mini-Fault Tree for the Top Event Q2 ourLO 
As the mini-fault tree derived from the propagation equations is not always complete, 
the initiating event statements and the decision table, for relationships, may be needed. 
There are two initiating event statements for the pipe namely, 
F PART-BLK: Q2ouTLO 
F LK-LP-EN: Q2oýLO 
Where PART-BLK and LK-LP-EN are abbreviations for partial blockage and leak to 
low pressure environment. The completed fault tree using these initial events is shown 
in figure 2.21. 
Q2 LO 
OUT 
OR 
G1 LO G2 LO PART- LK-LP-OUT 
BLK EN 
Figure 2.21 Complete Fault Tree for Top Event Q2 ouTLO 
As more information can be added to the mini-fault trees than can be contained in the 
propagation equations, propagation equations can not be mapped from mini-fault trees. 
The unit models used in the method consist of a collection of mini-fault trees that are 
stored in tabular form. The format of the table for the mini-fault tree shown in figure 
2.21 can be seen in table 2.9. 
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Q2 
OUT 
LO 
Base events Top event Gate 
V GIINLO T Q2OUTLO OR 
V G2OUTLO 
F PART-BLK 
F LK-LP-EN 
Table 2.9 Table for the Mini-Fault Tree in Figure 2.21 
In order for the method to deal with control loops, the loops need to be identified 
manually and all the relevant information needs to be given as input to the programs. 
The program contains special control loop models which have predefined branches for 
the different modes of loop failure. There are three models for dealing with control 
loops: 
1. Controlled variable deviation in either feedback or feedforward loops 
2. Manipulated variable deviation in feedback loops 
3. Manipulated variable deviation in feedforward loops 
The main drawback with this method is that all loops have to be found and identified 
manually which for a complex system with many loops is a difficult and time 
consuming task. 
The method has been coded into a suite of computer programs which carry out fault 
tree synthesis from the mini trees of the unit and event models. The computer program 
is called FAULTFINDER and has been tested on four examples: heat exchanger 
system, reactor system, distillation system and computer controlled pump system. 
2.4.3 Macro Fault Trees 
Poucet and De Meester 1981 [19] proposed a method that splits the system into macro 
components. A macro fault tree is constructed for each macro component. The 
appropriate macro trees are then joined together to give the overall system fault tree. 
The program has a library where fault tree structures for different failure modes of 
macro components are stored. The stored module for macro components can easily be 
amended by the analyst to incorporate any changes that may be needed. The models 
are stored by the use of tables. As shown in table 2.10, each table represents one 
macro component. 
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Each node or gate is represented by a variable, the variable has TOP 
three parts: the first is the node name, the second is node type 
OR 
and a table that contains pointers giving the addresses of all the 
elements connected to that node. So for this example the node p2 
name is TOP, the type of gate is "OR" and the pointers are p2, p3 
p3 and p4. p4 
Table 2.10 
Poucet 1990 [23] built on the ideas in the original paper and introduces the STARS 
(Software Tool for the Analysis of Reliability and Safety) package. This system is 
based on an expert system so the analyst can be aware of how and why the results are 
being obtained. The fault tree construction is in three steps. Firstly the system is 
described by a functional flow diagram or a P&ID, secondly macro fault trees are 
constructed using the information entered. Finally the macro fault tree is developed 
further expressing the basic events using the information about the component 
characteristics. STARS has a component knowledge base which contains component 
characteristics for different types of components and knowledge on the way 
components behave in different states. 
2.4.4 Mini-Fault Trees 
Taylor 1982 [20] proposed a method which also used mini-fault trees. The algorithm 
takes a top event from a particular component. Then component mini-fault trees with 
this top event as output are found in the library module and added to a failure tree. 
The mini-fault trees are checked to see if any event needs to be developed further, then 
the fault tree is constructed by connecting together all mini-fault trees. Each mini-fault 
tree describes the effect, in terms of component state change and component output 
resulting when an input or a spontaneous event occurs. The events in the mini-fault 
trees are expressed as < variable > BECOMES < value >, and a condition as < variable 
> IS < value >. Table 2.11 shows how the mini-fault trees are represented in tabular 
form, and is the transition table for a control valve. 
The rows of the table represent an input event and the columns a condition. As the 
table represents a control valve, the rows are input pressures, the columns are valve 
positions and the elements are output pressure. 
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Xis Xis Xis Xis Xis Xis 
ZERO LO DISTLO NORM DISTH HI 
AL 
Pi -> - -3 -ý -ý -4 -3 
ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO 
- -9 -9 -9 
Pi --> LO LO or LO or LO or LO or LO 
DISTLO DISTLO DISTLO DISTLO 
Pi -3 - -9 -> -> --9 -3 
DISTLO DISTLO DISTLO DISTLO DISTLO DISTLO 
Pi -3 - -3 -3 -3 -3 ---> 
DISTHI DISTHI DISTHI DISTHI DISTHI DISTHI 
-4 -9 -9 -4 -4 
Pi -> HI - HI or HI or HI or HI or HI 
DISTHI DISTHI DISTHI DISTHI 
Pi - - VHI VHI VHI VHI VHI 
VHI 
Table 2.11 Transition Table for a Control Valve 
An equation bigraph for the component is drawn in which a square represents each 
equation and a circle each variable. A line is drawn from the variable node to those 
equation nodes corresponding to equations in which the variable appears. Arrows are 
marked on the lines of the bigraph to produce a cause-effect graph. 
The method also deals with control loops. Feedforward loops are identified from the 
cause-effect graph whenever there are two non-cyclic paths in the graph from one 
variable node to another. There is a feedback loop in a system when there is a cycle in 
a cause-effect graph for the system. The loop is negative if a disturbance along one 
path is reduced or negated by the effect of disturbances along a second path. Once the 
loop has been identified, special mini-fault trees are introduced for those components 
which serve to reduce or eliminate disturbances in the NFBL. With these new mini 
trees and slight modifications in the fault tree construction algorithm a completed fault 
tree may be produced. The algorithm deals with loops on a component by component 
basis rather than a loop by loop basis. These techniques were developed into the 
computer package for fault tree construction called RIKKE. 
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2.4.5 Causal Trees 
Bossche 1985 [21] proposed an algorithm that uses component models that allow fault 
propagation in two directions upstream and downstream. In the component model all 
relations for the normal state are recorded, but for all other states only those that do 
not conform to the normal state are recorded. The system model consists of three 
tables: the component table, the table of environmental variables with range indicators 
and the configuration table. A complete description of the system is provided by the 
component models and the three tables. The method uses causal trees to find 
feedforward and feedback loops. The structure of the causal tree is very similar to that 
of the fault tree. There are two different types of node used in causal trees. The first 
is an unconditional node showing that each incoming branch is able to cause one of the 
events indicated by the node parameter. The second is a conditional node showing that 
all incoming branches are required to cause the events indicated by the node parameter. 
The paper also distinguishes between three types of variable : 
1. Environmental variables (EN), indicating environmental effects on the system 
2. Component variables (CO), which are variables used in component models 
3. System variables (SY), for the interconnection of components and 
environmental variables 
The nodes of causal trees are divided into three groups : 
1. non-loop nodes 
2. nodes that belong to one or more feedback loops 
3. nodes at which two branches of a feedforward loop meet 
For non-loop nodes an unconditional node of the causal tree translates to an "OR" 
gate, similarly conditional nodes translate to "AND" gates in the construction of fault 
trees. Only unconditional nodes appear in feedback loops, nodes on the feedback path 
are developed as non-loop nodes, which is similar for the feedforwad path but for large 
deviations (±10) only. For moderate deviations (±1) in the forward path of a feedback 
loop an operator is given. An operator is also given for when a node where two 
branches of a feedforward loop meet. 
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The component models are made up of propagation relationships that show the effect 
of one variable on another and the magnitude of the effect. 
The method introduced in [21] is further developed in Bossche 1991 [31], [32], [33]. 
The method constructs fault trees in two steps. Firstly a causal tree is constructed 
showing the propagation paths for all basic events leading to deviations in the top 
parameter. From the causal tree all loops are identified and traced to see if they 
prevent some faults from reaching the top parameter. Secondly the fault tree 
describing the top event is obtained from the causal tree. 
The fault propagation is described by relations between variables or by relations 
between variables and component states. The general form of the relation is shown in 
figure 2.22. 
effect cause 
conditional variable 
component state 
Figure 2.22 Propagation Relationships 
Where the propagation factor can take the values: 
(+ 1) positive relationship between variables 
(-1) negative relationship between variables 
(0) to indicate that under the given conditions the normal relationship is broken 
When fault propagation is considered in two directions, the relation between the two 
related variables, such as voltage and current or pressure and flow, depends on the 
direction of the failure propagation with respect to the direction of transport (current 
or mass flow). The relation is positive for downstream failure propagation and 
negative for upstream failure propagation. The method incorporates the two related 
variables into a single twin variable with the subscript p for the potential variable and t 
for the transport variable. 
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Propagation 
factor 
All of the information is stored in component and system models, the component 
models contain a set of relations for each state. A component has one normal state and 
any number of failed states, only relations for the normal state and for all states that do 
not conform to the normal state are considered. A simple example of a component 
model for a control valve is shown in table 2.12 where CO represents the component 
variables. 
State Relation direction Condition Order of 
of transport introduction 
1 Normal C02t(w) -+1: - 1 
Colt(w) 2 
C02t(w) < -1 C03(w) 
2 Stuck C02t(w) <0 C03(w) - 3 
3 Closed C02t(-10) - 3 
4 Open C02t(-10) - 3 
5 Reversed C02t(w) <-I C03(w) - 3 
Table 2.12 Component Model for a Control Valve 
If a twin variable appears on the left side of column 2 the cause is situated upstream 
and if it appears on the right the cause is situated downstream. In the table above the 
twin variables are CO2 and CO I. 
The system model contains a list of all components, all of the environmental variables 
affecting system performance and a component interconnection scheme describing the 
system configuration. 
As with the digraph method this method is split into two distinct stages, firstly the 
construction of the causal tree then all control loops in the causal tree have to be 
traced prior to the fault tree construction. 
2.4.6 Input Output Tables 
Cheng, Wei & Yuan 1992 [24] build on the idea introduced by Lapp and Powers [1] of 
using input/output (I/O) tables. Uunlike Lapp and Powers [11 who use their I/O tables 
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to draw the digraph, in the new method the fault tree can be constructed straight from 
the new 110 tables. The new UO tables first list all the states of the unit under study by 
means of a failure mode and effect analysis, then describe the relationship between the 
in-variables and the out-variables. 
To explain more clearly how an 110 table is constructed consider the air-to-open 
control valve shown in figure 2.23. 
P3 
3 Where P is pressure 
M is mass flow 
PI 
IV 
- P2 
M1 
1 Control 2 M2 
T is temperature 
T1 Valve T2 
air-to-open 
Figure 2.23 A Control Valve 
The I/O table is constructed by firstly classifying all failure modes and failure states of 
the component as either CFs (Conditional Failures) or UCFs (Unconditional Failures). 
Where CF is a failure whose occurrence together with the deviation of a specific in- 
variable cause the deviation of a specific out-variable and UCF is a failure whose 
occurrence alone can cause such a deviation. A state of a unit may either be Normal 
(i. e. good), a CF or a UCF. The control valve has four in-variables: P l, MI, TI and 
P3, and three out-variables: P2, M2 and T2. There are six failure modes, two CFs and 
4 UCF's. The CF's are REV (reversed action) and STK (stuck) and the four UCF's are 
CV-F-HA (fails high), CV-F-LA (fails low), CV-F-OP (fails open) and CV-F-SH (fails 
close). The deviation of a variable is signified by one of five distinct states, the states 
and their definition being exactly the same as used by Lapp and Powers [1], also the 
input variables and the output variables are listed in the same manner. The domain 
column of table 2.13 lists each of the in-variables possible deviations. 
The new 110 tables appear to store the information in a similar way to the decision 
table method. The paper states that the domain column lists each in-variable and its 
possible levels of deviation. Unfortunately the examples given in the paper do not 
include any different deviations in the domain column. If the design of the I/O table is 
primarily to save storage space in the data base then why include the normal deviations 
in the domain column, it would be more efficient to just include deviations which differ 
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from the normal. Also if storage space is so important it is obvious that there is no 
relationship between the in-variable pl and the out-variables M2 and T2, so why store 
a zero in the corresponding columns. Another important point is that the paper makes 
no mention as how to deal with loops. Automatic fault tree construction is 
straightforward if there are no loops in the system, most problems occur when the 
loops are encountered. There seems to no method to detect any loops in a system. 
Unit 
states 
Parameter P2 M2 T2 Domain 
Normal Pl +1 0 0 +10 -10 -1 +1 0 
Ml 0 +1 0 +10 -10 -1 +1 0 
Ti 0 0 +1 +10 -10 -1 +1 0 
P3 0 +1 0 +10 -10 -1 +1 0 
CF: 
REV P3 0 -1 0 +10 -10 +1 -1 0 
STK P3 0 0 0 +10 -10 +1 -1 0 
UCF: 
CV-F- 0 +1 0 00 
HA 
CV-F- 0 -1 0 00 
LA 
CV-F- 0 +10 0 00 
OP 
CV-F- 0 -10 0 00 
SH 
Table 2.13 I/O Table for Control Valve 
This again is similar to the decision table approach which on its own had no facility for 
finding and classifying control loops. 
2.4.7 Model and Library Based Methods 
De Vries 1990 [22] developed a new method for automatic fault tree construction for 
electrical circuits. The method AFTGM (Automated Fault Tree Generation 
Methodology), unlike most previous methods has the facility to incorporate the time 
parameter. Like other methods a component library is used to store component 
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models. The basis of the method is to represent the circuit with a graph, where the 
vertices represent circuit nodes and the edges represent circuit legs. The graph is then 
decomposed to solve the problem of handling loops and to break the problem down 
into smaller pieces. This results in the circuit being divided into sub-circuits that are 
now treated as individual components. Backtracking is done by a circuit analysis 
program such as SPICE (Simulation Program, Integrated Circuit Emphasis). 
Backtracking considers one component at a time, going from output to input. To 
avoid excess time and calculations the program discards any sets that contain previous 
subsets that cause the top event as the tree is being constructed. A method for finding 
the current directions was proposed by following a set of distinct rules. The method 
has not yet been fully automated. 
2.5 Expert Systems 
Rich & Venkatasubramanian 1986 [24] introduce a prototype expert system called 
MODEX, which uses model-based reasoning together with a Knowledge base that 
facilitates process generality of the expert system. The flow of information is based on 
physical links between the components and causal relationships among process 
variables. The Knowledge base used by MODEX is represented by both frames and 
production rules. Frames are lists that represent structure and connectivity properties 
of objects. Production rules represent behavioural knowledge, which is of the form (IF 
< certain conditions are satisfied >, THEN < perform certain actions >). The working 
memory (WM) is a data base that contains the current state of the problem solving. 
The production memory (PM) contains the behaviour knowledge, which is stored as 
rules. Rules are selected from the PM and applied to the WM until there are no more 
rules to be executed. In MODEX the reasoning is based on the causal models that are 
represented as frames and rules. The Knowledge base has causal models of process 
units, information on how the components are connected, basic principles of the 
process such as conservation laws and a library of fault models of the process units. 
The method is being improved to try and incorporate the ability to diagnosis faults in 
transient processes. 
Waters & Ponton 1989 [25] build on the work done by De Kleer & Brown [26] to 
apply qualitative simulation to process plants to construct fault trees. The method is 
based on artificial intelligence (A. I. ) and provides a technique for reasoning about 
system behaviour in the partial or total absence of numerical information. The method 
in question is a bottom up method as opposed to the normal fault tree methods which 
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are top down methods. The main disadvantage with a bottom up method is that it 
explores all behaviours that are consistent with the initial state of the system and the 
input deviations, which can make the method much more combinatorial than normal 
fault tree analysis. Also many of the results may not be needed from a safety point of 
view. As the method is based on De Kleer & Brown it treats the problems as quasi- 
steady-state. The main other researcher on qualitative simulation, Kuipers 1986 [46] 
requires every variable to be a continuous function of time and this avoids this 
restriction. The basis of the method is shown in figure 2.25. Where the initial state of 
the system is described by all the initial states of the devices in the system. Using this 
information all possible deviations of the process variables may be found. 
There may be several sets of directions of change, in which case these sets are called 
global interpretations and each is considered in turn. The device state changes are then 
considered one at a time and the process is repeated with the system in its new state. 
The two stages of the method are known as finding intra-state behaviour and finding 
inter-state behaviour. The method is repeated until no new states can be found. 
Initial state 
Interpretation-1 Interpretation-2 Interpretation -N 
iz ) 
ý( 
\X-4 
New-state-1 New-state-N 
Interpretation-1 Interpretation-N 
Input deviations 
increasing in size 
Figure 2.25 The Structure of the Output from the De Kleer Method 
The directions of change are represented by difference variables, del(T), which can 
take the value +, 0 or -. Where del(T) indicates the deviation of the variable T and the 
values it takes are similar to the gains on the edges of digraphs. Device behaviours are 
represented by confluence equations. For example consider the resistance element 
shown in figure 2.26. 
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pl fl 
rl 
p2 f2 
r2 
p3 f3 
Boundary conditions: del(pl) del(p3) =0 
Find: del(f 1), del(p2) 
Figure 2.26 Two Resistors in Series 
Where p is pressure and f is flow. 
The qualitative simulation begins at element rl whose behaviour is described by the 
confluence equations: 
1. del(f 1) = del(p 1) - del(p2) 
2. del(f2) = del(f 1) 
When the first confluence is considered on its own there are 13 valid combinations for 
the difference variables del(f I), del(p 1) and del(p2). When the second equation and 
the boundary condition del(p 1) =+ are also considered, 5 partial interpretations are 
produced: 
(del(p 1) = del(p2) = de1(f 1) = +, del(f2) = +) 
(del(p 1) = del(p2) = del(f 1) = 0, del(f2) = 0) 
(del(p 1) = del(P2) = del(f 1) = -, del(f2) = -) 
(del(p 1) = +, del(p2) = 0, del(f 1) = +, del(f2) = +) 
(del(p 1) = +, del(p2) = -, del(f 1) = +, del(f2) = +) 
This is only for the local behaviour of rl, now the element r2 is introduced with the 
boundary condition del(p3) = 0. The partial interpretations are combined to create a 
single global interpretation: 
(del(p 1) = +, del(p2) = +, del(f 1) _ +, del(f2) = +, del(P3) = 0, del(f3) = 
which is the correct solution to the problem. 
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An algorithm generates local interpretations for each confluence, then for each set one 
is picked in the hope of creating the complete global interpretation. To check if the 
choice is correct a test is made on the difference variables to see if any have been 
assigned two different values. In this case we backtrack and make other choices for 
the confluences in order to end up with the complete global interpretation. When a 
complete global interpretation is found backtracking is instituted so all other 
possibilities can be found as well. 
As well as the confluence equations a set of relational equations is needed that must be 
satisfied within the state, for example the relational equation for the resistance element 
is [fin] _ [(pin - Pout)] 
Which has the following local interpretations: which is the same as: 
([fin] _ +, [Pin - Pout] _ +) (fin > 0. Pin > Pout) 
([fin] = 0, [Pin - Pout] = 0) (fin = 0. Pin = Pout) 
([fin] _ -, [Pin - Pout] = -) (fin < 0. Pin < Pout) 
The relational equation can be used to find the global interpretations but the method is 
very inefficient. A program has been written using Prolog to implement the qualitative 
simulation. A difficulty encountered with the program is the amount of time it takes to 
run simulations. The problem being the number of combinations that have to be 
produced and then discarded. If the package is to become practical there needs to be 
some method of reducing the number of combinations. The number of combinations is 
partly dependant on the order in which the confluences and rational equations are 
solved. Unfortunately for anything other than a straight section the best path to take 
to solve the system is usually not known. So for most systems that contain either 
branching points or loops the number of combinations can not normally be reduced. 
The authors are currently pursuing research on trying to mix the top down and bottom 
up approaches to create a mixed method. They hope to achieve this by Ä. I. tools 
contained within a tool kit such as knowledge craft. 
Xie, Xue and Xi 1993 [34] developed a method for fault tree construction making use 
of Artificial Intelligence techniques. The package called TREE EXPERT is designed 
as a software tool to work with the skilled analyst in order to help the analyst work in 
a more efficient manner. 
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The method uses a knowledge base which is split into to distinct levels. Level one is 
the generic knowledge base which describes the information at the component level, 
while the second is the system-specific knowledge base which contains information at 
the system level. The generic knowledge base (GKB) is a component library which 
includes information on all common components. The library entry for a specific 
component may need to be modified as only a general component is stored, this can be 
done by the GKB editor. For each component the following items are considered : 
1. component icon 
2. component definition table 
3. knowledge tree 
The component definition table contains the information on the component, i. e. (I/O) 
descriptors, failure modes, support systems and operating modes. The knowledge tree 
contains all the logical relations between its input and output parameters and failure 
modes. The production rules in the knowledge tree are not in the normal format of IF 
() THEN ( ), but are organised in the form of a fault tree. As well as the usual event 
types there are extra events that are included in the knowledge tree. 
CDT conditional gate 
DEU upstream developed event 
DED downstream developed event 
The conditional gate is used to keep or eliminate sub-trees depending on the operating 
states specified in the system-specific knowledge base. The DEU and DED denote the 
externally developed events, where upstream is towards the input leg and downstream 
the output leg. 
The System-specific knowledge base (SKB) describes where the components are 
located and how they work. The SKB is split into two main parts. The first part is the 
P&ID, this is built up on the screen using a graphics editor. The internal relationships 
between components are created at the same time as the user connects the components 
on the screen. The second part consists of a data base which includes component state 
information for the system. The software also includes a program that prompts the 
user for any additional information about the components when the P&ID is being 
constructed. 
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The heart of the software package is called the inference engine which has three main 
functions: 
1. To obtain a top event to start the inference engine 
2. Local inference is performed for a component by going through the 
knowledge tree for the component during which all the details of the 
fault tree are generated 
3. Perform global inference which is to go through the P&ID which 
generates the main logical stem of the fault tree 
In the TREE-EXPERT all the information for fault tree construction i. e. GKB and 
SKB can be created or modified by the user. TREE-EXPERT contains in the library 
components in use in nuclear power plants, but new components can be created and 
added to the library. The system description is input into the package by drawing a 
P&ID using a graphics package with two pop-up menus, the command menu and the 
icon menu. Once all the information has been entered into the package, to start to 
construct a fault tree a top event is defined. 
TREE-EXPERT appears to be a complete software package and will help the safety 
analyst construct fault trees more accurately and efficiently. One concern is that there 
was no mention of how the package deals with control loops or circuits which is the 
main issue at the moment. 
Smith, Schwarzblat and Baker 1994 [43] introduced an expert system PC fault tree 
aide (PC-FTA) that is very similar to TREE EXPERT [34]. The information for each 
component consists of a component type code and description. The models for the 
component's behaviour comprise a set of IF/THEN type rules, associated with 
component type. The paper makes no mention on how the method detects, classifies 
and deals with control loops or circuits. 
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2.6 Summary of Main Categories 
2.6.1 Digraph Based Methods 
The digraph method is a good manual technique as it requires the analyst to obtain an 
in depth knowledge of the system. The algorithms that construct the fault trees from 
the digraph are not yet rigorous enough to be built into a computer package with 
complete confidence that the fault trees produced give the correct minimal cut sets. 
The main disadvantages with the technique are: 
1. As the number of variable states is limited to five there can be no distinction 
between a zero state and a very low state 
2. If the digraph is used to model electrical circuits there are too many states and 
inconsistent logic rules 
3. The digraph can not model reverse flows in chemical process systems 
4. Difficulty sometimes encountered determining the normal states for some 
systems 
5. For complex control systems the task of manually constructing the digraph is as 
time consuming as producing the fault tree directly 
The main advantages with the technique are: 
1. The ability to detect and classify control loops and circuits by multiplying the 
relevant gains on the loops/circuits 
2. To draw a digraph an analyst needs an in depth understanding of the system in 
question 
3. Manual fault tree development is performed in a well structured systematic way 
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2.6.2 Decision Table Method 
The main disadvantages with the method are: 
1. A large decision table library for all the most frequently encountered 
components needs to be constructed and stored 
2. The decision table method has no facilities for the detection and classification 
of control loops or circuits 
3. Fault trees that are constructed using this method are very large compared with 
fault trees for the same system produced using the digraph method. The reason 
for this is that the decision table fault trees contain working states i. e. NOT 
failed states which leads to the use of NOT logic. To give the analyst a better 
understanding of the real structure of the trees and to reduce their size it is 
better if the working states are deleted from the trees 
The main advantages with the decision table technique are: 
1. That there are no limits on the number of states the process variable can take, 
so systems can be modelled in more detail 
2. The method is a very logical, flexible and structured method which therefore 
could lend itself to the possibility of automation 
The rest of the approaches encountered all have advantages and disadvantages, the 
main disadvantage is that most of the methods do not have the ability to detect and 
classify control loops. The methods that do posess this ability can not be relied on to 
produce a fault tree that when analysed will have the correct minimal cut sets. Most of 
the methods have been developed to be applied to chemical control systems and do not 
contain operators appropriate for application to the electrical circuits that are found in 
railway safety systems. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
To date, no one method can be totally relied upon to produce a fault tree which when 
analysed contains the correct minimal cut sets for control systems. It was decided to 
consider two of the main methods which have been found to exhibit desirable features 
with the aim of producing a new approach capable of dealing with the circuits found in 
railway safety systems. For future extension of the method it is also desirable to have 
the ability to detect, classify and deal with control loops. The main advantages with 
the digraph method is its ability to deal with loops and circuits. This is a feature 
required for railway systems and was therefore considered as worthy of future 
investigation. As the digraph methods have mainly been applied to chemical 
processing plants or systems not rail systems, the method was going to be applied to 
two simple rail systems that did not contain control loops to investigate its potential for 
automation. The second method that deserved more consideration was the decision 
table method. Its main advantage for the railway systems being its flexibility which 
included no restriction on the number of states that variables can take. Other 
advantages of the decision table technique is that from the decision tables the fault tree 
can be constructed using a well defined algorithm. The main drawback to the method, 
is in its present form there is no facility for the detection or classification of control 
loops. 
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Chapter 3 
Application of the Digraph and Decision Table Methods 
to Examples of Railway Safety Systems 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of the project is to produce an automatic fault tree construction method, 
which has the capability of being applied to railway safety systems. After researching 
the present methods available the digraph and the decision table methods were selected 
as having some positive features which made them worthy of further consideration. 
These desirable features were the flexibility of the decision table method and the means 
of detecting, classifying and analysing control loops, using operators in the digraph 
method. To investigate these features further the two methods have been applied to 
two simple railway safety systems. The Train Detection system and the Train Stop 
system. 
3.2 The Train Detection System 
3.2.1 System Description 
To lessen the risk of collision between trains, the track is divided into sections whereby 
two trains are not allowed to occupy the same section of track at any one time. To 
insure this a train detection system is incorporated on each section. The running rails 
of each section are electrically isolated from the sections on either side by insulation 
blocks, such a section is illustrated in figure 3.1. When a track section is unoccupied, 
electric current flows around the circuit and energises the track relay which causes a 
green signal, allowing trains to enter this section. If a train is in the section, the leading 
wheels and axle, being made of steel, provide a short circuit between the tracks. 
Therefore the relay is de-energised causing the signal to display red until the train has 
left the section. If a train attempts to enter an occupied section the Train Stop located 
at the signal causes the train brakes to activate. On automatic trains there is equipment 
to detect whether track circuit current is flowing or not. If a flow is not detected in the 
section the emergency brake would be applied. 
In the analysis presented here failure of the insulating ends between sections were not 
taken into consideration- The system shown in figure 3.1 is for the situation when 
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there is no train in the section and so the signal is on green. When a train is present in 
the section the first axle is represented by line 3 in figure 3.1. It is considered here that 
no train present will represent the normal case when there will be no current path from 
line 2 to line 3. If there is no train and a closed circuit there is current to the relay 
which energises the relay coil, the contacts then make the connection to the green bulb. 
G1 and G2 are independent power supplies for each circuit. 
GI 
Train Axle When Present 
Track Circuit 
Contacts Green 12 
G2 
Red 
11 
Signal Circuit 
Figure 3.1 Train Detection System 
3.2.2 Decision Table Method Applied to the Train Detection System 
The decision tables that are needed for the construction of the fault tree for the Train 
Detection system are shown on the next page. 
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'STATE" O1C 02M 
CWC EN 
NC - NC DE 
-F NC DE 
I1C °.; STATE O1C 
C w C 
NC W NC 
Table 3.2 Tconnector linlout 
-I1C 12C STATE 01C 
c - w c 
- c w c 
NC NC - NC 
Table 3.3 Tconnector 2inlout 
C - W NC C 
NC - - NC - 
_ C - - C 
NC NC - - NC 
C - AC C - 
- NC AC - 
NC 
Table 3.4 Axle 
IIC STATE OIL 02C 
CW ON C 
-F OFF NC 
NC - OFF NC 
Table 3.6 Bulb 
11C STATE O1C 
C W C 
- F NC 
NC - NC 
Table 3.7 Generator 
I1C I2M STATE O1C 02C 
C EN W C - 
C DE W - C 
NC - - NC NC 
- DE - NC - 
- - F NC NC 
- EN W - NC 
Table 3,8 Contacts 
62 
If the system contains loops and a fault tree is constructed using the decision table 
approach, a method needs to be developed to determine when the construction of the 
loop branches terminate. Therefore when a fault tree is under construction before 
adding any gate a check is made with all previous gates on the branch for a repeated or 
inconsistent event. This method needs to be set out in a list of logical rules to ensure 
that an algorithm can be developed with the view to automation. The new method will 
be explained here in order to use the developed rules on the decision table construction 
of the fault trees for the two railway safety systems in this chapter. 
The Identification of Repeated and Inconsistent Events 
Before any rules can be developed on how to deal with repeated and inconsistent 
events, these events have to be identified prior to their addition to the fault tree. A 
method of labelling each event being expanded in the fault tree must be constructed. 
The method used to identify each event/gate in the fault tree is a text string that holds 
the name and number of the component being dealt with. Then depending on how 
many variable state matches are found in the appropriate output column of the 
components decision table either ROW and row number or COL and column number 
are added. If there is more than one match then the COL and column number are 
added, the column numbers having been defined to start at zero. The identifiers that 
contain the text ROW are only constructed if the row in question contains an entry in 
any of its inputs as opposed to just an entry in the state column. If there is just an 
entry in the state column then the failure or working state is just added to the fault tree. 
To explain in some detail how the identifiers are constructed consider figure 3.2 which 
shows the top structure of the fault tree for the Train Detection system with the top 
event "green bulb off when there is no train present in the section". 
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GLOFF 
OR 
GBF BulbG Row3 
Contacts Co10 
OR 
Contacts Row3 j Contacts Row4 CSF 
Figure 3.2 Top Structure of the Fault Tree for the Top Event 
"Green Bulb Off when there is No Train in the Section" 
The construction begins by looking for the variable 'OFF' in the output column zero of 
the decision table for the green bulb, table 3.6. From the table there are two matches 
in rows 2 and 3, and therefore the first gate of the fault tree is an OR gate. The two 
matched rows are expanded one at a time, as row 2 only contains an entry in the state 
column no identifier is needed and the basic event is added to the tree. As row 3 has 
an entry in the input columns an identifier is constructed, the identifier will be 'BulbG 
Row3' as the component name is 'BulbG' and the row being dealt with is the third. The 
variable to be expanded is NC, from the topology of the system output column 0 of the 
decision table for the Contacts (table 3.8) needs to be searched. As there are three 
matches with the variable NC the identifier is constructed. In this case since there is 
more than one match the identifier is built up using the component name and column 
number to give 'Contacts Col()'. Each of the three rows where the matches were made 
are dealt with in turn. 
Before each new identifier is added to a branch of the tree a check needs to be made to 
see whether the identifier is a repeated or inconsistent event. When each identifier is 
compared if there is a complete match then there is a repeated event, no variables need 
to be tested. If there is a match apart from the last number then there may be a 
repeated or an inconsistent event, the variables need to be checked. 
If the variable output from the component is in the same output column then this 
variable only needs to be compared and if there is a match then the event 
is a repeated 
event and if not the event is an inconsistent event. For example consider the two 
identifiers 'RELAY ROW 1' and 'RELAY ROW 2t, from the decision table for the relay 
in table 3.1 if the output for both identifiers came from line 6, i. e. the first output 
column, then the variable would 
be current (C) and no current (NC) and hence the 
event would be an inconsistent event. 
On the other hand if the output for the second 
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identifier came from output 2, the Contacts, then the output variables could not be 
compared as they are from different components. In this case the input variables are 
compared ignoring any don't care states. So the only variables to he compared are 
from the first input column, namely current (C) and no current (NC). Again this gives 
an inconsistent event. 
Rules for Dealing with Repeated and Inconsistent Events 
1. For a repeated event the branch of the tree where the second event occurred is 
terminated and the next son of the gate is expanded. The gate whose son was 
terminated is not deleted even if it now contains only one input. 
2. For an inconsistent event which is an input to an AND gate, the branch of the 
tree is traversed upwards until an OR gate or the identifier where the match 
was made is encountered. Then the branch is terminated at this point and the 
next son of the gate where the termination has taken place is expanded, again 
the gate is not deleted. 
3. Inconsistent events to an OR gate are dealt with in exactly the same way as for 
a repeated event. 
After the tree has been constructed the tree is traversed deleting all AND or OR gates 
that only have one son or one basic event as input. 
Consider the top event of interest to be that the "green bulb is off when there is no 
train present", then following the decision table method the output variable OFF is 
searched for in the decision table for the bulb. As there are two matches in the table, 
namely rows 2 and 3 an OR gate is added and then these rows are expanded in turn. 
This procedure is continued until all branches end with basic events or repeated and 
inconsistent events are encountered. In the construction of the fault tree the new rules 
for the detecting and handling of any repeated or inconsistent events were applied to 
give the completed fault tree shown in figure 3.3. 
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The minimal cut sets for the fault tree are: 
1 LE12F 6 LE9F 11 RYF 
2 GR2F 7 GR 1F 12 CSF 
3 LE6F 8 LE 1F 13 BGF 
4 LE7F 9 LE2F 
5 LE8F 10 LE4F 
The other top event of interest is "red bulb off when there is a train present", i. e. when 
there is a connection between line 2 and line 8 in figure 3.1. The fault tree developed 
using the decision tables for this event is shown in figure 3.4. The prime implicants for 
the fault tree are : 
1 LE12F 
2 GR2F 
3 BRF 
4 -LE12F -GR2F CSF 
5 -LE6F -LE7F -LE8F -LE9F -GR1F -LE1F -LE2F AEAC -LE4F 
-RYF -CSF 
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Figure 3.3 Fault Tree for Top Event 
"Green Bulb Off when there is No Train Present" 
RYF 
CSF 
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Figure 3.4 Fault Tree for Top Event "Red Bulb Off with a Train Present" 
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3.2.3 Digraph Method Applied to the Train Detection System 
The Train Detection system was also modelled using the digraph method. Again the 
modelling was considered as two distinct systems, one with the train present and one 
without the train. This method of dealing with the Train Detection system simplifies 
the construction of the digraph by cutting down on the number of conditional edges 
needed. In the digraph construction each system is again broken down into two sub- 
systems: the track circuit and the signal circuit. These two sub-systems are linked 
depending on whether the relay is energised or not. For example if there is no train 
present and all the components in the track circuit are working then the relay is 
energised as represented by the variable taking a value greater or equal to zero. The 
completed digraph for the system considering no train present is shown in figure 3.5. 
The digraph has been constructed to be consistent with the failures considered when 
the system was tackled using the decision table technique. 
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-1 0 
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+ 1: MR <0 
_1 
RB RBF 
MR>0 
+1 
Figure 3.5 Digraph for Train Detection System when there is No Train 
From the digraph it can clearly be seen how the two sub-systems have been modelled 
separately. The digraph for the track circuit system is quite straightforward, each of 
the joins between components have been linked with a directed edge with a gain of +1. 
For example the gain on the direct edge between 14 and MR (the relay energised) takes 
the value +1 because an increase in the current in L4 will cause an increase in the 
magnetic field and energise the relay. The failures are also added to the digraph as 
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disturbances. The digraph for the signal circuit sub-system is more complex than the 
track circuit digraph as it contains conditional edges. In the digraph CG and CR are 
the current to the green and red bulbs respectively. The conditional edges between 112 
and CG are +1 given that MR >0 and 0 given that MR < 0, the first conditional edge 
translates into a gain of +1 if the relay is energised i. e. if there is no train and the rest of 
the circuit is working. The second conditional edge indicates that there is no 
relationship between 112 and CG if the relay is de-energised (MR is less than normal), 
the normal state is when there is no train. A disturbance is also added to the node CG 
to indicate that CG takes a low value when MR < 0. The other conditional edges are 
constructed in a similar manner to give the completed digraph. 
It can be seen from figure 3.5 that there is a loop 14 -ý 16 -ý 17 -. 18 -ý 19 -4 Il --) 12 
---> 14 but this loop does not have the correct characteristics of negative feedback or 
feedforward loops. This type of loop simply represents continuity of the electric 
circuit. 
The next step of the analysis is to construct the fault tree with the top event "green 
bulb off when there is no train present" from the digraph shown in figure 3.5. In the 
fault tree, events that have already been developed in the same branch i. e. repeated 
events are represented by the text RP'. Also events that are the same but in different 
branches have only been expanded once and are labelled I and 2. The complete fault 
tree is shown in figure 3.6. The minimal cut sets that are derived from the fault tree 
are: 
I LE7F 5 LE1F 9 RYF 
2 LE6F 6 GR1F 1() CSF 
3 LE8F 7 LE2F 11 GR2F 
4 LE9F 8 LE4F 12 L 12F 
13 GBF 
These minimal cut sets were exactly the same as those produced using the 
decision 
table approach. 
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OR 
CG<0 
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OR 
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OR 
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OR 
LERF 17< 0 
OR 
LE7F 16< 0 
OR 
LE6F 14< 0 
Figure 3.6 Fault Tree for Top Event "Green Bulb Off when there is No Train" 
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The second system represents the situation when a train is present. When constructing 
the digraph for this system an extra node needs to be added to represent the axle of the 
train. The extra node will be the link between the two nodes representing current in 
line 2 and line 8. The digraph also differs from the first as the directed edge between 
nodes 12 and 14 needs to be a conditional edge because there will only be a relationship 
between the two if the axle of the train is cracked. Also there are two directed edges 
between 12 and 13 one of them being a conditional edge, the conditional edge translates 
to if the axle is cracked in which case there is no relationship between the two nodes. 
The digraph for the sub-system, the signal circuit, does not change at all. The 
completed digraph for the system can be seen in figure 3.7. 
+1 
Figure 3.7 Digraph for the System with the Train Present 
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When the fault tree was produced from the digraph the minimal cut sets obtained were 
incorrect. The fault tree was inspected in detail to see why the incorrect minimal cut 
sets were being created. To understand the cause of the problem examine the top 
section of the fault tree shown in figure 3.8. 
RBOFF 
OR 
RBF CR< 0 
OR 
MR >_ 0 AND 
0 
112 <0 MR< 0 
O O 
Figure 3.8 Fault Tree for the Top Event RBOFF with the Train Present 
If we use the bottom up approach to find the minimal cut sets for the part of the fault 
tree shown in figure 3.8. We obtain a top event logic expression A+ AB + RBF, 
which can be reduced to A+B+ RBF using Boolean reduction. Therefore the branch 
of the tree that would have been expanded from the header MR <O is not needed as it 
is redundant. The digraph method doesn't recognise this and its inclusion means that 
the minimal cut sets for the fault tree were incorrect. The digraph method fails to 
recognise mutually exclusive events, i. e. it does not take into consideration NOT logic, 
so its failure to recognise failed states results in a structure of the tree that does not 
yield the correct minimal cut sets. The examples show that the digraph method can not 
be relied upon to consistently produce accurate fault trees for railway safety systems. 
On the other hand the decision table approach does use NOT logic because of this it 
has been able to model the systems accurately. 
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3.3 The Train Stop System 
3.3.1 System Description 
A feature of the London Underground Ltd (LUL) railway signalling system is the Train 
Stop. This device consists of a lever mounted at track level outside the right-hand 
running rail. The lever is provided at every signal and is raised when the signal is red. 
It is lowered automatically when the signal clears. If a train passes a raised Train Stop 
the lever strikes a receiver on the train which operates the tripcock. The tripcock 
contains a valve connected to the train line such that when the valve is opened the train 
line air pressure is lost, causing an emergency brake application. Therefore any train 
that passes a red signal will automatically be stopped. The tripcocks are provided at 
each cab end of all LUL trains and no train is allowed to run in service unless they are 
operative. A cam on the lever lifts the valve which allows the train line air to exhaust. 
The system definition used for the Train Stop is a general description encompassing 
the main features of this type of system. The type of pneumatic brake used on the train 
is the Westinghouse brake shown in figure 3.9. 
Reservoir 
Track wheel Brake shoe 
Figure 3.9 Westinghouse Brake System in the Braking Position 
Drivers brake valve 
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When the Train Stop is in the up position and hits the tripcock on the train the valve in 
the main brake pipe opens, hence the pressure in the pipe is vented to atmosphere. 
Now the auxiliary reservoir contains air at a higher pressure than that in the main brake 
pipe. This causes the brake valve piston to be forced upwards, allowing compressed 
air to enter the brake cylinder. The compressed air entering the cylinder causes the 
brake blocks to be pressed hard against the wheels. 
The system diagram is drawn in parts: the Train Stop and the compressed air line, 
figure 3.11, the tripcock and the brakes, figure 3.12 and system for opening the valves 
that raise and lower the Train Stop figure 3.10. At this stage failures in the Train 
detection system and compressors have not been taken into consideration. 
2 
Rl ýO 
O4 ttý 5G 
Figure 3.10 
RI/1 
0-c 
1 
O----c 
Relay diagram 
The train detection system would pass current into line 2 figure 3.10 when a train was 
in the track section and line 4 if the track is clear. SV1 and SV2 are the solenoids 
which operate the corresponding valves V1 and V2 respectively. The solenoids 
become energised when relay contacts R 1/ 1 or R2/1 are closed. 
SP 
av 
Figure 3.11 Train Stop System 
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Figure 3.11 shows the Train Stop, where Cl is the line compressor, when V2 is open 
the Train Stop is pushed down, when VI is open the Train Stop is pushed up. The 
spring is to make the system fail safe whereby if any of the valves fail or compression is 
lost the spring will lift the Train Stop. 
V3 
C2 14 
Piston 1& 
Reservoir 
Tripcock 
Piston 2 
Brake shoe 
17 
Figure 3.12 Tripcock System 
Figure 3.12 shows the tripcock system including the compressor in the train C2 and the 
main components of the brakes. 
3.3.2 Decision Table Method Applied to the Train Stop System 
The fault tree for the system constructed using the decision table method is shown in 
figure 3.13. The failure model for the spring and the Train Stop were incorporated 
into one single decision table as this modelled the behaviour of the components better. 
The dual decision table contains the failures for both components. Also the piston 1 
and the reservoir were modelled using one decision table. 
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The decision tables that were used to construct the fault tree are shown below: 
-"IiP 
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STATE OiP 
P w p 
NP W NP 
- FUP NP 
- FD P 
Table 3.9 Piston 2 
11P STATE O1P 
P W NP 
NP W P 
- FUP P 
- FD NP 
- C NP 
Table 3.10 Piston 1 
UP STATE O1P 
P W P 
NP - NP 
- F NP 
Table 3.11 Pi e 
I1C STATE O1C 
C W C 
NC W NC 
_F 
Table 3.12 
NC 
Line 
il k 2P STATE OI P 
C P W P 
- - FC NP 
- P FO P 
NC - W NP 
- NP - NP 
Tab e'3.13 Control Valve 
UP I2P STATE O1A 
P - W&- UP 
NP P W&- D 
- - FUP&- UP 
- - FD&- D 
NP NP W&W UP 
NP - W&F ST 
Table 3.14 Train Stop & 
Spring 
lip STATE 01P 02P 
PWpp 
NP W NP NP 
Table 3.15 Teonnector 1 in 2 out 
lip I2P STATE O1P 
Ppwp 
- NP W NP 
NP -W NP 
Table 3.16 Tconnector 2 in 1 out 
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1A' 'STATE" 01P 
ZwP 
LW NP 
- FO NP 
- FC P 
ab1ý .7 
Eýsca halve 
=IIA STATE O1A 
UP WL 
-FZ 
D-Z 
Table 3.19 Tripcock 
IiP STATE O1 P 
P W P 
NP W NP 
- F NP 
Table 3.23 Brakeshoe 
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Brakc Off 
OR 
Brakr Rc. w2 BEF 
AND 
NOT Pialcm2 CC40 
BEF OR 
Pistm2 Rawl PN2Fl/P 
AND 
Piatont Cd0 AND 
OR 
NOT NOT 
Pistool Rrnv1 PNIFD PNIC PN2F`D PN2FUP 
AND 
AND Tcm 1 Rcxv 1 
AND 
NOT NOT NOT 
PNIFUP PNIED PNIC 
NOT Valvri Cd0 NOT 
CR2F OR TRIF 
Valvc3 Rowl VE3FC 
AND 
AND Ti ,. od C olO 
OR 
NOT NOT 
VE3FC VE3FOT Trirc , ck Rrnv3 
Tm p CdO 
OR 
Tsýc, , Rrnv2 TPA 
AND 
Pi 
. 12Cd0 AND Pi 1? Rrnvl 
OR AND 
NOT NOT 
Pi . 12 
Rrnv2 PEI 2F AFT' TPA VaI% 2 Colo NOT 
Valvel Cd0 OR PEI aF 
OR 
Valve 2 Rrnvl V: ilvr2 Row? 
VEIFC Valvel Row4 ValveI Rows AND AND 
AND Tucm2 Rrn+"'_ 
AND Line? Rowl Týcm? RowI AND VE2F0 
li[r6 Cd0 AND AND AND 
TEn,? 
AND 
OR 
AND 
NOT Pi(a R CcdO NOT NOT 
NOT NOT T2F OR Rela Rcwvl NOT Pi rc"1 O Rcrvvl 
ý2FC VE2Row2l 
VE1FO VE! FC LH7F AND TýIF AND 
Relayl cow Pi R Row2 PERF 
Pi 
ýFoý 
R<M 1 NOT 
OR o ripI Rrnv2 IA: Rowt NOT NOT Tcm2 Rowl 
AND TR IF 
RY2F PI OF AND 
LFAF Tonu2 R<m-1 NOT Rda Row2 RYIF 
ý1F N 
PEIOF 
AND U; ix2 Rcwl PI , rR RAM 1 NOT 
AND TR2F 
LE2F 
Ir----"'" Pi R Rc. wl 
NOT NOT NOT AND 
Tr-'F 
CR1F PEXF 
NOT NOT 
CRIF PEHF 
Figure 3.13 Fault Tree for the Top Event Brakes Off 
The minimal cut sets that are obtained from the fault tree are: 
1 LE2F 5 PE 12F 9 PN 1 FD 
2 RY 1F 6 TPFD 10 PN 1C 
3 LE6F 7 TKF 11 PN2FUP 
4 VE1FC 8 VE3FC 12 BEF 
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All of these cut sets are minimal and sufficient to cause the top event. The 
construction of the fault tree was a straightforward task as no repeated or inconsistent 
events arose. 
3.3.3 Digraph Method Applied to the Train Stop System 
As the complete Train Stop system has been split up into 3 smaller sub-systems, it is 
easier to create a digraph for each of the sub-systems and then link the digraphs 
together by the deviations in variables. The digraphs are constructed using the same 
method as for the first example and are shown in figures 3.14,3.15 and 3.16. 
I2 +1 I3 +1 RB I4 +1 15 +l 6B 
+1 +1 
RI R2 
R1/1F 
v -7 
II 
xý: 
-1 
R2/1F 
+1 2(MSV1 
+1 
MSV2 
Figure 3.14 Digraph for Sub-System Shown in Figure 3.10 
In figure 3.14 the variable I1 represents the current to the relay contacts R1/I and R2/1 
The abbreviations used to indicate failure events on the digraph are: 
TKF tripcock failed 
R#/1F relay # failed V3FC valve 3 failed open 
C#F compressor # failed V3FC valve 3 failed closed 
V#O valve # open PN 1 FO piston 1 failed open 
L#F line # failed PN 1 FC piston 1 failed closed 
TSBR Train Stop broken P2FUP piston 2 failed up 
TSFO Train Stop failed open BEF brakeshoes fail 
SPB spring broken 
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The abbreviations for failures of valve 2 correspond directly to those listed for valve 1 
and the disturbances are mostly lines failing. 
MSVI<0 L1 2F 
-1 -1 TSBR 
+1: MSV1>0 l 
+1 
P9 P12 +1: P12, P13ý 
-1 
S 
P8 -l 
+1 O" 
j"A 
V1O 
-1 P10 
2 -1: Pl3>0, 'ýo 
+1 -1 P12<0 
C1F 
Pi l +1: 
MSV2>0 
P13 ST 
-1 
-1 -ý 
MSV2<0 
Ll3F SPB 
Figure 3.15 Digraph for the Train Stop System 
Figure 3.16 Digraph for the Tripcock System 
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As in the previous example because of the type of system being analysed there are no 
negative feedback or feedforward loops in the digraph. This simplifies the translation 
from the digraph to the completed fault tree as the loop operators need not he used. 
The construction of the fault tree starts with the top event, brakes fail to apply, and by 
examining the information on the digraph the disturbance is traced hack to all possible 
local causes. 
BRAKE OFF 
P17<0 
OR 
PNIC PNIFD P14>0 PN2FIJP BFF 
OR 
CR2F TC>0 
OR 
TS <0 TKF 
OR 
F- AND 61 TSB ANI) 
F- -1 
SPB OR G2 P12<0 
AND AND G3 
P12<0 P13<0 P12>_ 0 P13> 0 
P13>() 
V3 F(. -' 
Figure 3.17 Fault Tree for the Top Event Brakes Fail to Apply 
The fault tree shown in figure 3.17 has not been fully constructed as from the tree 
structure it can be seen that the minimal cut sets that the tree will produce are incorrect 
for the system. When the process variables P13 > 0, P12 > () from G3 are developed, 
these just develop to normal conditions which can be classed as being true. Therefore 
the gate G3 can be removed giving the second input to the OR gate G2 as true. This 
gives the minimal cut set for gate G1 as SPB i. e. spring broken alone. The event SPB 
is not however a minimal cut set for the system. The tree generated from the digraph 
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is incorrect, therefore the digraph method is not rigorous enough to automatically 
produce fault trees that have the correct minimal cutsets for the systems in question. 
3.4 Conclusion 
From the two train systems that have been worked through it has been made clear that 
the digraph method in its present form is not suitable for this type of system. The main 
reason for this which has been explained earlier is its inability to recognise mutually 
exclusive events. This problem leads to the construction of incorrect fault trees which 
produce corresponding incorrect minimal cut sets for the system. Another drawback is 
the difficulty in identifying the normal state for railway safety systems. On the other 
hand the decision table approach has dealt with both systems well producing fault trees 
that give the correct minimal cut sets. The main disadvantage with the decision table 
approach is its inability to detect and deal with control loops and circuits. It is also 
difficult to model circuits since repeated events are encountered in the fault tree 
development. The advantage with the digraph method is the ability to detect and 
classify control loops and then apply operators when nodes on the loops are 
encountered during fault tree construction. Therefore perhaps the best approach to try 
and automate might be to develop a cross between the two methods, trying to 
incorporate the good features of both methods. 
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Chapter 4 
Modelling Components, Control Loops and Circuits 
4.1 Introduction 
Certain situations result in faults traced during fault tree construction leading hack to 
themselves and thus giving circular logic. Two such situations are when electrical 
circuits or control loops are encountered. The objective of the work described in this 
thesis is to model railway safety systems. In the systems studied it has not been 
required to follow the fault propagation through control loops. However a broader 
objective is to lay the basis of a technique which, if successful in its application to 
railway safety systems, can be extended and developed to model chemical process 
plants. For future development the technique would therefore need to process a 
capability to model continuous process variables and fault propagation through control 
loops. This chapter shows how the decision table technique can be extended to model 
control loops and therefore its potential application to automatic fault tree 
development in other industries. In the modelling of railway safety systems and indeed 
safety systems from all industries electrical circuits will be encountered. It is shown 
how the decision table method can be used to efficiently model this commonly 
encountered situation. 
For systems which contain control loops it is required to identify their type and 
location prior to the fault tree development. Once all the loops have been identified 
the fault trees can be constructed by applying appropriate "operators" when the entry 
component in the loop is encountered in the construction of the tree. When a fault in a 
component is encountered which lies on a NFB (negative feedback) loop the operator 
developed by Lambert [4] is applied. Another operator for the NFF (negative 
feedforward) loop is applied if the fault being traced occurs at the output of the NFF 
loop. If the component fault to he dealt with in the fault tree enters the NFF loop 
anywhere other than the loop output then the tree is built up in the normal manner. 
Also a new operator has been introduced that is applied to electrical circuits. All of 
these operators eliminate the possibility of repeatedly tracing fault events round loops 
and circuits. A benefit of the application of all operators is also to reduce the size of 
the fault trees produced. 
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4.2 Component Modelling 
Definitions and Conventions of Possible Variable Types 
The topology file links the output ports of each component to the input ports of other 
components to build up the system. In order for faults to be traced through the system 
the code or label used to represent the process/system variable and its deviation must 
be consistent in each component model. 
The five main variable types that have been used in the modelling presented in this 
thesis are: 
1. Current 3. Pressure 5. Energised 
2. Flow 4. Temperature 
For the AFTCC program to trace the different types of variable through the decision 
tables during fault tree construction there needs to he a standard set of 
rules/conventions for the variable names and their deviations which appear as entries 'in 
the decision tables. The rules are easily explained by examining a completed decision 
table which represents the functioning/failure of some relay contacts, see table 4.1. 
The header row of the table indicates the number of inputs to the component, the state 
of the component and the number of outputs. For the input and outputs the variable 
traced along the connection is also indicated The output variable for both outputs of 
the relay contacts is current as abbreviated by "C". This indicates the variable type 
traced. The variable current can exist in one of two states, either current "C" or no 
current "NC". 
IlC 12M STATE 41C 02C 
C M W C - 
C NM W - C 
NC - - NC NC 
- M - - NC 
- NM - NC - 
- - F NC NC 
Table 4.1 Decision Table for the Contacts 
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Input column one of the table is the current into the relay contacts. The second input 
column represents the input from the relay, the relay is energised or de-energised. As 
there is only ever a single letter allowed in the header row inputs and outputs, the 
codes "EN" (energised) and "DEN" (de-energised) could not be used. Therefore a 
new code was added "M" (relay magnetised) and "NM" (relay not magnetised) as 
shown in table 4.1. 
There is no limit on the number of different states a variable can take as long as the 
variable code is limited to only three letters. For example for the continuous variables 
such as flow the standard six states are: 
VHF very high flow NF normal flow 
HF high flow LF low flow 
VLF very low flow 
ZF zero flow 
The difference between the variable states very high and high can he explained with 
reference to a control loop. The very high state is beyond the capabilities of the loop 
to control, where as the variable state high can be controlled by the loop. 
4.2.1 Format of the Decision Tables in the Library File 
The basic format of the decision table consists of the following: 
General component type 
Specific type 
Number of inputs, number of outputs, number of parts 
Gains associated with the relationship between input and output variables 
The headers for the main part of the decision table with their number and variable 
The decision table 
EXCLUSIVE row header 
Working state and all failures 
The first two lines in the decision table describe the component and its specific type for 
example, in row 1 valve and in row 2 air-to-open. The number of parts in the decision 
table represents the case when a system has more than one variable that may wish to he 
traced. For example the Nitric acid system in chapter 2 has decision tables that are 
split into two independent decision sections, one tracing the variable Flow (F) and the 
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other the variable Temperature (T). Instead of having two separate tables the tables 
are linked together to form one model in the decision table library file. 
The gain associated with the input and the output variables is entered in the decision 
table as either a "+" or a "-" depending on their relationship. For example when the 
input pressure is high (HP) then the output pressure is also high (HP) then the 
associated gain is "+". If circumstances mean that when there is a high input pressure 
(HP) producing a low output pressure (LP) the associated gain is "-" i. e. the change of 
the output variable with respect to changes in the input variable. When any loops are 
identified in the topology graph (see section 4.4) the sign of the gains are used to 
classify these loops as NFB, NFF or circuits. The heart of the decision table is then 
produced by logically building up all the possible combinations of variable states and 
then reducing the created table as much as possible using "don't care" states, a "don't 
care" state is represented by a "-" in the decision table. 
The "EXCLUSIVE" row in the component model is there to terminate the decision 
table part of the model. The row under the "EXCLUSIVE" row contains the working 
state of the component and a complete list of failure states. The working state is 
always the first entry in the row. As an example if we consider the decision table for a 
valve the "EXCLUSIVE" row for the valve may he: W, FO, FC, FS, where the codes 
FO stands for failed open, FC stands for failed closed and FS stands for failed stuck. 
This row is utilised when the fault tracing process produces the occurrence of a 
working state in the fault tree structure. Since the fault tree deals with failure events 
then for consistency the structure would be converted to take the form shown in figure 
4.1. 
AND 
F- I 
NOT NOT NOT 
VEFO VEFC VEFS 
Figure 4.1 Example of How to Deal With a Component in its Working State 
If an event was traced to failure as opposed to the working state then the failure would 
just he added to the tree as a basic event. 
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When a possible NFB loop or circuit has been identified from the topology graph of a 
system for a particular top event, if the overall gain on the loop is negative then it is 
classified as a NFB loop, but if the overall gain is positive then one more check needs 
to be made to decide whether the loop is an electrical circuit or not. For an electrical 
circuit the loop must contain a component that is a power source. Therefore a label 
must be included in the decision tables to indicate whether the component is a power 
source or not. If the component is a power source a "P" will be included in the third 
row of the decision table, the row that indicates how many inputs and outputs the table 
has. The "P" will be placed at the end of the row separated from the last number by a 
comma. Nothing will appear in the decision tables that are not power sources. 
Therefore if the loop is to be an electrical circuit one of the component decision tables 
on the loop must contain a "P" in its third row, otherwise the loop is neither a NFB 
loop or a circuit. 
4.2.2 Rules for Decision Table Construction 
To explain how a decision table for a component is constructed consider the Relay 
Contacts component in the Train Detection safety system. The first entry in the 
decision table is the name of the component. The second row is the specific type of 
that component. When the file that contains the decision table is only used for one 
particular system and the system only contains one type of Contacts component, the 
entry in the second row is not important. Since there are no variations for this type of 
component an entry of "NORMAL" is made. If a decision table library file is to be 
built up that contains variations of a type of component then the entry in the second 
row must be more specific. For example as different decision tables are needed 
for 
Contact components with a different number of inputs and outputs, the number of 
inputs and outputs to the component can he used to make up the second row specifier. 
As more and more systems are analysed by the automatic 
fault tree construction code 
(AFTCC) the decision table library file will hold more and more of the most commonly 
encountered components. In the event that a component 
decision table is not found 
during an analysis AFTCC stops and indicates which component 
has no entry in the 
decision table library file. 
The third row of the decision table contains in order; the number of 
inputs, number of 
outputs, number of parts to the table and 
in the case of a power supply the letter "P". 
The fourth row of the table represents the relationships between the input events and 
the output events. 
89 
The fifth row contains the input, state and output columns with the variable that is 
traced. Now the logical relationships between the inputs and outputs are developed. 
The method of construction of the relationships which appear in the decision table is 
firstly to decide how many different variable states are needed for each of the inputs of 
the component and how many different failures (component states) are to he 
considered. In this example there are two different states for the two inputs and only 
one failure state. The states for the inputs are for input one C (current) and NC (no 
current) and input two E (energised) and DE (de-energised) translated to M and NM 
respectively for notation purposes. The failure (F) of the Contacts component is when 
the Contacts fail so as not to make contact with either of the output positions. Now 
every combination of the different input variable states with the two component states 
W (working) and F need to be entered into the table. The easiest method of doing this 
so no combination of states are missed is to deal with a single component state e. g. 
working and then systematically enter all the different combinations of variable states 
of input two and input one. Once this is done the same combinations need to he added 
for each of the failure states of the component. 
IiC 12M STATE O1C 02C 
C M W C NC 
C NM W NC C 
NC M W NC NC 
NC NM W NC NC 
C M F NC NC 
C NM F NC NC 
NC M F NC NC 
NC NM F NC NC 
Table 4.3 Decision Table for the Contacts 
The decision table shown in table 4.3 illustrates the method used to enter all the 
combinations of input variable states with the working and failure states. The next step 
is to decide what entries have to he put in the output columns of the decision table. 
Consider the first row of the table, there is current from input 1 the Relay is energised 
and the Contacts are working, therefore the 
Contacts will he connected to output 
contact 1. So there will 
he C in the output column to contact 1 which is the first 
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output column of the table and hence NC in output column two, the output to contact 
2. The rest of the output columns of the table are constructed in the same manner to 
give the completed table. There is nothing logically wrong with the decision table 4.3, 
but reductions can be made in the size of the decision table by incorporating "don't 
care" states. The advantages of this are to reduce the size of the decision table so that 
it takes up less storage space in the decision table library file. But more importantly it 
will lead to minimal failure combinations in the constructed fault trees. This will 
produce a smaller fault tree structure which will require less processing to reduce the 
cut sets to minimal cut sets. 
The method that is used to reduce a decision table using "don't care" states is explained 
by applying it to the decision table in table 4.3. 
Step 1: Start with the first input variable and write out all rows of the table that have 
the same value, in this case: 
I1C-º C, M, W, C, NC 
C, NM, W, NC, C 
C, M, F, NC, NC 
= C, -, F, NC, NC C, NM, F, NC, NC 
Thus for 11 =C all possible combinations of the other input and state are considered. 
Now comparing inputs and outputs it is clear that when the component is failed thereis 
no current on either output regardless of the value of the second input. Thus row 3 
and row 4 can be combined to give C, -, F, NC, NC as shown above. Each of the 
different input and working states are dealt with in turn as shown below: 
HNC --f> NC, M, W, NC, NC 
NC, NM, W, NC, NC 
=> NC, -, -NC, NC NC, M, F, NC, NC 
NC, NM, F, NC, NC 
I2M--º C, M, W, C, NC = -, M, W, -, NC NC, M, W, NC, NC 
C, M, F, NC, NC 
-, M, F, NC, NC 
NC, M, F, NC, NC 
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I2NM -º C, NM, W, NC, C 
NC, NM, W, NC, NC 
C, NM, F, NC, NC 
NC, NM, F, NC, NC 
w-. 
F-' 
C, M, W, C, NC 
C, NM, W, NC, C 
NC, M, W, NC, NC 
NC, NM, W, NC, NC 
C, M, F, NC, NC 
C, NM, F, NC, NC 
NC, M, F, NC, NC 
NC, NM, F, NC, NC 
-, NM, W, NC, - 
-, NM, F, NC, NC 
NC, -, W, NC, NC 
-, -, F, NC, NC 
Entering the reduced equations into the decision table gives the table shown in table 
4.4. 
I1C 12M STATE QIC 02C 
C M W C NC 
C NM W NC C 
C - F NC NC 
NC - - NC NC 
- M W - NC 
- M F NC NC 
- NM W NC - 
- NM F NC NC 
NC - W NC NC 
- - F NC NC 
Decision Table 4.4 
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Some of the rows in the table may be further reduced so the check is made again and 
the only reductions that can he made are: 
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IlNC NC, -, -, NC, NC => NC, -, -, NC, NC NC, -, W, NC, NC 
F -+ C, -, F, NC, NC 
-, M, F, NC, NC F, NC, NC 
NM, F, NC, NC 
-, -, F, NC, NC 
A "don't care" state can replace the W state in row 5 of the table. The reason for this 
is as the inputs to rows 5 and 6 are the same, as is output column 2a don't care state 
can be added in the state column of row 5. No changes can he made to row 6 as there 
is an input in output column 1. The same method is used when rows 7 and 8 are 
considered to replace the working state in row 7 of the table with a don't care state. 
The last step that may reduce the decision table is to look for non-minimal 
combinations in the decision table for the different output variable states. As there is 
only one entry for C in both of the output columns no reduction can he made, for these 
rows. NC in output 1 has four causes: 
0 1NC-+ C, NM, W 
NC, -, - 
-, NM, - 
-, -, F 
The fault tree structure for NC in output column 1 of the Contacts is shown in figure 
4.2. 
NC Contacts Output Col I 
OR 
ANI) NC NM F 
F---4--7 C NM W 
Figure 4.2 Fault Tree Structure for NC in Output Column 1 of the Contacts 
93 
From the fault tree in figure 4.2 it can be seen that as the variable NM can itself cause 
the top event, anything in combination with this will be non-minimal. When the 
Boolean algebra takes place all the inputs to the "AND" gate therefore become non- 
minimal. The non-minimal cause can be deleted from the table. Therefore the entry 
NC in output column O1C row 2 of table 4.4 can be replaced with "-". If the same 
method is applied to the variable NC in output column 2 the result is that the NC entry 
in output column 02C row 1 can also he replaced with "-". The reduction of the 
decision table for the Relay Contacts is now complete and shown in table 4.5. 
I1C 12M STATE O1C 02C 
C M W C - 
C NM W - C 
NC - - NC NC 
- M - - NC 
- NM - NC - 
- - F NC NC 
Decision Table 4.5 
These rules are applied when any component decision table is constructed and added 
to the decision table library file. 
CONTACTS 
NORMAL 
2,2,1 
I1C 12M STATE O1C 02C 
CM W C - 
C NM W - C 
NC - - NC NC 
-M - - NC 
- NM - NC - 
-- F NC NC 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
Decision Table 4.6 
The decision table in table 4.6 shows the complete decision table in the format it 
appears in the decision library file. 
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4.3 Definition of the Control Loop Operators 
The two main types of control loops are the NFB loop and the NFF loop. A NFB loop 
has the ability to correct moderate disturbances in the sensed process variable. 
Lambert's [4] NFB loop operator considers the loop in its entirety and gives 
combinations of component failures and loop input disturbances which cause the 
output from the loop to deviate from its normal value. This is a different more concise 
approach than that developed by Lapp and Powers [1]. Lambert's NFB loop operator 
is shown in figure 4.3. 
Deviation of variable on 
negative feedback kup 
OR 
Noise drives Large or fast external 
pitive loop disturbances enter the loop 
unstable cause deviation of variable 
I on negative feedback loop 
AND 
Noise (true) Loop is positive 
(odd number of n possible devices reversed) inputs 
Mcxlerate external 
disturbances enter 
loop cause deviation 
in Imp variable 
OR 
Moderate external disturbances 
enter the Imp at node 
,j 
cause 
deviation in loop variable 
Moderate 
external 
disturbances 
enter at node j 
AND 
Uptream control 
devices from 
node j to node 1 
inactivated 
Figure 4.3 Lambert's Negative Feedback Loop Operator 
Unlike NFB loops, NFF loops can in theory correct a disturbance prior to its 
progression through the system. This is achieved by sensing an up-stream variable and 
manipulating a down-stream variable. A NFF loop can only cancel disturbances which 
enter at the component that starts the control loop. The NFF loop operator is shown 
in figure 4.4. 
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The two operators which take the form of mini-fault trees were developed for 
application to digraphs not to the system description or decision tables, therefore the 
operators refer to nodes, i. e. digraph nodes. 
output (value) 
OR 
inputs (values) corrective branches 
which do not of NFFL fail 
start the NFFL I 
AND 
input (value) 
which starts 
the NFFL 
corrective branches 
of NFFL fail 
OR 
devices are inactive devices are reversed 
on corrective branches on corrective branches 
Figure 4.4 Negative Feedforward Loop Operator 
4.4 Algorithm Used to Identify Control Loops 
AFTCC identifies and classifies control loops and circuits by forming a topology 
graph. The topology graph is a directed graph consisting of nodes and edges. The 
nodes represent specific values of specific variables for the component identified. The 
edges link the nodes such that those nodes directly below any other node contribute to 
their cause. The topology graph unlike a fault tree does not however indicate how 
these events need to combine. For a simple example of how to construct a topology 
graph consider the simple NFB loop system shown in figure 4.5. The system is a 
simple control system where flow enters the air-to-open valve and the rate of flow is 
detected by the sensor (SEN). Depending on whether the rate of flow is too high or 
too low a signal is sent to the controller (CONT) and the pressure from the controller 
to the valve is adjusted accordingly. 
96 
v aive 
A/O 
Figure 4.5 Simple System that Contains a NFB Control Loop 
The contents of the file that holds the topology information for the system are shown 
below. 
sensor normal 2 lvalve controller outputflow 
controller normal l lsensor valve 
valve air-open 1 2inputflow controller sensor 
The format of the topology information is explained in detail in chapter 5 section 5.2. 
The other information that is needed for the construction of the topology graph is the 
decision tables for the components in the system. The top event to he analysed in this 
example is "very low flow from the sensor". In the decision tables the variable state 
abbreviations that are used are: VH (very high), H (high), N (normal), L (low) and VL 
(very low) and the variable type abbreviations are: F (flow), S (signal) and P 
(pressure). 
To explain the entries in the gain rows of the decision table consider the decision table 
for the valve, table 4.9. The gain rows start in the fourth row of the decision table and 
depending on the failures of the component can take up any number of rows. The first 
gain row indicates the normal gain associated with the inputs and outputs of the 
component, for the valves' case the two normal gains are positive. If any failure modes 
of the component change any of the normal gains for the component then these new 
gains are included with the relevant failure. For example in row 5 the "valve reversal" 
(RV) causes a change in the sign of the gain associated with input 1 and output 1, even 
though the gain associated with input 1 has not changed it must he included in the 
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decision table. For the failure mode "valve stuck" (VS) a "0" is added in gain row 6 to 
indicate that the input from the controller input 2 has no affect on the output when this 
failure occurs. 
The construction of the topology graph starts with looking at the decision table which 
contains the output for the top event, in this case the decision table for sensor, table 
4.7. All the causes of VLF are searched for in output column 2 of the sensor decision 
table, there is only one match. The row where the match was made has the inputs VLF 
and W, during the construction of the topology tree all entries in the state columns of 
the decision tables are ignored as only the fault propagation through the system is 
required. Therefore the only input is VLF, which from the topology file can he seen to 
be an output from the valve. The same method is now applied to the decision table for 
the valve, table 4.9. 
When finding which variable states need to he traced from the matches in the decision 
tables any repetitions of the same variable state only need to he dealt with once. The 
construction of each branch of the topology tree continues until the system boundary is 
reached or a repeated component is added to the branch. Once this method has been 
successfully applied to the system in figure 4.5 it produces the completed topology tree 
shown in figure 4.6. 
02 VLF 
SENSOR 
I1 VLF 
O1 VLF 
12 VLP VALVE 12 NP 
12 LP 
01 VLP 01 NP 
01 LP 
CONTROLLER CONTROLLER CONTROLLER 
I1 VHS 11 HS 11 NS 
O1 VHS O1HS 01 NS 
SENSOR SENSOR SENSOR 
II VHF I1 HF II NF 
Figure 4.6 Topology Tree for the System in Figure 4.5 
The construction of a larger and more complex topology tree which contains circuits is 
explained in chapter five. 
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SENSOR 
NORMAL 
1,2,1 
+, + 
I1F STATE O1S 02F 
VHF W VHS VHF 
HF W HS HF 
NF W NS NF 
LF W VLS LF 
VLF W LS VLF 
B VLS - 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, B 
Decision Table 4.7 
CONTROLLER 
NORMAL 
1,1,1 
RV, + 
IIS STATE O1P 
VHS W VLP 
HS W LP 
LS W HP 
VLS W VHP 
SPTL VLP 
SPTH VHP 
B VLP 
VHS RV VHP 
HS RV HP 
LS RV LP 
VLS RV VLP 
NS - NP 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, B, SPTL , SPTH, RV 
Decision Table 4.8 
VALVE 
AIR-OPEN 
2,1,1 
+, + 
RV, +, - 
VS, 0 0 
I1F 12P STATE O1F 
VHF VHP W VHF 
VHF HP W VHF 
VHF NP W VHF 
VHF LP W HF 
VHF VLP W HF 
VLF VLP W VLF 
VLF LP W VLF 
VLF NP W VLF 
VLF HP W LF 
VLF VHP W LF 
HF V HP W VHF 
HF HP W VHF 
HF NP W HF 
HF LP W NF 
HF VLP W LF 
LF VHP W IIF 
LF HP W NF 
LF NP W LF 
LF LP W VLF 
LF VLP W VLF 
NF VHF W VHF` 
NF HP W HF 
NF NP W NI 
NF LP W LF 
NF VLP W VLF 
(' VLF 
- 0 VHF 
VHF - S VHF 
VLF - S VLF 
HF - S HF 
LF - S LF 
NF - S NF 
VHF VHP RV HF 
VHF HF RV IF 
VHF NP RV VHF 
VHF LP RV VHF 
VHF VLP RV VHF 
VLF VLP RV LF 
VLF LP RV LF 
VLF NP RV VLF 
VLF HP RV VLF 
VLF VHP RV VLF 
HF VHP RV LF 
HF HP RV NF 
HF NP RV HF 
HF LP RV VHF 
HF VLP RV VHF 
HF ZP RV VHF 
LF VHP RV VLF 
LF HP RV VLF 
LF NP RV LF 
LF LP RV NF 
LF VLP RV HF 
NF VHP RV VLF 
NF HP RV LF 
NF NP RV NF 
NF LP RV HF 
NF VLP RV VHF 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, C. 0, RV 
.S 
Decision Table 4.9 
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In the decision tables the failure abbreviation codes stand for: 
1. W -> Working 5. RV -> Reversed 
2. B -ý Broken 6. C -ý Closed 
3. SPTL --ý Set point to low 7.0 --> Open 
4. SPTH -ý Set point to high 8. S --ý Stuck 
From the topology tree for the top event all the possible loops and circuits can be 
identified. The gains relating input and output events for the components in the 
potential loops are used for the loop/circuit identification and classification. As a NFB 
loop and an electrical circuit have exactly the same characteristics on a topology graph 
apart from the sign of the total gain for the loop (as described below), only two loop 
detection algorithms need to be introduced, one for NFF loops and the second for 
NFB loops. The algorithm for the detection of the NFB loops is the simplest as it only 
involves scanning one branch at a time. 
4.4.1 Detection of Negative Feedback Loops and of Circuits 
The characteristic of a NFB loop is that it has the ability to correct moderate 
disturbances in the sensed variable. To identify a NFB loop from the topology graph a 
path must exist that starts and ends with the same component with a resulting negative 
product of the gains. If there is a path starting and ending at the same component with 
a positive overall gain it may identify a circuit. The branches of the topology tree are 
dealt with one at a time. Each node on the branch is compared with every other node 
on the branch for a match. To obtain a match three criteria must he met: 
a) The component name must match 
b) The input columns must match 
c) The output variable must match 
In this example from figure 4.6 it can he seen that there are three possible NFB control 
loops or circuits. The three possibilities are : 
1 I1V SENSOR->1IVHSCONTROLLER-> 12VLPVALVE--*I'VLFSENSOR()2VLF 
1 00 
2. I1HFSENSOR-4 I1HSCONTROLLER-4 12LPVALVE-4 IIVLFSENSOR0'2\n1 
3 I1NF SENSOR - I1NS CONTROLLER ->12NP VALVE -ý IIVLF SENSOR O'2VLF 
The possible loops now have to be classified as NFB loops, circuits or neither. This is 
where the gain contained in the modified decision tables is used. The relationships 
between the appropriate inputs and outputs for all the components on the loop are 
extracted from the gain row in the appropriate decision tables. The individual gains on 
the possible NFB loop are multiplied together to give the resultant gain on the loop. If 
the resultant gain is positive, this indicates that the loop is not a NFB loop as the 
overall gain on the loop would have to be negative. To check if the loop is a circuit 
the variable that is traced around the loop has to be a state of current and the circuit 
has to contain a power supply. If no power source appears in the loop or the variable 
is not a state of current then the loop is neither a NFB loop nor a circuit and no 
operator will be applied during the fault tree construction. Any repeated events which 
appear in the fault tree will be dealt with by the fault tree construction algorithm. 
As the controller is the only component in the system which has a negative gain, the 
resultant gain on all three of the loops is negative, indicating that they are all NFB 
loops. When dealing with other more complex systems that contain NFB loops, once 
all the branches of their topology tree have been traversed the resulting loops need to 
be compared against each other for duplicates. If two loops contain the same 
components with the same variable then they represent the same NFB loop and one of 
the loops can be discarded from the list. In this example as the three loops contain the 
same components and variables two of the loops can he deleted to leave one. The 
remaining NFB loop is shown below with the variable at each component and not the 
variable state. 
I1F SENSOR -> Its CONTROLLER -ý 12P VALVE -> I'F SENSOR ('2F 
4.5 Application of the Negative Feedback Operator to a Simple System 
A manual application of the NFB loop operator is applied to the simple NFB control 
system illustrated in figure 4.5. The top event for the construction of the fault tree is 
"very low flow from the sensor", the completed fault tree after the application of the 
NFB loop operator is shown in figure 4.7. 
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Sensor output very low flo 
G1 OR 
odd number 
devices reversed 
G2 OR 
CRRV VERV 
large external 
disturbance enter loop 
G3 OR 
VEC CRSPTL CRB 
moderate disturbance 
enters loop and loop inactive 
G4 ANI) 
low now VES 
into Valve 
Figure 4.7 Fault Tree for the Application of the NFB Loop Operator 
The top event is a deviation from a component on the NFB loop and so the NFB loop 
operator is applied to the system to produce the fault tree. The NFB loop operator 
shown in figure 4.3 is now applied to the system with top event VLF from the sensor. 
After the first "OR" gate is added to the fault tree the part of the operator headed 
"noise drives positive loop unstable" is dealt with. As noise is always present in 
systems its input to the "AND" gate is assumed to he true so only the other inputs need 
to be developed. This is achieved by finding out if the system contains any 
components whose failures can change the gain associated with component inputs and 
outputs. The gain rows in the decision tables are searched to see if any failures change 
the original gain from positive to negative or negative to positive. From the tables it 
can be seen that two components in the NFB circuit can fail reversed causing an 
inversion of the gain. These components are the valve and the controller. These two 
failures, CRRV and VERV, are therefore added as inputs to gate G2 of the fault tree. 
The next gate for development in the application of the operator is that which deals 
with large or fast disturbances that enter the loop and cause deviations of the variables 
on the NFB loop. In this case large external inputs and failures that can not be 
controlled are searched for in the decision tables. As there are no external inputs to 
the NFB loop only the component failures are of interest. Consider each component in 
turn, first the sensor. Output column two of the decision table for the sensor is 
searched for the variable state VLF. There is only one match for this event in the table 
which contains the component in its working state, therefore no entries are added to 
the fault tree for the sensor. As the gain between input 1 and output 2 of the sensor is 
positive the variable deviation that is traced round the loop remains the same. 
So 
output column one of the decision table 4.9 for the valve 
is searched for the variable 
state VLF, in this case a matched row only contains a 
failure VEC (Valve Closed). 
Gate G3 an "OR" gate is added to fault tree and the failure is included as an input to 
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the gate. As the appropriate gain in the decision table is positive the variable state to 
be traced remains "very low". The next component in the loon is the controller The. 
same method is applied to the decision table 4.8 for the controller searching for the 
variable VLP, in this case there are two failures, CRSPTL (controller set point too 
low) and CRB (controller broken), these two events are also added to G3. This time 
the gain between the input and output of the controller is negative so the variable state 
is changed from VL to VH and failures causing VHS are sought. No such failures 
exist which cause output 1 VHS for the sensor; entries to G3 are now complete. 
The last branch of the NFB loop operator is now developed. Gate G4 an "AND" gate 
is added with the inputs LF into the loop and inactive control devices. The gain rows 
of the decision tables are searched for any failures that cause a device to he inactive, 
for such failures a zero is entered after the failure in the gain rows. The only inactive 
device in the loop is the failure VES (valve stuck), this failure is added to G4 to 
complete the application of the NFB loop operator. 
4.6 Application of the Negative Feedforward Operator to a Simple System 
The simple example of a NFF control loop for the application of the NFF loop 
operator is shown in figure 4.8. 
IN I 
IN 2 
CONT Valve 
OUT 1 A/O 
IN I 
OUTI 
OUT 1 IN 2 
IN 1 
SEN 
IN 1 OUT 1 
OUT 2 
IYVVVVV 
Heat Exchanger 
lOUT 
2 
Figure 4.8 Simple System that Contains a NFF Control Loop 
The system is a simple control system where the sensor (SEN) monitors the 
temperature of the flow into the system and sends a high or low signal to the controller 
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(CONT depending on the state of the temperature. The controller then closes or 
opens the air-to-open valve which either increases or reduces the coolant entering the 
heat exchanger. The system contains three components which are common with the 
NFB system, namely the sensor, the valve and the controller. Since the valve is air-to- 
open its decision table is exactly the same as that given in table 4.9. Minor differences 
arise in the decision tables for the sensor and the controller. The normal gain 
associated with the input and output to the controller in this system is positive as 
opposed to in the previous system where it was negative. Therefore the gains need to 
be changed in the decision table and the entries in the table that contain the failure RV 
will now be replaced with the working state etc. For this system the sensor monitors 
temperature rather than flow producing changes to its decision table. The decision 
table for the heat exchanger is shown in table 4.10 below. 
HEATEXCHANGER 
NORMAL 
2,2,1 
I1T 12F STATE O1T 02F 
VHT VHF W HT VHF 
HT VHF W NT VHF 
NT VHF W LT VHF 
LT VHF W VLT VHF 
VLT VHF W VLT VHF 
VHT HF W HT HF 
HT HF W NT HF 
NT HF W LT HF 
LT HF W VLT HF 
VLT HF W VLT HF 
VHT NF W VHT NF 
HT NF W HT NF 
NT NF W NT NF 
LT NF W LT NF 
VLT NF W VLT NF 
VHT LF W VHT LF 
HT LF w VHT LF 
NT LF W HT LF 
LT LF W NT LF 
VLT LF W LT LF 
VHT VLF W VHT VLF 
HT VLF W VHT VLF 
NT VLF W HT VLF 
LT VLF W HT VLF 
VLT VLF W LT VLF 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
Decision Table 4.10 
As before the first step in the fault tree construction is to identify and classify all loops 
in the system for the top event of interest. In this case the top event 
is "very low 
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temperature (VLT) from the heat exchanger". The first step is to construct the 
topology tree. The completed topology tree is shown in figure 4.9. 
01VLT 
I1 VLT \LIITLT 
02 VLT 
SE C 
I1 VLT 11 LT 
01 VHF 01 HF 01 NF 
12 VH P VALVE 12 VHP VALVE VLP VALVE I2 NP I2 HP I2LP I2H 
2H 12N JL UNP 
01 VHP 
01 VHP 01 HP 01 NP 01 01 NP 01 L, P 01 VL 01 HP O1 N 01 LP 
CONT CONT CONT CONT CONT CONT CONT CONT C'ONT CONT CONY 
II VHS Il HS I1NS I1 VHS 11 HS Il NS 11 Ls I1VLS 11 HS I1NS I1LS 
01 VHS 01 HS 01 NS 001 VHS 01 HS 01NS OILS 01VLS O1 HS 01 NS OILS 
SE SE SEN SEN SEN SE SEN SEN SE SEN 
11 VHT I1 HT Il NT 11 VHT Il HT I1 NT I1 LT 11 VLT 11 HT 11 NT 11 LT 
Figure 4.9 Topology Tree for System in Figure 4.8 
4.6.1 NFF Loop Detection 
A NFF control loop features two paths in the system structure, a causative path and a 
corrective path. These features are identified on a topology graph by paths which 
progress upward from a common node which occurs on two or more branches and the 
upward paths converge at a second node. In other words there needs to he two or 
more paths between two components in the system. 
The rules for the method of detection are: 
1. Only deal with branches that have a common end node. 
2. For two branches with a common end node traverse up the topology graph to 
locate the second common node where the branches meet. 
3. The resultant gains on each path of the branches are then evaluated. If the 
resultant gains are of a different sign then the loop is a NFF loop, otherwise the 
loop can he discarded. 
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From the topology tree in figure 4.9 the common variables on each branch trace the 
same variable type, the variable states only differ. To save writing down all the 
possible NFF loops and then deleting any duplicates only one loop will he written 
showing the variable type. From the topology tree it is clear that there are two paths 
from the sensor to the heat exchanger as shown below. 
IIT SENSOR 1 T HEAT EXCHANGER OIT 
IiT SENSOR Its CONTROLLER -ý 12P VALVE -> I1F HEAT EXCHANGER O1T 
To determine if the loop is a NFF loop the resultant gain on the two paths need to be 
different. From the decision tables for the components the gains for each component 
on the two paths are: path 1 +, + and path 2 +, +, +, -, therefore the resultant gains on 
the two paths is positive for path 1 and negative for path 2, indicating that the loop is a 
NFF control loop. The negative gain on path 2 came from the relationship between the 
coolant entering the heat exchanger and the temperature state leaving the system. 
Since the fault tree traces the causes of an event representing a deviation at the loop 
output the NFF loop operator (figure 4.4) is applied to the system. The first step is to 
add the initial "OR" gate G1. This is developed by looking first at inputs which do not 
start the NFF loop but cause a VLT (very low temperature) from the heat exchanger. 
No single failures are found on the causative branch so looking on the corrective 
branch from the decision table for the valve there is the single failure VEO (valve failed 
open). Tracing around the corrective path an entry is also found in the decision table 
for the controller CRSPTH (controller set point too high). These two failures are 
added to a second "OR" gate G2. The decision tables are searched for failures that 
change the sign of the gains on the different paths and also inputs which do not start 
the NFFL which give the required output event. The second branch develops causes 
of the loop being inactive ANDED with low temperature into the loop. Causes for the 
loop to he inactive are provided by any failure that changes the gain on the two paths. 
From the decision tables it can be seen that there are three failures that can cause this: 
VES (valve stuck), VERV (valve reversed) and CRRV (controller reversed). The 
failures are added to the tree to produce the completed fault tree for the application of 
the NFFL operator which is shown in figure 4.10 
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Heat exchanger ouput temp very low 
GI OR 
input which do 
not start NFFL 
G2 OR 
I VEO CRSPTH ORG3 
G4 AND 
VERV G5OR 
F- I 
CRSPTL CRB SRB 
low temp into 1()()p 
and loop inactive 
G6 AND 
low temp G70R 
into loop 
CRRV VES VERV CRRV 
Figure 4.10 Fault Tree Produced by the Application of the NFFL Operator 
4.7 Circuit Operators 
There are two circuit operators described below. The first is applicable when the No 
Current situation is traced for a circuit 
and can be summarised as follows: 
This first operator is illustrated in figure 4.11 
1. A failure of any component in the circuit will cause the open circuit condition 
i. e. No Current. Therefore deal with all components in turn adding their 
relevant failure states to an "OR" gate. 
2. For each component the decision tables are checked to see if there are any 
external inputs to the circuit at that component. Any entries of NC in the input 
that traces the path around the circuit can he ignored as this just represents the 
circuit continuity. External inputs must then be examined. If the external input 
is any state of the variable current then this external is inconsistent and can be 
ignored. Otherwise the external input is expanded using the decision tables as 
with any other variable state in the fault tree. 
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NC in Circuit 
OR 
n possible 
inputs 
Development of each 
component on the circuit 
OR 
OR 
All combinations of events 
which give NC in circuit output col 
which also have NC in circuit input col 
(NC in circuit input col is ignored as it 
represents circuit continuity) 
AND 
Expand row entries checking that 
any external events are not inconsistent 
OR 
All combinations of events which 
give NC in circuit output col which 
do not have NC in circuit input col 
AND 
Expand row entries checking that 
any external events are not inconsistent 
Figure 4.11 NC in Circuit Operator 
When current flowing in a circuit is traced during fault tree development, all the 
components in the circuit must he working, so an "AND" gate appears in the operator 
as shown in figure 4.12. 
n possible 
inputs 
OR 
C in Circuit 
AND 
Development of each 
component on the circuit 
OR 
All combinations of events 
which give C in circuit output col 
which also have C in circuit input col 
(C in circuit input col is ignored as it 
represents circuit continuity) 
AND 
Expand row entries checking that 
any external events are not inconsistent 
OR 
All combinations of events which 
give C in circuit output col which 
do not have C in circuit input curl 
ANI) 
Expand row entries checking that 
any external events are not inconsistent 
Figure 4.12 C in Circuit Operator 
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The method used to apply the circuit operators is explained in chapter 5, when the 
operators are applied to the Train Detection system. 
4.8 The Automatic Fault Tree Construction Code 
The aim of the automatic fault tree construction package is to construct the fault trees 
for any type of railway safety system with the minimal amount of time and effort 
provided by the analyst. With these criteria in mind the topology file that contains the 
information indicating how the components link together to form a system is produced 
from a Piping and Instrumentation Diagram or other schematic diagram using Autocad 
or manual entry. The other file that is necessary for the fault tree construction is the 
file that contains the decision tables for each component in the system. The decision 
tables for the most commonly encountered components are stored in a decision table 
library file. Any decision tables in this file can he amended for specific application to 
the system under consideration, or additional decision tables can easily he added to the 
file. The only other information required by the program is the specification of the top 
event to be developed. 
4.8.1 Overall Structure of the AFTCC Program 
The data flow chart showing the overall package is shown in figure 4.13. The system 
description can be entered as system diagram using the facilities in Autocad. For each 
component there will be an unique symbol in the component graphics library file and a 
decision table in the component functionality library. Component symbols are linked 
together and the system drawing file is then created which holds all of the topology 
and connectivity information. This includes information on which ports (input/output 
connections) of the components are connected together. Component decision tables in 
the library file can be amended or new decision tables added using a text editor. The 
AFTCC program prompts the user to answer four questions: the name of the topology 
file, the variable state, the output port and lastly the output component name. The 
program produces a formatted file which can be read by the fault tree analysis package 
FaultTree+. Using this commercially available package qualitative and quantitative 
analysis can be performed giving the top event probability or frequency of occurrence. 
The AFTCC program is written in C using user defined structures which are stored as 
linked lists. The memory for the structures is dynamically allocated when the program 
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is running which reduces the likelihood of arrays going out of hounds. The main 
functions and the structure in the program are briefly discussed below. 
Initially the data structure CPNAME is built up for each of the components in the 
topology file, the structure contains the variables shown below: 
typedef struct cpname { 
char *compname; 
char *comptype; 
long linepos; 
long decposition; 
int compnunn; 
int noinputs; 
int pouts; 
int inputs [9] ; 
int numins; 
int outputs[9]; 
int numouts; 
struct cpname *nextptr; 
} CPNAME; 
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Figure 4.13 Data Flow Chart 
There are two variables in the structure that are of type "long", these variables are 
linepos and decposition. Linepos holds the position in bytes from the top of the 
topology file to the location of the line that the structure holds. Decposition holds the 
position in bytes from the top of the decision table library to where the decision table 
for each component is found in the file. The structure also contains a pointer, nextptr 
111 
which will point to the next structure in the linked list. Once all the information is 
stored in the linked list the headptr of the list is passed to the function that constructs 
the topology tree, TREECON. 
TREECON constructs the topology tree using the same method described earlier in the 
chapter. The tree is constructed recursively completing the left most branch first and 
then traversing up the branch from its terminating event until an incomplete gate 
structure is encountered that has an input to be developed. The topology tree is also 
constructed as a linked list of a user defined structure. The TREECON function calls 
numerous smaller functions that read the decision table for the component being dealt 
with and search for matches in the appropriate output column and then deal with the 
matches. During construction of the topology tree each branch end is stored as a 
pointer list for later use in the search for control loops and circuits. TREECON calls 
itself recursively until the right most branch has been completed. The function then 
returns to the main function. 
From main the next function to he called is the function FBPATHS. This function uses 
the method for NFB loop detection explained earlier to find all possible NFB loops. 
Once the list of possible loops is found any duplicate loops are deleted from the list. 
The function that finds all possible NFF loops is called, FORPATHS, and again uses 
the method detailed earlier in the chapter. The gains for the two paths in the list of 
possible control loops are determined. For the potential NFF list if the resultant gains 
on the two paths are the same then the loop is deleted from the list. For the potential 
NFB list, a negative resultant gain on the loop indicates a NFB loop, a positive gain 
indicates a potential circuit. For the loop to be stored as a circuit two further criteria 
need to he satisfied: the variable traced around the loop has to he a state of current and 
a component on the loop must contain a power ("P") supply. If the loop does not 
satisfy the requirements of a NFB loop or a circuit it is just discarded. 
Now that all the possible control loops and circuits have been detected the main fault 
tree construction can take place. The function FAULTCON is called from main to 
start the fault tree construction. This function like the function that constructs the 
topology tree is also recursive. Each time the function is called the component, output 
column and variable combination which identify each event being developed in the fault 
tree are checked to see if the component lies on either one of the circuits, one of the 
NFB loops or one of the NFF loops. If it does then the appropriate function is called 
and the operator is applied to the whole loop or circuit. Any external inputs to the 
loops or circuits are stored in a linked list with a pointer to the gate to which they will 
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be added to later. Once the operators have been completed the recursive FAULTCON 
function is recalled to deal with the next event to be expanded in the tree. When all the 
events have been expanded the function returns to main. While there is still a member 
of the list of external inputs to the loops and circuits the function FAULTCON is 
called. After completion of the FAULTCON the external is deleted from the list. If 
during this call any operators are applied the relevant external inputs encountered are 
added to the end of the list. The calls to FAULTCON stop when the external list is 
empty. 
Each time a gate needs to be added to the fault tree a structure containing all the 
relevant information is added to the linked list. For each gate in the linked list there is 
a prevptr pointer that points to the gate above it in the tree and an array nextptr of 
pointers, to point to the input gates. When basic events are added to gates this 
information is just added to the structure for the gate. Finally when the program 
returns from FAULTCON for the last time the completed fault tree structure is stored 
in a linked list of structures. The linked list is now traversed printing each gate and its 
inputs to a file. This file then has to he manipulated so the fault tree structure 
information is in the correct format for direct entry into the fault tree analysis software 
package FaultTree+. 
4.9 Conclusion 
Two new circuit operators have been introduced that are applied when electrical 
circuits are encountered during the construction of fault trees. The main advantage of 
using the new operators in the automatic fault tree construction is to create smaller 
more compact fault trees. The reduction in the size of the fault trees is important when 
trying to locate the causes of incorrect minimal cut sets during checking. The circuit 
operators also reduce the number of repeated events encountered in the fault tree 
construction as circuits are now dealt with in their entirety. 
Gains have been introduced into the decision tables to enable the detection and 
classification of control loops or circuits. From the application of the new decision 
table method to the two systems that feature control loops it is clear that the method 
has the ability to detect, classify and apply the control loop operators. 
As this project is only concerned with the automatic construction of fault trees for 
railway safety systems, no further applications of the program to systems that contain 
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control loops have been carried out. The manual applications in this chapter illustrate 
that the method has the ability to deal with control loops and therefore the potential 
exists to extend the procedure proposed for railway safety systems to applications in 
other industries. 
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Chapter 5 
Application of the Fault Tree Synthesis Algorithm to 
Systems without Control Loops 
5.1 Introduction 
The automatic fault tree construction program, AFTCC has been written with the 
capability to model, negative feedforward (NFF) and negative feedback (NFB) control 
loops and electrical circuits. However the railway safety systems supplied for analysis 
by London Underground Ltd, which typify the problems they deal with, do not contain 
any NFF and NFB control loops. As an initial test of the program, two railway safety 
systems were analysed. The systems are those for which manual fault trees were 
constructed as presented in chapter 3, the systems are the Train Detection system and 
the Train Stop system. The work in chapter 3 provides a comparative analysis to 
check that the automatically constructed fault trees produce the correct minimal cut 
sets. The first of these systems, the Train Stop system was selected for its simplicity. 
Since it does not contain any control loops or circuits it will test the programs general 
fault tracing capability. As the second system, the Train Detection system, contains 
circuits, this will provide a test of the operators produced to trace Current and No 
Current conditions in the circuits. Also the example emphasises the advantages gained 
by applying the circuit operator during fault tree construction in terms of the size of the 
fault trees produced. 
5.2 Application to Train Stop System 
A full description of the Train Stop system is given in chapter 3 section 3.3. The 
automatic construction of the fault tree as performed by AFTCC is very similar to the 
manual technique used in chapter 3. The computerised approach constructs a system 
topology graph to identify control loops and circuits. As there are no circuits or 
control loops in this system the generation of the topology graph and its features will 
be explained in the next section using the Train Detection system. Some amendments 
have been made to the decision tables in chapter 3, mainly the replacement of some 
working states in the decision tables by don't care states to express the component 
model more efficiently. The replacements have only been made when the state of the 
component is unimportant. For example by definition the Tconnectors are only used to 
link components together in the modelling of the systems and their failures are not 
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considered. As its state i. e. working or failed is not of any interest in the analysis and 
therefore not included in the developed fault tree all of the entries in the state columns 
of this decision table have been changed to don't care states. This only has the effect 
of deleting the working states of the Tconnectors from the completed fault tree. 
In the worked examples of how AFTCC automatically constructs the fault trees the 
row numbers of the decision tables that are mentioned in the text and the fault trees do 
not correspond to the whole of the decision tables. They in fact refer to rows that 
illustrate the relationships between the inputs and outputs of the decision table. 
Consider the decision table for the brakeshoe, table 5.1, when a match is found for the 
variable NP in rows 2 and 3, these rows are really rows 7 and 8 of the whole decision 
table. 
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The full set of modified decision tables are shown below : 
BRAKES HOE 
NORMAL 
1,1,1 
I1P STATE O1P 
PW P 
NP - NP 
-F NP 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
PIPE 
NORMAL 
1,1,1 
IIP STATE O1P 
PW P 
NP - NP 
-F NP 
EXCLUSIVE 
W. F 
LINE 
NORMAL 
1,1,1 
I1C STATE O1C 
Cw C 
NC - NC 
-F NC 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
TRIPCOCK 
NORMAL 
1,1,1 
IIA STATE 
UP W 
-F 
D- 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
O1A 
L 
Z 
Z 
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RELAY 
NORMAL 
1,1,1 
I1C STATE OIC 
CW C 
NC - NC 
-F NC 
EXCLUSIVE 
W. F 
PISTON 
NORMAL 
1,1,1 
IIP STATE ()1P 
PW P 
NP - NP 
- FLIP NP 
- Ff) P 
EXCLUSIVE 
W. FUP, FD 
PISTON 
RES 
1,1,1 
I1P STATE O1P 
PW NP 
NP W P 
- FUP P 
- FD NP 
-C NP 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, FUP, FD, C 
Decision Table 5.7 
LINE 
LOUT 
1,1,1 
I1C STATE O1C 
-wC 
-F NC 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
I 
VALVE 
CONTROL 
2,1,1 
+, + 
I1C 12P STATE O1P 
CP W P 
-- FC NP 
-P FO P 
NC - W NP 
- NP - NP 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, FC, FO 
; Decasion Table 5.9 
VALVE 
ESCAPE 
1,1,1 
IIA STATE O1P 
Zw P 
LW NP 
- FO NP 
- FC P 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, FO, FC 
TRAINSTOP 
SPRING 
2,1,1 
I1P 12P STATE O1A 
P- W&- UP 
NP P W D 
-- FUP&- UP 
-- FD D 
NP NP W&W UP 
NP - W&F ST 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, FUP, FD 
SPRING 
W, F 
Decision Table 5.11 
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TCONNECTOR 
2INIOUT 
2,1,1 
UP 12P STATE O1P 
Pp- p 
- NP - NP 
NP -- NP 
EXCLUSIVE 
W. F 
TCONNECTOR 
1 IN20UT 
1,2,1 
+, + 
I1P STATE ()1P 02P 
P-PP 
NP - NP NP 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
Decision Table 5.13 
TCONNECTOR 
1IN 1 OUT 
1,1,1 
lip STATE ()1P 
P-P 
NP - NP 
EXCLUSIVE 
W. F 
COMPRESSOR 
NORMAL 
1,1,1 
lip STATE O1P 
-WP 
-F NP 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
The top event of interest is "no pressure from the brake shoes", therefore the entries 
needed for the programs execution are: 1) the name of the input file, 2) the state of the 
variable to be traced, 3) the output entry in the topology file for the component and 4) 
the output component name. Before the execution of the program the two input files, 
the topology file and the decision table library file, must be completed and have the file 
name extensions top and txt. In this example the two files were called Stop. top and 
Stop. txt. 
The prompts from the AFTCC and the manual entries for this example are: 
1. prompt "Enter the name of the text file produced by Autocad" 
input Stop 
2. prompt "Enter the variable state" 
input NP (no pressure) 
3. prompt "Enter the output" 
input Brakeoff 
4. prompt "Enter the component name" 
input Brakeshoe 
The program then produces the fault tree structure shown in figure 5.1. To illustrate 
how AFTCC builds up the fault tree look at the top section of the fault tree. Initially 
the top identifier is added to the tree, this comes from the top event. Then the decision 
table for the Brakeshoe, table 5.1, output column 0 is searched for the variable state 
NP (no pressure). From table 5.1 there are two matches in rows 2 and 3, the identifier 
Brakeshoe Row 2 is now added to the tree. As Brakeshoe row 2 only contains one 
entry NP in input 1, no gate is added to the tree, the topology file is used to trace this 
event back through the system by finding the component whose output is linked to the 
input column of the Brakeshoe. The connected component is Piston 2 output column 
0. From the decision table for Piston 2, table 5.6, there are two matches for the output 
NP in rows 2 and 3. Therefore the identifier that is added is Piston 2 Col (). The rest 
of the automatic expansion of the fault tree is built up in the same manner to give the 
completed fault tree in figure 5.1. The way in which AFTCC builds up the fault tree is 
to keep developing the left most son of each gate until the branch has terminated. The 
branch is traversed upwards from the last entry in the fault tree until a gate is reached 
that has sons that have not been developed, then the left most undeveloped son is 
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expanded and the process is repeated. Therefore for the fault tree the last entry in the 
tree is the expansion of the event Brakeshoe row 3 which contains only the component 
in its failed state BEF, so this entry is the last entry to be added to the fault tree. 
Brake Off 
OR 
Brakeshoe Ra+2 BEF 
Piston2 Cow 
OR 
Plston2 Row2 PN2RIP 
Psstonl Colt3 
OR 
Pistonl Rowl PNIFD PNIC 
AND 
AND T rii Rowl 
AND 
N( )T NOT NOT 
PNIFUP PNIFD PNIC 
V ýlvr3 Co1t3 NOT 
OR (R? F 
Valvr3 Rrnvi VEiFC 
AND 
AND Tri k Co10 
OR 
NOT NOT 
VEiFC VE: iFO TKF Tricock Row3 
Tst F-10 
OR 
Tst xow2' TPFD 
AND 
Pi 12 Co10 AND Pi 13 Rrnv 
OR AND 
F7- I NOT NOT 
Pt 12 Row2 PE12F T jP 
T'FD Valve2 Co10 NOT 
Valvel Colo 
OR 
PE1. iF 
OR 
VEIFC Valve! Row4 Valvrl Rows 
AND Tcon2 Row2 
Pi SCo10 
Line6 Co10 AND 
OR 
OR 
r 
NOT NOT PF Row2 
u RcW2 LE6F VEIR) VE1FC CRIF 
Rela 1 Co10 
OR 
Rela 1 Roa2 RYIF 
LE2P 
Valve 2 Rawl Vnlve2 Rrnv'i 
AND 
AND Line7 Row I 
AND D 
/, \ 
NOT NOT 
NOT Rela Rowl 
VE2FC VE2FO 
LE7F AND 
NOT NOT 
LE4F RY2F 
AND 
Tccm3 Rcm 1 VE, 2Ft 
Pi ßr10 Rrnvl 
AND 
Tcvu2 Rowl NOT 
F'i irK R wI 
PEIOF 
AND 
NOT NOT 
(RIF PEXF 
Figure 5.1 Fault Tree for Top Event "No Pressure From Brake Shoes" 
A key to decipher the failure codes entered in the fault tree is shown below: 
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Brakeshoe = BS(F) 
Pipe = PE#(F) 
Line = LE#(F) 
Tripcock = TK(F) 
Relay = RY(F) 
Piston (Normal) = PN2(FUP, FD) 
Piston(Res) = PN 1(FUP, FD, C) 
Valve(Control) VE#(FC, FO) 
Valve(Escape) = VE3(FO, FC) 
Trainstop = TP(F) 
Tconnector TR#(F) 
Compressor CR(F) 
Where the # indicates where the appropriate number for the component is added and 
the text in the brackets are all the different failures that can take place for the 
component. The different types of failures that occur are: 
1. F= Failed 
2. FUP Failed Up 
3. FD Failed Down 
4. C Cracked 
5. FC Failed Closed 
6. FO = Failed Open 
The output file containing the fault tree structure is then analysed using FaultTree+. 
The minimal cut sets that were calculated are: 
1. RY1F 5. PE12F 9. PN1FD 
2. LE2F 6. TPFD 10. PN 1C 
3. LE6F 7. TKF 11. PN2FUP 
4. VE1FC 8. VE3FC 12. BEF 
These cut sets are exactly the same as the cut sets that were produced from the 
manually constructed fault tree developed in chapter 3, thus providing confidence in 
the basic fault tracing mechanisms of AFTCC. 
121 
5.3 Application to Train Detection System 
The Train Detection system is described in Chapter 3 section 3.2. To develop the fault 
tree for the top event "Red bulb off when there is a train present in the section" 
AFTCC requires the shown inputs to the prompts. 
1. prompt "Enter the name of the text file produced by Autocad" 
input Axle 
2. prompt "Enter the variable state" 
input NL (no light) 
3. prompt "Enter the output" 
input Rloff 
4. prompt "Enter the component name" 
input Bulb2 
The list of decision tables below are the tables stored in the library file, Axle. txt, which 
are required to model the system. 
BULB 
NORMAL 
1,1,1 
+, +, + 
I1C STATE OIL 02C 
CW LC 
-F NL NC 
NC - NL NC 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
Decision Table 5.16 
LINE 
NORMAL 
1,1,1 
I1C STATE O1C 
CW C 
NC - NC 
_F NC 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
Decision Table 5.17 
RELAY 
NORMAL 
1,2,1 
+, + 
I IC STATE O1 C 02M 
CW CM 
NC - NC NM 
-F NC NM 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
Decision Table 5.18 
GENERATOR 
NORMAL 
1,1,1, P 
IIC STATE O1C 
cw c 
F NC 
NC - NC 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
'DecisionTable 5.19 
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AXSW 
NORMAL 
1,2,1 
+, + 
Tic STATE O1C 02C 
NC - NC NC 
CW NC C 
C AC C NC 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, AC 
Decision Table 5.20 
TCONNECTOR 
1IN2OUT 
1,2,1 
+, + 
IIC STATE 01C. 02C 
C-CC 
NC - NC NC 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
Decision Table 5.21 
TCONNECTOR 
2INIOUT 
2,1,1 
+, + 
IIC 12C STATE O1C 
C-- C 
-C- C 
NC NC - NC 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
_1 
TCONNECTOR 
1IN1OUT 
1,1,1 
IIC STATE OIC 
C-C 
NC - NC 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
CONTACTS 
NORMAL 
2,2,1 
11C 12M STATE O1(' 02C 
CM W C - 
C NM w - C 
NC - - NC NC 
- NM - NC - 
-- F NC NC 
-M - - NC 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
Decision Table 5.24 
The topology file which defines how the components are linked to form the system has 
been created from the system drawing. The topology diagram that shows how each of 
the components is linked together is shown in figure 5.2 
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Figure 5.2 Topology Diagram for Train Detection System 
Figure 5.2 is a drawing representation of what appears in the topology file for the 
system. However in the topology file BulbR and BulhG have been re-labelled. The 
reason for this is that there are two components in the system that have the same 
decision table in the library file. The two components have to be labelled with the 
same letters but to distinguished them the last entry in their name is a number. So in 
this case BulhG has become Bulb1 and BulbR has become Bulb2. The topology file 
for the top event Red Bulb off when there is a train in the section in shown in figure 
5.3. 
generator 1 normal 1 lline9 line 1 
line l. normal 1 1 generator 1 line2 
line2 normal 1 l line 1 axsw 
line4 normal 1 laxsw relay 
relay normal 2 lline4 line6 
contacts normal 2 2generator2 relay bulb 1 
bulb 1 normal 2 lcontacts gloff 
bulb2 normal 2 lcontacts rloff 
line 12 normal 1 1 tconnector4 generator2 
contacts 
hulh2 
tconnector4 
tconnector4 
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generator2 normal 
line6 normal 
line7 normal 
axsw normal 
line8 normal 
line9 normal 
tconnector4 2in 1 out 
tconnector 1 2in 1 out 
Figure 5.3 
1 llinel2 
1 1 relay 
1 lline6 
2 lline2 
1 1 tconnector l 
1 lline8 
1 2bulb 1 
1 2axsw 
contacts 
line7 
tconnectorl 
line4 
line9 
generator 1 
bulb2 line 12 
line7 line8 
tconnector 1 
Topology File for Train Detection System 
To explain the format of the topology file, consider the line 6, the line for the Contacts 
component, i. e. : 
contacts normal 2 2generator2 relay bulb 1 hulh2 
The first entry in the line is the component name and is stored in a field of length 
twenty, next is the text to identify different types of components with the same name, 
this is also entered in a field of length twenty. In this case the text, "normal", is entered 
in the identifying field as there is only one standard contacts component in the system. 
An example of two different types of component with the same name are an air-to- 
open valve and an air-to-close valve. In this case the entries in the identifying field 
would be air-to-open and air-to-close instead of normal. The third and fourth entries 
are both of field length one and are separated by a field length of one. These entries 
are the number of outputs and the number of inputs that the component has. Next all 
of the input components are entered followed by all of the output components all in 
fields of length twenty. The topology diagram in figure 5.2 shows how the inputs and 
outputs for each component are found. 
5.3.1 Analysis for Top Event Red Bulb Off when Train in Section 
The top event for the Train Detection system to be investigated is the "Red Bulb off 
when there is a train in the section". The first step in the construction of the fault tree 
is to build up the topology graph of the system. This is achieved by using the decision 
tables and the topology diagram, figure 5.2, to link each of the system components as 
the variable states are traced from the top event back through the system. In the 
construction of the topology graph as with the fault tree column numbers from the 
decision tables are numbered from zero. To make the manual application clearer 
consider the column numbers starting from one. A topology graph is a directed graph 
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consisting of nodes and edges. The nodes represent specific values of specific 
variables for the component identified. The edges link the nodes such that those nodes 
directly below any other node contribute to its cause. The topology graph unlike a 
fault tree does not however indicate how these events need to combine. As each new 
node representing a component is added to the graph the output column number which 
connects it to the event above it, input column number which identifies how the cause 
of this event will be traced, and variables states on each of these channels are also 
included. Construction starts with the top event component, so the initial component 
to consider is the Red Bulb_ From its decision table, table 5.16, it can be seen that the 
top event variable is in output column 1. From table 5.16 the causes of this output are 
given by two rows, the Bulb fails (row 3) or there is no current, NC, in input column 1 
(row 2). Since the topology graph is only to trace potential circuits and control loops 
only the connectivity of events is of interest. The component states given in the state 
column of the decision tables is of no interest in the graph construction and so the first 
of these events is ignored and only the second is traced further. The Red Bulb 
connects to output column 2 of the Contacts (system topology diagram) and the 
method is applied again. Each of the branches of the graph is terminated naturally at 
the system boundary or when the new component being added to the branch is a match 
with a component which appears further up on the same branch. For a match the 
component label and the output column numbers have to be identical, the variables 
being traced do not. The completed topology graph for "Red Bulb Off when there is a 
train in the section" is shown in figure 5.4. 
Consider the termination of the branches labelled 3 and 5 in figure 5.4. The last 
component added to the branches is L4 01 (output column 1). When these branches 
are traversed upwards towards the top event they both encounter the same component 
which is L4 01. As the component name and output column match the two branches 
are terminated. Other branches are terminated for similar reasons. These matches 
where an event is traced back to itself as a contradiction to its cause identify possible 
control loops and circuits. From the topology graph all the possible loops and circuits 
can be identified. For each identified loop or circuit the resultant gain is found by 
multiplying together the appropriate gain for each component in the loop. If the 
resultant gain is negative then the loop is a NFB loop. On the other hand if the 
resultant gain is positive, the variable traced in the loop is a state of current and the 
loop contains a power supply then the loop is a circuit. If the resultant gain on the 
loop is positive and the other two criteria are not satisfied then the loop is discarded. 
In this case all of the possible loops or circuits that the program identified satisfy the 
criteria for a circuit. 
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The circuits that the program identified are : 
1. Cont(02) --> Buib2(02) -> Tcon4(O1) -4 Linel2(O1) - Gen2(01) 
2. Gen2(O 1) -* Cont(O 1) --* Bulb l (02) -4 Tcon4(O 1) -ý Line l 2(O 1) 
3,4. Line4(O 1) -* Relay(O 1) -> Line6(O 1) -> Line7(O 1) -- Tcon l (O 1) --- 
Line8(0 1) --> Line9(0 1) - Gen 1 (O 1) -* Line 1 (O 1) -4 Line2(0 1) --> 
Axsw(O 1) 
5,6. Line2(O 1) -->Axsw(02) -ý Tcon 1(O 1) - >Line8 (O 1) -> Line9(O 1) - 
Gen 1 (O 1) -4 Line 1 (O 1) 
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01 NL 
RB 
11 NC 
02 NC 
11 NC CONT 12 EN 
01 NC 02 EN 
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01 NC 11 NC 
I1C 
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L12 L4 
01 NC I1C 
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Figure 5.4 Topology Graph for Red Bulb Off 
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I BULBR OFF 
G1 OR 
BB2F BULB2 Row3 
G2 OR 
GR2F G3 OR LE12F BB2F 
M 
CSF RELAY Rowl External input to circuit 1 
AND 
AND NOT 
RYF 
NOT NOT NOT NOT NOT NOT NOT NOT NOT AWAC 
LE4F RYF LE6F LE7F LE8F LE9F GR1F LEIF LE2F 
Figure 5.5 Fault Tree Produced by AFTCC for the Top 
Event Red Bulb Off When a Train is Present in the Section 
The state of the variable that is traced round each of the circuits is as follows: 
1) No Current 2) No Current 3) Current 4) No Current 5) Current 6) No Current 
The program then builds up the fault tree in the normal manner applying the circuit 
operators when it comes across any of the components that lie on the circuits. 
A key to decipher the failure codes entered in the fault tree is shown below: 
Bulb = BB#(F) 
Line = LE#(F) 
Relay RY(F) 
Generator GR#(F) 
Axsw = AW(AC) 
Contacts => CS(F) 
As before the # indicates where the appropriate number for the component is added 
and the text in the brackets are all the different failures that can take place for the 
component. 
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As an example of how the circuit operator is applied by the program to the circuits 
found from the topology tree, the construction of the fault tree in figure 5.5 will be 
worked through. The first circuit is encountered after the identifier BULB2 row 3. 
From the decision table for the bulb, table 5.16, the entries in row 3 are NC on the 
input and "-" in the component state. The topology diagram shows that the bulb input 
can be traced to the next component i. e. CONT 02 NC. The circuits for the system 
are then checked to see if a match can be found with the component, output column 
number and variable. A match is found in circuit 1. The circuit operator for NC is 
now applied, so an "OR" gate, G2, is added, and each component on the circuit is dealt 
with in turn. The decision table for the Contacts, table 5.24, is viewed for causes of 
NC in output column 2. There are three matches in the output column, these occur in 
rows 3,5 and 6 which have causes: i) NC, -, - ii) -, -, F and iii) -, M, -. The inputs 
from any of the components on the circuit can be deleted from the three matched rows 
as these just trace the path of the circuit. In this case the first input column is from 
L12 and the second from the Relay, therefore since L12 is part of the circuit all inputs 
in column 1 can be ignored, which just leaves the contributions from rows 5 and 6 to 
consider. As there are still 2 rows an "OR" gate, G3, is added to G2 of the fault tree 
and these rows are expanded in turn. Row 5 of the Contacts decision table contains 
only the component in its failure mode, therefore the failure (CSF) is added to G3 
(figure 5.5). Any inputs that are not from the circuit are described as external inputs, 
in this case the input in row 6 is from the Relay which is not on the circuit. When an 
external input is encountered, a check only needs to he made if the variable to he 
traced is a state of current which may have the ability to energise the circuit. In this 
case, as the variable is not a state of current the input is an external one and will be 
expanded later by the normal fault tree development technique. The method used to 
check for consistency will be explained by applying it to the component Tconnector 4 
later. The next component on the circuit is Bulh2 (02), which is dealt with in the same 
manner as for the Contacts. From the decision table for the Bulb there are two 
matches in 02 for the variable NC, the matches occur in rows 2 and 3. As the bulb 
only has one input, this is the input that traces the path round the circuit then as before 
this can be ignored, leaving only the failure of the Bulh2, so (BB2F) is added to G2. 
All of the other components on the circuit are dealt with similarly, the only difference 
occurring with the component Tconnector 4. 
For Tconnector 4 the output column 1 of the decision table, table 5.22, is checked for 
the variable NC. A match is found in row 3 of the table. The entries in this row are 
NC and NC, the second entry traces the path around circuit 1 and so can be deleted, 
this leaves NC in input 1. From the topology diagram this event is traced to Bulb 1 02 
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NC. All of the circuits are searched for Bulb 1 02 NC this combination and a match is 
made on circuit 2. As the entry component and variable at which the operator was first 
applied (CONT 02 NC) does not appear in circuit 2, this external input is an 
inconsistent input and need not be considered. Therefore there is no input from 
Tconnector 4 in the fault tree. 
With the first application of the circuit operator completed the stored external input to 
G3 is expanded. In this case the variable in input 2 of the Contacts was M. Contacts 
input 2 is connected to the Relay output column 2. As this variable M and output 
column do not appear on any of the circuits the fault tree is developed in the normal 
manner. Output column 2 of the decision table for the relay is searched for the variable 
state M, only one match is found which is in row 1 of the table, row 1 contains C 
(Current) for the input and W (Working) for the component state. So as there are two 
inputs, an "AND" gate G4, is added as input to the "OR" gate G3. A NOT gate is then 
developed from G4 to deal with the working state of the Relay. The working state is 
converted to NOT failed states since we only want failed states in the final fault tree to 
ensure the correct Boolean reduction takes place during the analysis. The Relay input 
1 is connected to Line 4 output 1 and the variable now being traced is C. All of the 
circuits are searched for Line 4 01 C and a match is found in circuit 3. At this stage 
the circuit operator for current is applied to give the complete fault tree shown in 
figure 5.5. 
The minimal cut sets calculated from the fault tree with the top event "Red Bulb off 
when there is a Train in the section" are: 
1. AWAC 3. LE12F 5. BB2F 
2. CSF 4. GR2F 
These are exactly the same cut sets that were produced from the manually constructed 
fault tree in chapter 3. 
5.3.2 Analysis for Top Event Green Bulb Off when No Train in the Section 
When there is no train in the track section the topology file needs to be changed to 
remove the axle component. This can be accomplished either by editing the topology 
file and deleting the axle component or by using Autocad to redefine the system 
components. As with the previous example the first step performed 
by AFTCC is to 
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find and classify all control loops and circuits by means of the topology graph. For this 
top event there are four circuits, which are: 
1. Cont(O 1) - Bulb 1(02) -4 Tcon4(0 1) -* Line 12(01) -* Gen2(0 1) 
2. Gen2(01) -ý Cont(02) -ý Bulb2(02) -4 Tcon4(01) -ý Line l2(O 1) 
3,4. Line4(01) --ý Relay(01) -+ Line6(01) - Line7(01) --* Tcon2(01) -4 
Line8(O 1) -4 Line9(O 1) -> Gen 1 (O 1) - Line 1 (O 1) - Line2(O 1) -> 
Tconl(O1) 
The state of the variable that is traced round each of the circuit is as follows: 
1) No Current 2) No Current 3) Current 4) No Current. 
Operators were again applied when the circuits were encountered during the fault 
tracing and the completed fault tree for the top event "Green bulb off when there is no 
train present" is shown in figure 5.6. 
LBULB 1 OFF 
OR 
BB1F BULB4 Row3 
OR 
GR2F OR LE12F 
CSF OR 
RY2F OR 
LE4F RYF LE6F LE7F LE8F LE9F GRIF 
BB1F 
LE1F LE2F 
Figure 5.6 Fault Tree Produced by AFTCC for the Top Event 
Green Bulb Off when No Train in the Section 
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The *. ATS file that was created by the program was input to the fault tree analysis 
package FaultTree+ and the minimal cut sets that were produce are : 
1. LE4F 6. GR 1F 11. LE 12 F 
2. LE6F 7. LE 1F 12. GR2F 
3. LE7F 8. LE2F 13. BB1F 
4. LEBF 9. RYF 
5. LE9F 10. CSF 
These minimal cut sets agree with those generated for the manually developed fault 
tree in chapter 3. 
5.4 Conclusions of the First Test of the Programs Capabilities 
In the two systems that the program has been tested on, the automatic fault trees that 
have been constructed have produced minimal cut sets that entirely agree with those 
derived from the manually constructed trees. In the case of the Train Stop system if 
the manual tree was constructed using the modified decision tables for the system the 
two fault tree structures would be identical. 
An advantage of applying the circuit operators can clearly be seen in the construction 
of the fault trees for the Train Detection system. There is a marked difference in the 
size of the manual fault trees compared to the automatically constructed fault trees. 
The automatically generated fault trees generally have much larger structures. There 
are advantages in producing smaller compact fault trees. They are easier for the analyst 
to follow the logic of the fault development which enables any errors in the fault tree 
construction to be identified and corrected. There is also enhanced efficiency in 
analysis producing a saving of time in the analysis of the compact fault trees. The 
application of the Circuit Operator has produced fault trees of a more compact form. 
The analysis of the Train Stop system shows that the automatic construction algorithm 
for basic systems that do not contain any control loops or circuits works and produces 
the correct minimal cut sets. This indicates that the algorithm correctly traces fault 
events back through the system from one component to the next. From the analysis of 
the Train Detection system, which is more complex from a fault tree generation 
viewpoint, the circuit operators for Current and No Current have been tested and have 
produced smaller fault trees that when analysed have produced the correct cut sets. 
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Chapter 6 
Application of the Fault Tree Synthesis Algorithm to 
LUL Safety Analysis Studies 
6.1 Introduction 
Since the Kings Cross disaster in 1987 and the publication of the Fennell Report, 
London Underground Ltd have given the improvement of passenger safety a higher 
priority. A Safety Case has been produced which identifies all of the credible hazard or 
accident situations that could potentially cause injuries or death to London 
Underground passengers. It also quantifies their likelihood of occurrence and 
consequences. Once the hazards had been identified and analysed, changes in the 
systems have been implemented to reduce the associated risk where it was found to be 
unacceptable. Fault trees were constructed to develop causes of each hazardous event 
(these are sometimes referred to as Hazard trees). Their quantification enabled the 
frequency of occurrence of each hazard to be predicted and subsequently a judgement 
to be made on the acceptability of the associated risk. Potential modifications in 
systems were analysed and the most cost effective solutions to improve safety 
identified. Each of the ten lines of London Underground Ltd were treated separately 
as was each of the nineteen hazardous events identified as having the potential to cause 
fatalities. The analysis performed for each of the different lines on the system exhibited 
major similarities. 
One of the aims of this project is to make use of these similarities by producing a 
computer package that would contain all the information needed to automatically 
construct the fault trees required for any specified line or station of the London 
Underground System for any specified top event hazard. The fault trees could then be 
generated by AFTCC if this information could be expressed in the same format as the 
component models for the engineering systems. By then identifying the line or 
situation which was the subject of the analysis the information needed to construct the 
fault trees could be extracted from the decision tables and the code will automatically 
construct the trees. This would give a great saving in man hours and produce accurate 
fault trees. 
The feasibility of this approach has been demonstrated by considering one of the 
hazard events, the collision of two trains. For each line which comprises the London 
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Underground System this hazard is broken down into the five basic types of collision, 
which are: 
1. Forward collision 
2. Backward collision 
3. Head-on collision 
4. Runaway collision 
5. Side-on collision 
If the train collision situation could be modelled successfully then this process could be 
performed on each of the other hazard events. 
6.2 The Types of Hazardous Events 
The main hazardous events considered in the Safety Case were: 
1. Collision of two trains 
2. Collision hazards 
3. Derailment 
4. Train fire 
5. Tunnel fire 
6. Station fire 
7. Escalator fire 
8. Lift fire 
9. Saloon car ventilation hazard 
10. Flooding 
11. Explosion 
12. Door opening hazard 
13. Staff/Passenger accidents 
14. Inadequate evacuation from train 
15. Inadequate evacuation from station 
16. Inadequate evacuation from tunnel 
17. Power failure 
18. Fire not extinguished by SPADE system 
19. Structural failure 
Each of the nineteen hazardous events listed above require a fault tree or hazard tree to 
be constructed. For some events a separate construction is required for each line, as 
in 
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the case of events in categories 1-5. Others for example as in category 6, station fire, 
need a fault tree for each type of station (i. e. deep level stations or surface stations). 
Each modelling situation needs to be identified in the analysis by specifying the line, 
station etc. 
6.3 Collision of Two Trains 
To explain how the automatic modelling of the fault trees was achieved it will be 
applied to the hazardous event collision between two trains. The example of one line, 
the Bakerloo line, will be considered. 
Collisions involving two trains can occur throughout the network, both in traffic and 
non-traffic hours, and present an extreme risk of driver fatality at all times. On 
passenger trains there is also a high risk of passenger deaths and injuries. As already 
mentioned there are five basic types of collision which can occur. Each of these types 
of collisions can also occur in several ways, a forward collision would require the 
following situations to be modelled: 
1. Forward collision due to a short signalling overlap 
2. Slow forward collision after trip and proceed is implemented 
3. Fast forward collision after trip and proceed is implemented 
4. Forward collision due to overran signalling overlap 
The first of these occurs when a station is closed and trains are non-stopping. The 
track passing through some stations has a short signalling overlap in which the length 
of the overlap is calculated from normal station run through speeds, assuming that the 
trains stop at the station. If the station is closed and if the driver ignores the station 
run through speed limit the overlap is infringed. The train stopping distance would 
then be greater than the length of the overlap, and a collision with a slower moving 
train in the next track section could occur. 
The second and third situations concern the trip and proceed process. Trip and 
proceed is a procedure whereby a train may pass through a red signal. This may 
bring 
about a forward collision if the train is unable to stop before running into a train which 
occupies the same track section. A significant factor is the speed at which the train 
is 
travelling. The rule book procedure for trip and proceed states that trains must 
continue until they reach the next signal at a speed not exceeding ten miles per 
hour, 
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such that they can stop within the distance that the driver can see is clear. If this speed 
is not exceeded then a collision is unlikely to occur because the train will have a short 
stopping distance and the driver is likely to be able to stop the train before hitting a 
train which is in the next section. It is assumed that a slippery track will not prevent a 
train travelling at this speed from stopping. If the ten mile per hour restriction is not 
adhered to, then a collision is considerably more likely. Trip and proceed is also 
implemented when a train encounters a delay. Such a delay may be due to a signal 
failed to "danger", rolling stock faults or track problems. It is important to 
differentiate between these causes. If a signal is red because it has failed to "danger", 
then there is a relatively low likelihood that there is a train in the next track section. If 
a signal is red due to almost any other reason, then there will be a train in the next 
track section. 
The final mode of forward collision occurs when a train passes the end of the signalling 
overlap and moves into an occupied track section. There are two ways by which this 
may occur: 
1. A signal or track circuit wrong side failure may result in a train being signalled 
to pass into an occupied track section. 
2. A train passing a red signal due to driver error, and the train does not stop 
within the signalling overlap. Failure of the train to stop within the signalling 
overlap may be due to train over speeding. Train Stops provide an additional 
protection system against signal overrun. 
If either of these situations occur, then the train could hit a preceding train in the next 
section. In order for a collision to result the preceding train must be either stationary 
or moving more slowly than the following train, and the following train must fail to 
stop in time, either due to driver error, failed braking systems, slippery track, or an 
insufficient stopping distance due to the relative proximity of the two trains. 
Backward collision is brought about by a train moving, either under power or by 
rolling, in a backward direction after overrunning a red signal. If the train had passed 
the signalling overlap, then reversing movement may lead to two trains occupying the 
same track section, and a collision will result if the rearward train is unable to stop. 
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A head on collision may occur if a train is driven forwards from the wrong end. Rare 
occurrences of this have been reported. If this occurs it is possible for a collision to 
result. 
A runaway train may collide with another train if it is running down a gradient towards 
the other train. In order for a collision to occur the runaway train must run out of 
sidings directly onto the same track section as the other train, otherwise it will be 
stopped by a trainstop as it passes a red signal. 
There are three ways in which a side on collision may occur: 
1. A side swipe collision resulting from two trains passing at a section of track 
which is sufficiently out of gauge to infringe the collision envelope. 
2. A collision resulting from a wrong side failure of a semi-automatic signal 
3A "T-bone" collision resulting from either incorrect clip and scotch, or 
incorrect train movement after clip and scotch. 
6.4 Modelling Train Collision Fault Trees 
The first step to model the train collision scenario was to produce the input files that 
would be needed to automate the fault tree construction. A library file was needed 
that contained the decision tables for all of the elements found in the systems. A 
topology file is also required that holds the information to show how the elements are 
linked together. In the engineering system examples, that have been dealt with 
previously the topology file has been created using Autocad from a schematic drawing 
of the system, however in this case the files were produced manually. The format of 
the decision tables in the library file is different from the decision tables for the 
engineering systems. The differences are explained later with an example. There is 
only one decision table library file that holds all the information for the collision of two 
trains on any of the lines of the London Underground System. For analysis of each of 
the separate lines the relevant information for that line needs to be extracted from the 
general decision tables. 
To explain how this was done it is easier to look at an example of one of the general 
decision tables that was stored in the decision table library file. Consider the decision 
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table for the event Slow collision after trip and proceed (SLOWCOLL) decision table 
6.1. 
SLOWCOLL 
NORMAL 
7,1,1 
I1T 12T I3T 14T 15T 16T 17T STATE OIT 
T -TTT V T 
T-T TT-- PJDBN T 
TTT T--- MCE T 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
Decision Table 6.1 
Decision table 6.1 is in the format that it appears in the general decision table library 
file. The entries in the state column of the decision table are the first letters of the 
track that they correspond to. For example if we look at the second row of the 
decision table we have PJDBN which indicate the Piccadilly, Jubilee, District, 
Bakerloo and Northern lines (respectively). The method of construction of the general 
decision table for SLOWCOLL is to search each of the different lines for the event, 
then find out what inputs the event has in each of these lines. Table 6.2 shows this 
result, where the input events are labelled in the first column and for the lines where 
the input events are present the first letter of the line is entered in the appropriate place 
in table 6.2. 
TAP M D P N C E B J 
DFCP M C E 
TSASTOP M D P N C E B V J 
TFTSSE M D P N C E B J 
SLOW D P N B V J 
RMRS V 
TFTSRMNO V 
Table 6.2 
The reason there are only nine entry columns in the table is that during the modelling 
of the collisions between two trains, the collisions on the City & Hammersmith 
line 
have been included in the Metropolitan line. 
A key to the abbreviations for the events used in this chapter are listed below: 
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COTT Collision of two trains 
SLOWCOLL Slow collision after trip and proceed 
FCTAP Forward collision after trip and proceed 
RACOL Runaway train collision 
RATRANTP Runaway train and no trap points 
RT Runaway train 
TAP Trip and Proceed 
DFCP Driver follows correct procedure 
TSASTOP Train in section ahead stationary 
TFTSSE Train fails to stop (slow emergency) 
SLOW Train does not exceed 10 mph 
RMRS Restricted manual implemented (red signal) 
TFTSRMNO Train fails to stop (restricted manual normal operation) 
TINS Train in next section 
NTP No trap points 
RATRS Runaway train (service train) 
RATRE Runaway train (engineering train) 
Decision table 6.1 is constructed by grouping together all the lines that have common 
components, for instance from columns 2,6 and 7 of table 6.2 the lines M 
(Metropolitan), C (Central) and E (East London) all have the same inputs to the 
component SLOWCOLL. Therefore in decision table 6.1 a "T" (T stands for true) is 
entered in the input columns of each of the common inputs and a don't care state is 
entered in the rest of the input columns. In the state column the first letters of the lines 
with the common input components are entered and lastly a "T" is entered in the 
output column. There is always only one output. The rest of the decision table is 
constructed using the same technique to give the completed decision table 6.1. When 
the line of interest is the Bakerloo line then the decision table 6.1 would take the form 
shown in decision table 6.3. 
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The first and third line of decision table 6.1 have been deleted as they do not give any 
details about the Bakerloo line, also any inputs that contain don't care states are 
deleted to give only four inputs. As the decision table 6.3 is now solely for the 
Bakerloo line the B in the state column has been replaced by a don't care state. This is 
done so the program will not count the state column as an input cause to any event 
being traced and therefore try and add a basic component state or "NOT" its failed 
state to the fault tree. 
A pre-processor has been developed that copies the general decision table library file 
and then extracts from each of the decision tables only the information relevant to the 
specified line. Some of the decision tables stored in the file will only be needed for say 
one particular line, therefore for all other lines these tables are deleted. All the 
converted decision tables are written to a new file whose name is formed from the first 
three letters of the option specified, such as the line, followed by "txt", so In this case 
the name of the file would be "bak. txt". 
Unlike the general decision table library file a topology file needs to constructed for 
each of the different lines, this is done manually. The pre-processor also needs to work 
on the topology file in this case the file named "hak l . top" . 
Initially the file is 
duplicated and the copy is named "bak. top" then all of the event names are stored, for 
each event all of its causes are read one at a time and each input name is compared 
with all the event names for a match. If a match is not found then we know that this 
input can not be traced further and is therefore a basic event, this input name is then 
added to the end of the copied file in a format which specifies the number of inputs, 
number of outputs and the output event. These events as they are really just basic 
events have no input and only one output, an example of an added line is shown below. 
TSASTOP NORMAL 10 SLOWCOLL 
When a basic event is added to the bak. top file AFTCC will require a decision table for 
it and so a new decision table needs to be built for the new event. All of the decision 
tables that will need to be added have the effect of terminating the fault tracing process 
within Ali I'CC and will all take the same format as the table shown in decision table 
6.4. All of the basic events that are added to the fault tree come from decision tables 
with the same format as decision table 6.4. This is the reason why a don't care state 
has been entered in the state column of the table. When a don't care state appears in 
the state column and the decision table has no inputs the basic event that is added to 
the fault tree is the name of the decision table, in this case TSASTOP. 
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Once all of the inputs to the components have been dealt with the two new files are 
complete and can now be used as input to the main AFTCC program which will now 
construct the fault tree in the same way as for the modelling of the engineering 
systems. 
6.5 Application of the Program for the Bakerloo Line for the Hazardous 
Event Train Collisions 
Now that the method has been devised to deal with the London Underground hazard 
trees the AFTCC program was tested on the Bakerloo line for the hazardous event 
collisions of two trains. The entries needed for the programs execution are: the name 
of the input files, the state of the variable and the top event of interest. In this case the 
inputs to the prompts from the new program are: 
1. prompt "Enter the name of the text file" 
input BAK 
2. prompt "Enter the variable output state" 
input T 
3. prompt "Enter the top event" 
input COTT# 
The top event has been entered as COTT# as there is a event named COTT which is 
really the decision table for the top event. 
To illustrate how the fault tree is constructed the top event fault tree structure shown 
in figure 6.1 will be worked through. The general library decision tables for the events 
in figure 6.1 are shown in decision tables 6.5 - 6.9. 
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COTT 
NORMAL 
9,1,1 
+, + 
IIT 12T 13T 14T 15T 16T I7T I8T 19T STATE O1T 
T- ------- EPNMDC T 
-T ------- JEBPNMDC T 
-- T------ - T 
-- -T----- JEDPNMDC T 
-- --T---- - T 
-- ---T--- - T 
-- ----T-- PNMDC T 
-- -----T- - T 
-- ------T V T 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
Decision 
able 6.5 
FCTAP 
NORMAL 
2,1,1 
+, + 
I1T 12T STATE O1T 
T- JEBPNMDC T 
-T JEB PNM DC T 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
RACOL 
NORMAL 
2,1,1 
+, + 
I1T 12T STATE OIT 
TT-T 
EXCLUSIVE 
W. F 
Decision Table 6.9 
Some of the above decision tables have an additional feature to the decision table 
shown in table 6.1, the difference being in the state column there is a don't care state. 
The don't care state for this application indicates that the inputs to the event are 
common to all lines. As the top event is a collision between two trains on the 
Bakerloo line the general decision tables are reduced. Decision tables 6 . 
7,6.8 and 6.9 
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RATRANTP 
NORMAL 
2,1,1 
+, + 
IiT 12T STATE O1T 
TT-T 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
`yjDecision Table 6.8 
RT 
NORMAL 
2,1,1 
+, + 
I1T 12T STATE O1T 
T--T 
-T-T 
EXCLUSIVE 
W. F 
are already in their reduced form. The reduced decision tables for 6.5 and 6.6 are 
shown below: 
COTT 
NORMAL 
5,1,1 
IiT 12T 13T 14T 15T STATE O1T 
T----- T 
-T---- T 
--T--- T 
---T-- T 
----T- T 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
Decision Table 6.10 
FCTAP 
NORMAL 
2,1,1 
+, + 
IiT 12T STATE O1T 
T--T 
-T-T 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
The top structure of the topology file for the Bakerloo line shown in figure 6.2 
COTT NORMAL 16FCTAP FC BC HOCOL SOCOL RA('OL ('OTT# 
FCTAP NORMAL 12SLOWCOLL FASTCOLL ('OTT 
RACOL NORMAL 12RATRANTP TINS ('OTT 
RATRANTP NORMAL I 2NTP RT RA('()L 
RT NORMAL 12RATRS RATRE RATRANTP 
Figure 6.2 Top Structure of the Topology File for the Bakerloo Line 
The next step in getting the information in the format required by AFTCC is the 
manipulation of the topology file shown in figure 6.2. All of the entries in the input 
columns of the file are checked against the event names in the first column of the file. 
If a match is found then this input is a event which will enable the event tracing to he 
performed and nothing more is done. If there is no match then the input is a basic 
event that will need to be added to the fault tree. In this case, as described earlier a 
new line is added to the topology file and a new decision table for this event is added 
to the decision table library file for the Bakerloo line. This will cause AFTCC to 
terminate the tree development at this point. In this example the new decision table 
library file and the topology file will contain four new entries as shown in figure 6.3. 
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COTT NORMAL 16FCTAP FC BC 
FCTAP NORMAL 12SLOWCOLL FASTCOLL 
RACOL NORMAL 12RATRANTP TINS 
RATRANTP NORMAL 12NTP RT 
RT NORMAL 12RATRS RATRE 
TINS NORMAL 10 
NTP NORMAL 10 
RATRS NORMAL 10 
RATRE NORMAL 10 
HCK'OL S(X'OL RA('OL ('OTT# 
C'OTT 
C'()TT 
RACOL 
RATRANTP 
RAC'()L 
RATRA. NTP 
RT 
RT 
Figure 6.3 The Top of the Topology File for the Bakerloo Line 
The added decision tables are: 
TINS 
NORMAL 
0,1,1 
STATE O1T 
-T 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
NTP 
NORMAL 
0'1,1 
9 
STATE O1T 
-T 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
RATRS 
NORMAL 
0,1,1 
STATE OIT 
-T 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
RATRE 
NORMAL 
0,1,1 
STATE 01T 
-T 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
Is om Table `6.16` 
In the fault tree construction as the gain is of no importance a "T" has been included in 
the gain row of the decision tables. 
Now both of the input files for the top section of the fault tree are complete and the 
fault tree construction can take place. The tree is constructed as it would be for an 
engineering system the only difference being when decision tables 6.12,6.13,6.14 or 
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6.15 are encountered. As these have no input and a don't care state in the state 
column, the name of the event is added to the appropriate gate as a basic event to give 
the fault tree structure shown in figure 6.1. 
When the program is run an output file is created that holds the topology of the 
constructed fault tree in the correct format for direct analysis with the software 
package FaultTree+. The completed tree for the Bakerloo line with the top event 
COTT (collision of two trains) had exactly the same tree structure and minimal cut sets 
as the fault tree that was produced by London Underground. 
6.6 Conclusion 
From the shown example it is clear that the fault trees that have been produced for 
London Underground can now be reproduced using the automatic fault tree 
construction program AFTCC. The main reason for creating extra code to deal with 
the London Underground fault trees is if for any reason extra or different top events 
need to be analysed or any other alterations in the system, then the fault trees would 
have to be manually re-drawn with their new top events. Now as the tree can he 
drawn automatically the program can be run with the new top event to produce the 
new tree. If for example one of the systems needs to be analysed in more detail then 
all that needs to be done is to add the extra information to the two input files to the 
program and then the program can be run to produce the new fault tree. This process 
can be performed for all the different lines for the other hazard trees. 
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Chapter 7 
Fault Tree Development for Failures of a 
Train Emergency Braking System 
7.1 Introduction 
On London Underground the six car train in normal service is made up of two three 
car units. There are three different types of unit, a unit cannot be split into operational 
sub-units. The system to be analysed is the emergency braking system from the 
London Underground 1973 train stock. 
The train braking control system consists of two basic parts: the Round Train circuit 
and the Safety Brake circuit. These circuits are used to activate the vehicle braking 
system. In this analysis the emergency braking system is examined for one car only. 
Fault trees are constructed for the top events "spurious application of the emergency 
brakes" and "brakes fail to be applied in an emergency". The safety devices that 
activate the emergency brakes are the deadman's handle, the tripcock and the 
passenger alarm buttons. The deadman's handle is in the drivers cab, pressure must be 
maintained on the handle at all times when the train is in motion. If there is no 
pressure on the handle and the train is in motion then there is an emergency brake 
application. The deadman's handle is a safety device that stops the train if the driver 
has any difficulties. The passenger alarm buttons are situated in the cars and when 
pressed they cause an emergency brake application. The tripcock is described in 
chapter 3 in the analysis of the Train Stop system. If the tripcock is struck an 
emergency brake application takes place. All three of these causes of brake activation 
are considered in the analysis of the system. 
Spurious emergency brake application is also considered since the frequency of trains 
passing along the London Underground lines is very high, a stationary train in a tunnel 
is very dangerous. It would increase the chance of a high speed collision with the 
potential to cause multiple fatalities. Also the trains help with the ventilation 
by 
pushing fresh air along the tunnels. In the event that trains are stopped 
for a sufficient 
amount of time, the passengers could find difficulty breathing. 
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7.2 Brake System Description 
The main elements of the train braking system are as follows: 
Round Train Circuit 
This circuit passes around the train, forming a loop. When the circuit is energised it is 
designed to prove that the train is properly coupled, complete and that various safety 
devices throughout the train are all set. If this is so the Round Train Master relays at 
the operational cab are energised. These interlock with the Safety Brake circuits. 
Safety Brake Circuit 
There are two such circuits on any train, one of which will be in use (selected by the 
train operator). The selected circuit checks the condition of a number of safety devices 
(e. g. deadman and tripcock) and the interlocks at the operational cab. If these are all 
set, then the Safety Brake circuit is energised. This causes Brake Safety relays on each 
car to energise, permitting the emergency brake to be released. 
Vehicle Braking System 
On the 1973 tube stock the Westcode Brake system was introduced. The main 
advantage of the Westcode system is that it allows electrical control of emergency 
braking as well as of service braking. The system abolished the need of the train line 
pipe, with its tendency to leak or rupture and its varying degrees of efficiency 
depending on its length. The Westcode system allowed the introduction of a wire in its 
place. The wire could perform all the safety functions required by law with loss of 
current in the wire replacing loss of air in the train line pipe when problems occur. 
On London Underground the Westcode system is arranged so that all the safety 
functions (tripcock, deadman and passenger alarm) are monitored by a series of wires 
running the length of the train. The activation of any of the safety devices will cause a 
loss of current on these wires which will, in turn, cause the brakes to be applied on the 
whole train. The wires are known as the Train Safety Wires. To admit air to, and 
release air from the brake cylinders, a valve is fitted to each car. This valve is known 
as the 7 Step Valve as it can vary the pressure supplied to the brake cylinders in seven 
different steps. In order to keep the brakes released on the car the 7 Step Valve must 
remain energised. Loss of supply current will cause the valve to admit air pressure to 
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the brake cylinders. The current to the valve is dependant on there being current in the 
Train Safety Wires. Loss of the Train Safety Wire circuit will cause the 7 Step Valve 
to give an emergency application of the brakes. The system therefore has the built in 
safety features required by law. 
A feature of the 1973 stock is the Load-Weight control of braking. This means that 
the weight of each car is automatically monitored as passengers board and disembark 
and the amount of air pressure admitted to the brake cylinders during application is 
adjusted according to the load in the car. This system uses Main Line air and is 
controlled by a Variable Load Control Valve mounted under each car, and a Variable 
Load Valve mounted next to the 7 Step Valve on each car. 
ABC 
Variable 
Load Valve 
Pilot Valves 
-ý Exhaust 
C 
Diapham effective area: 
B4 
units 
A6 units 
E7 units 
-* Brake Cylinders 
Rate Valve -) 
Valve Stem 
Exhaust Valve F 
Figure 7.1 7 Step Valve 
The 7 Step Valve shown in figure 7.1 is fitted with three Pilot Valves, labelled A, B 
and C, which when de-energised, admit air into the three chambers, also labelled 
A, B 
and C. The chambers are separated from each other by flexible diaphrams of differing 
effective areas. The diaphrams are all connected to a central, vertical stem. The valve 
stem will move down in response to the movement of the diaphrams caused when the 
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air is allowed to enter the chambers by the Pilot Valves. The downward pressure of 
the valve stem will depend on the combination of one or more of the chambers being 
pressurised due to the action of the Pilot Valves. At the base of the 7 Step Valve there 
is a spring loaded valve F, which is opened by downward pressure of the valve stem. 
When valve F is opened, air from the brake reservoir will pass to the brake cylinders. 
Pressure will then be exerted in chamber E of the 7 Step Valve, and will cause an 
upward pressure on its diaphram. This upward pressure will now oppose the 
downward pressure on the valve stem and, when the pressures equalise, valve F will 
close. No more air can now pass to the brake cylinders, and the existing brake 
pressure is maintained. 
The three diaphrams which control the downward pressure on the valve stem have 
differing areas. These are 4/7ths, 6/7ths and 7/7ths of maximum brake cylinder 
pressure. If all three Pilot Valves are de-energised, all three chambers will he supplied 
with air, the valve stem will be under maximum pressure, and maximum brake cylinder 
pressure will be applied. This is how an emergency brake application is achieved. All 
the other combinations of Pilot Valve operation and brake pressure obtained are shown 
in table 7.1. 
Westcode 
Step 
Pilot Valves 
De-ener ised 
Diaphram 
Operation 
Downward Pressure 
on Valve Stem 
Release None Nil Nil 
1 A 7-6 1/7 
2 B 6-4 2/7 
3 A&B (7-6) + (6-4) 3/7 
4 C 4 4/7 
5 A&C (7-6)+4 5/7 
6 B&C (6-4)+4 6/7 
Emergency A&B&C (7-6) + (6-4) +4 7/7 
Table 7.1 Variation of Brake Steps 
The Variable Load Valves' purpose is to provide a supply of air pressure to the 7 
Step Valve which is proportional to the weight of the car. The Variable Load Valve is 
connected to a Variable Load Control Valve as shown in figure 7.2. An air pressure 
signal is sent to the Variable Load Valve from the Variable Load Control Valve which 
corresponds to the weight of the car. If there is a loss of air pressure to the Variable 
Load Valve, the valve will allow pressure to be supplied to the 7 Step Valve equivalent 
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to tare load. The air for the brake equipment is supplied from the air supply unit on 
each car, which also supplies the door control equipment. The supply is passed to the 
Variable Load Valve shown in figure 7.2 and to the Tripcock pressure switches shown 
in figure 7.4. Air is also supplied to the Brake Supply Reservoir through a non-return 
valve and a brake isolating cock (BIC) shown in figure 7.2. The BIC is fitted with a 
vent hole so that when it is closed the air in the supply reservoir will exhaust 
The Westcode Electrical Circuits 
There are three main control circuits fitted to the 1973 stock for the operation of the 
Westcode brake. These are the Passenger Alarm circuit shown in figure 7.5, which 
detects operation of the Passenger Emergency Buttons and the rear tripcock. The Full 
Speed and Slow Speed Safety Circuits shown in figure 7.4, which monitor the 
condition of all the safety devices on the train, and lastly the service braking control 
wires, which allow the driver to control the brake by means of his Brake Controller. 
The loss of current in any of the Westcode brake circuits will cause an emergency 
brake application, and special override arrangements are provided to enable the train to 
be moved under these circumstances. 
7.3 Modelling of the Westcode Brake System 
Most London Underground trains contain six cars, as the braking system on each car is 
structurally the same, only one car will be analysed. Therefore the Round Train Wire 
will be ignored. This wire is used to check the completeness of the train, if there is a 
break in any of the couplings and the train splits into two parts, connections will be 
broken in the Round Train Wire, causing an emergency brake application on the two 
split sections. Also the only brake application considered is the emergency brake 
application as failure of this is likely to cause safety related problems. The whole 
braking system has been split into four sub-systems shown in figures 7.2,7.3,7.4, and 
7.5. 
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Pilot Magnrnr 
Figure 7.2 1973 Tube Stock Westcode Air Piping 
B 
Wires to 
(. Invert Rely., 
IStep 
Valve 
Figure 7.3 Service Circuits 
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Brake Cylinder Brake C'yhnder 
CONTI 
Figure 7.5 Passenger Alarm Circuit 
Each of the four sub-systems are connected. The relay BPMR in system 4 (figure 7.5) 
has its contacts BPMC1 and BPMC2 in the circuits for system 3 (figure 7.4). Systems 
2 and 3 are connected by the relays BSRY1 and BSRY2 with the contacts BSCT1 and 
BSCT2 (figure 7.3). System 2 controls the 7 Step Valve in system 1 (figure 7.2). A 
listing of the main components in each system follows : 
System 1 Compressor 
Non Return Valve (Valve 4) 
Brake Isolating Cock (BIC) 
Brake Reservoir 
Variable Load Valve (Valve 2) 
Variable Load Control Valve (Valve 3) 
7 Step Valve (Valve 1) 
Pipe 
Brake Cylinder 
Brake Pads 
System 2 Generator 4 (GEN4) 
Controller 
Brake Safety Contacts Full (BSCT2) 
Brake Safety Contacts Slow (BSCTI) 
7 Step Valve 
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System 3 Generator 2 (GEN2) 
Switch 
Deadmans Contacts Full (DMC2) 
Deadmans Contacts SLOW (DMC 1) 
Brake Passenger Master Contacts Full (BPMC2) 
Brake Passenger Master Contacts Slow(BPMC 1) 
Tripcock Contacts Full (TCC2) 
Tripcock Contacts Slow (TCC 1) 
Brake Safety Relay Full (BSRY2) 
Brake Safety Relay Slow (BSRY1) 
System 4 Generator l (GEN 1) 
Circuit Breaker (C/B) 
Passenger Alarm Button (PAB) 
Brake Passenger Alarm Relay (BPAR) 
Brake Passenger Alarm Contacts (CONT1) 
Brake Passenger Master Relay (BPMR) 
For the system to be modelled the two input files which describe the system had to he 
constructed. The files are the topology file and the library file which are used by the 
fault tree generation code. 
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All of the decision tables for the Westcode Brake system are shown below in the 
format that they appear in the library file. 
VALVE 
NRET 
1,1,1 
I1P STATE O1P 
-w p 
P FO P 
NP FO NP 
EXCLUSIVE 
W. FO 
GENERATOR 
IINIOUT 
1,1,1, P 
IIC STATE O1C 
Cw C 
NC - NC 
-F NC 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
CIRBREAK 
NORMAL 
1,1,1 
I1C STATE 
- OP 
NC - 
CC 
- STO 
C STC 
EXCLUSIVE 
C. OR STO, STC 
olc 
NC 
NC 
c 
NC 
c 
CONTROLLER 
NORMAL 
1,1,1 
+, + 
IIC STATE O1C 
Cw C 
NC - NC 
-F NC 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
BRAKERS 
NORMAL 
1,1,1 
IiP STATE O1P 
PW P 
NP - NP 
- CR NP 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, CR 
BCYL 
NORMAL 
1,1,1 
IiP STATE O1P 
HP W HP 
LP W LP 
NP - NP 
- PS NP 
- BC NP 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, PS, BC 
Decision Table 6 
156 
BPAD 
NORMAL 
1,1,1 
TIP STATE OIP 
HP W HP 
LP W LP 
NP W NP 
- SON P 
- SOFF NP 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, SON, SOFF 
PASSENGER 
NORMAL 
1,1,1 
IiP STATE OIP 
-PP 
- NP NP 
EXCLUSIVE 
NP, P 
PIPE 
NORMAL 
1,1,1 
IIP STATE O1P 
HP W HP 
LP W LP 
NP - NP 
- RUP NP 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, RUP 
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CONTACTS 
NORMAL 
2,1,1 
+, + 
I1C 12M STATE O1C 
CM W C 
- NM W NC 
NC - - NC 
-- FO NC 
C- FC C 
EXCLUSIVE 
vv 1)F(' 
1 sion Table 10 
BUTTON 
PA 
2,1,1 
I1P 12C STATE O1C 
- NC - NC 
P- W NC 
NP C w c 
-C FS C 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, FS 
S Decision Table 12 
SWITCH 
NORMAL 
1,2,1 
+, + 
I1C STATE O1C 02C 
C ND NC C 
CD C NC 
NC - NC NC 
EXCLUSIVE 
W. ND. D 
I 
TRIPCOCK 
NORMAL 
1,2,1 
+, + 
IiP STATE OID 02D 
- TSD DD 
- TS UP ND ND 
EXCLUSIVE 
TSD, TSUP 
Decision Table `14 
TCONNECTOR 
CONTT 
2,1,1 
+, + 
IIC 12C STATE O1C 
C-- C 
-C- C NC NC - NC 
EXCLUSIVE 
W. F 
J 
COMP 
NORMAL 
1,2,1 
+, + 
I1P STATE O1P 02P 
_wPp 
_F 
NP NP 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
Decision Table 16 
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RELAY 
BPAR 
1,2 1 
+, + 
I1C STATE O1C 02M 
CW C M 
NC - NC NM 
-F NC NM 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
DEADMAN 
NORMAL 
1,2,1 
+, + 
UP P STATE ()1 P 02P 
- NP NP NP 
-ppp 
EXCLUSIVE 
P. NP 
BSRY 
NORMAL 
1,2,1 
+, + 
11C STATE ()IM 02C 
CW M C 
NC - NM NC 
-F NM NC 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
GENERATOR 
2IN 1 OUT 
2,1,1, P 
+, + 
I1C 12C STATE O1C 
C- w C 
_C w C 
NC NC - NC 
-- F NC 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
Decision Table 20 
BPMC 
NORMAL 
2,1,1 
I1C 12M STATE O1C 
CM W C 
- NM W NC 
NC - - NC 
-- FO NC 
C- FC C 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, FO, FC 
EY,, 
Decision Table `21 
VALVE 
VLV 
2,1,1 
+, + 
I1P 12P STATE oIP 
HP P W Hp 
AP P W AP 
LP P W LP 
NP - - NP 
- NP - NP 
- - FB NP 
- - STC NP 
- P STN AP 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, FB, STC, S TN 
J 
TCC 
NORMAL 
2,1,1 
+, + 
I1C 12D STATE OIC 
CD W C 
- ND W NC 
NC - - NC 
-- FO NC 
C- FC C 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, FO, FC 
Decision Table 22 
VALVE 
VLCV 
2,1,1 
I1P 12P STATE O1P 
TP P W LP 
CP P W HP 
AP P W AP 
- NP - NP 
STC NP 
-P STN 
AP 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, STC, STN 
Decision Table 23 
BPMR 
NORMAL 
1,3,1 
IIC STATE O1M 02M 03C 
CW M M C 
NC - NM NM NC 
-F NM NM NC 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
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BSCT 
NORMAL 
2,3,1 
IIC 12M 
CM 
NC - 
C- 
- NM 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, FO, FC 
STATE O1C 
W C 
- NC 
FO NC 
FC C 
W NC 
02C 
c 
NC 
NC 
C 
NC 
03C 
C 
NC 
NC 
C 
NC 
Decision Table 27 
BICT 
NORMAL 
1,1,1 
I1P STATE 
Pw 
NP - 
- FO 
EXCLUSIVE 
W. FO 
o1p 
p 
NP 
NP 
VALVE 
7SV 
5,2,1 
I1P 12P 13C 14C 15C STATE (_)1P 02C 
HP P NC NC NC W HP NC 
NP - ---- NP - 
- NP ---- 
NP - 
-P --- 
STD P- 
-- --- 
STUP NP - 
-- CCCw 
NP C 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, STUP, STD 
Decision Table 31 
DMC 
NORMAL 
2,1,1 
I1C 12P STATE O1C 
CP W C 
- NP W NC 
NC - - NC 
-- FO NC 
C- FC C 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, FO, FC 
TCONNECTOR 
1IN2OUT 
1,2,1 
+, + 
I1C STATE O1C 02C 
C-CC 
NC - NC NC 
EXCLUSIVE 
W, F 
Decision Table 30 
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7.4 Fault Tree Development for Brake System Failure 
Once the two input files have been created then AFTCC can be run to produce the 
output file defining the fault tree structure in the correct format for entry into the fault 
tree analysis package FaultTree+. The first stage in the automatic fault tree 
construction process is to build up the topology graph for the system. This graph is 
stored as a linked list forming a tree structure. Once the graph has been constructed all 
possible NFF loops, NFB loops and circuits can be identified using the algorithms 
described earlier in chapter 4. 
In the first analysis performed the top event of interest was "failure of brakes on one 
car in an emergency". AFTCC prompts the user for the information required for the 
modelling. The information is: the name of the input files, the state of the variable to 
be traced, the output and component name. The prompts and the manual entries for 
this example are: 
1. prompt "Enter the name of the text file produced by Autocad" 
input West 
2. prompt "Enter the variable state" 
input NP (no pressure) 
3. prompt "Enter the output" 
input wheel 
4. prompt "Enter the component name" 
input bpad 
When the program is run for the top event "brakes fail to apply in an emergency", there 
are no NFB or NFF loops but there are ten circuits. Components appearing on the ten 
circuits are listed in table 7.2. 
1. Tconnector6 01 Valvel 02 Generator4 01 Controller 01 
Tconnector4 01 Bsctl 01 
2. Tconnector4 01 Bsctl 02 Tconnector7 01 Valvel 02 
Generator4 01 Controller 01 
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3. Generator2 01 Switch 02 Dmc2 01 Bpmc2 01 Tcc2 01 
Bsry 02 
4. Contacts 1O1 Bpmr 03 Generator lO1 Tconnector 101 
5. Generatorl 01 Tconnector1 02 Cirbreak Ol Button OI Relay2 O1 
6. Tcc 1O1 Bsry 1 02 Generator2 O1 Switch O1 Dmc 1O1 Bpmc 1 
7. Controller 01 Tconnector4 02 Bsct2 02 Tconnector7 01 Valve 1 02 
Generator4 01 
8. Tconnector4 01 Bsctl 03 Tconnector8 01 Valvel 02 Generator4 01 
Controller 01 
9. Controller 01 Tconnector4 02 Bsct2 03 Tconnector8 01 Valve 1 02 
Generator4 01 
10. Tconnector6 01 Valvel 02 Generator4 01 Controller (=11 Tconnector4 02 
Bsct2 01 
Table 7.2 List of Circuits for No Emergency Brake Application 
In each of the ten circuits the variable state that is traced is Current (C). The ten 
circuits appear on three of the four sub-systems of the Westcode Brake System. 
Circuits 4 and 5 come from the Passenger Alarm circuit shown in figure 7.5, circuits 3 
and 6 come from Full and Slow Speed Safety circuit shown in figure 7.4 and circuits 1, 
2,7,8,9 and 10 come from the Service Circuit shown in figure 7.3. The program now 
commences to construct the fault tree for the top event. Before any event is developed 
a check is made to see if the event to be developed lies on any of the NFB, NFF loops 
or circuits. The fault tree is constructed in the normal manner until a component state 
is encountered which lies on one of the circuits. The initial part of the fault tree 
construction is shown in figure 7.6. The three events that have yet to be expanded in 
the tree are Tcon6 Colo, Tcon7 ColO and Tcon8 ColO on the right-hand centre branch. 
These events are the first occurrences where the circuit operator needs to be applied. 
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Figure 7.6 Fault Tree for the Top Event "Failure of Brakes in an Emergency" 
A situation has occurred in analysing this system which had not previously been 
encountered when the circuit operator was applied to component Tconnector6 for the 
event 01 C. When the circuits were checked for a match with this component, a 
match was found in circuits 1 and 10. This was the first time that an entry component 
was common to more than one circuit and this situation had not been anticipated. The 
circuit operator had to be amended to deal with this new problem efficiently. The 
amended circuit operator would have to be more general to deal with any number of 
matches for the entry component. Firstly let us look at the situation that we have from 
the two circuits with the common entry component. There are five common 
components in the two circuits- When checking for common components only the 
component name has to be checked the output column number is not important. The 
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common components in circuits 1 and 10 are Tconnector6, Valvel, Generator4, 
Controller and Tconnector4. 
The circuit operator is applied and the common components are dealt with in the same 
manner as when the circuit operator was applied to the Train Detection system in 
chapter 5. As the variable state being traced is current (C) the circuit operator for 
current, figure 4.12 in chapter 4, is used so the first gate to be added is an "AND" gate, 
then each of the common components is dealt with in turn. The decision table 15 for 
the component Tconnector6 is found and output column 1 is searched for the variable 
state current, there are two matches in rows 1 and 2. The matches give C, -, - and -, C, - 
so there are only two entries that need to be considered. The first entry is current in 
input 1 of Tconnector6, this input comes from Brake Safety Contacts Slow (Bsctl) 
output 1. All of the circuits are checked to see if Bsctl 01 appears on any of them. It 
only appears on circuit 1 which is one of the circuits that the operator is currently 
being applied to, so this entry is just tracing the current round the circuit and since it 
will therefore be dealt with by the circuit operator it needs no further consideration. 
The next input, row 2 -, C, - is dealt with in the same manner, this time the input event 
is traced to the component Brake Safety Contacts Full output column 1 (Bsct2 01) 
which only appears on circuit 10 which is the second circuit that is being dealt with and 
therefore again is not considered further. For the common component, Tconnector6, 
no entries are added to the "AND" gate. The next common component is Valve l 02, 
decision table 31. There is only one match found for this event in output column 2 of 
the decision table, which is row 6. The entries in row 6 are -, -, C, C, C, W. These 
events are examined to see if any of the inputs are external inputs to the circuit and 
therefore have to be expanded. The inputs are from Tconnector6 01, Tconnector7 01 
and Tconnector8 01 respectively and the variable traced in each case is current. Each 
one of these inputs are checked in turn for their appearance in any of the circuits. As 
Tconnector6 01 appears on the circuits that the operator is currently being applied to 
its fault development will be dealt with by the operator. Tconnector7 01 C appears on 
circuits 2 and 7, as these circuits do not contain the entry component for circuits 1 and 
10 this possible external disturbance can be discarded. This also applies for 
Tconnector8 01 C. Therefore the only input that is left to develop is the working state 
W of Valve 1, the 7 Step Valve. The rest of the common components are dealt with as 
described previously to produce the fault tree structure shown in figure 7.7. 
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Tcon6 Co10 
AND 
AND NOT NOT Non Common Components 
GR4F CRF waiting to he developed 
NOT NOT 
VEISTUP VEISTD 
Figure 7.7 Application of the Circuit Operator to Tconnector6 ColO 
The branch waiting to be expanded in figure 7.7 is the branch that will contain the 
components that are not common to the two circuits. The two non-common 
components are Bsctl 01 (Brake Safety Contacts Slow) and Bsct2 01 (Brake Safety 
Contacts Full). To produce the correct structure of the tree all combinations of the 
failures of the non-common components on each circuit must he taken together. This 
results in an "OR" gate added as input to the initial "AND" gate can the circuit operator 
which has its inputs from failures occurring on the non-common sections of each 
circuit. Using this the remaining events for components Bsctl and Bsct2 are expanded 
by tracing the causes of these events from their decision table, table 27. This results in 
the fault tree in figure 7.8 
Tcon6 Colo 
AND 
AND NOT 
GR4F 
NOT NOT 
VEISTUP VEISTD ý- 
OR 
AND BTIFC 
Bsryl Rowl AND 
NAT NOT 
BTIFO BTIFC 
NOT OR 
CRF I 
OR 
AND BT2FC 
Bsry2 Row l AND 
NOT NOT 
BT2F() BT2FC 
Figure 7.8 Completed Application of the Circuit Operator for Multiple Circuits 
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The rest of the tree is expanded applying the circuit operator whenever the next 
component to be dealt with lies on one or more of the circuits. When the program has 
terminated the fault tree structure is contained in a data file in the format for direct 
input into the fault tree analysis code FaultTree+. 
The causes of an emergency brake application are: release of the deadman's handle, 
activation of the passenger alarm circuit and activation of the tripcock. Therefore 
three separate fault trees need to be constructed for failure of the brake system when it 
is activated by each of these causes when a demand occurs. To model each situation 
the top event is "ANDED" with the cause of the emergency brake application demand. 
So the three separate trees are in turn "ANDED" with: DNNP (no pressure on the 
deadmans handle), PRP (pressure on one of the passenger alarm buttons) and 
TKTSUP (tripcock remains stuck in upward position) and "NOT" the occurrence of 
the other two events. The minimal cut sets for each fault tree are listed below and 
agree with those obtained by a manual analysis. 
The minimal cut sets for no emergency brake application when there is no pressure on 
the deadmans handle are : 
1. DNNP VE3STC 
2. DNNP CPF 
3. DNNP VE2FB 
4. DNNP VE2STC 
5. DNNP BTFO 
6. DNNP B SCR 
7. DNNP BLBC 
8. DNNP BT1FC 
9. DNNP BDSOFF 
10. DNNP BT2FC 
11. DNNP VE 1 STUP 
12. DNNP PERUP 
13. DNNP BLPS 
14. DNNP DC 1 FC SHD 
15. DNNP DC2FC SHND 
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The minimal cut sets for no emergency brake application when one of the passenger 
alarm buttons is pressed are : 
1. PRP VE3STC 
2. PRP CPF 
3. PRP VE2FB 
4. PRP VE2STC 
5. PRP BTFO 
6. PRP B SCR 
7. PRP BDSOFF 
8. PRP BT1FC 
9. PRP BT2FC 
10. PRP VE 1 STUP 
11. PRP PERUP 
12. PRP BLPS 
13. PRP BLBC 
14. PRP SHD BNFS 
15. PRP SHD CS1FC 
16. PRP SHD BC1FC 
17. PRP SHND BNFS 
18. PRP SHND CS1FC 
19. PRP SHND BC2FC 
The minimal cut sets for no emergency brake application when the tripcock is struck 
up are : 
1. TKTSUP VE3STC 
2. TKTSUP CPF 
3. TKTSUP VE2FB 
4. TKTSUP VE2STC 
5. TKTSUP BTFO 
6. TKTSUP BSCR 
7. TKTSUP BT1FC 
8. TKTSUP BDSOFF 
9. TKTSUP BT2FC 
10. TKTSUP VE 1 STUP 
11. TKTSUP PERUP 
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12. TKTSUP BLPS 
13. TKTSUP BLBC 
14. TKTSUP SHND 
15. TKTSUP SHD 
TC2FC 
TC 1 FC 
A key to help decipher the failure codes in the list of minimal cut sets is shown below: 
BC1FC Brake Passenger Master Contacts Slow Failed Closed 
BC2FC Brake Passenger Master Contacts Full Failed Closed 
BDSOFF Brake Pad Stuck Off 
BLBC Brake Cylinder Cracked 
BLPS Brake Cylinder Piston Stuck 
BNFS Button Failed Stuck 
BSCR Brake Reservoir Cracked 
BT1FC Brake Safety Contacts Slow Failed Closed 
BT2FC Brake Safety Contacts Full Failed Closed 
BTFO Brake Isolating Cock Failed Open 
CKOP Circuit Breaker Open 
CPF Compressor Failed 
CS 1 FC Brake Passenger Alarm Contacts Failed Closed 
DC 1 FC Deadman Contacts Slow Failed Closed 
DC2FC Deadman Contacts Full Failed Closed 
DNNP Deadmans Handle No Pressure 
PERUP Pipe Ruptured 
PRP Passenger Alarm Button Pressed 
SHD Switch Down 
SHND Switch Up 
TC 1 FC Tripcock Contacts Slow Failed Closed 
TC2FC Tripcock Contacts Full Failed Closed 
TKTSUP Tripcock Stuck Up 
VE1STUP Valve 1 Piston Stuck up 
VE2FB Valve 2 Failed Blocked 
VE2STC Valve 2 Stuck 
VE3STC Valve 3 Stuck 
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7.5 Fault Tree Development for Spurious Brake Applications 
The second analysis of the system develops causes of spurious emergency brake 
application, this event is of particular concern to London Underground Limited as 
stationary trains in the tunnels pose a major hazard. 
The system is described by the same topology file and decision tables. Development of 
the fault tree for spurious brake application only requires the program input parameters 
to be changed. The AFTCC prompts and entries for this example are: 
1. prompt "Enter the name of the text file produced by Autocad" 
input West 
2. prompt "Enter the variable state" 
input HP (high pressure) 
3. prompt "Enter the output" 
input wheel 
4. prompt "Enter the component name" 
input hpad 
The first output of the program is a list of all the NFB, NFF loops and the circuits. As 
in the previous modelling of this system there are no NFF or NFB loops there are only 
circuits. The circuits are listed in table 7.3. 
1. NC Tconnector6 01 Valvel 02 Generator4 01 Controller 01 
Tconnector4 01 B sct 1 01 
2. NC Tconnector4 01 Bsctl 02 Tconnector7 01 Valve l 02 Generator4 01 
Controller 01 
3. NC Button 01 Relay2 01 Generatorl 01 Tconnectorl 01 Cirbreak 01 
4. NC Contacts1 01 Bpmr 03 Generatorl 01 Tconnectorl 01 
5. C Generator2 01 Switch 02 Dmc2 01 Bpmc2 01 Tcc2 01 Bsry2 02 
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6. C Contacts l 01 Bpmr 03 Generator l 01 Tconnectorl 01 
7. C Generatorl 01 Tconnectorl 02 Cirbreak 01 Button 01 Relay2 01 
8. NC Generator2 01 Switch 02 Dmc2 01 Bpmc2 01 Tcc2 01 Bsry2 02 
9. NC Tcc lO1 Bsry l O2 Generator2 O1 Switch O1 Dmc lO1B pmc 1 
10. NC Controller 01 Tconnector4 02 Bsct2 02 Tconnector7 01 Valve l 02 
Generator4 01 
11. C Generator2 01 Switch 02 Dmcl 01 Bpmcl 01 Tccl O1 Bsryl 02 
12. NC Tconnector4 01 Bsctl 03 Tconnector8 01 Valve l 02 Generator4 01 
Controller 01 
13. NC Controller 01 Tconnector4 02 Bsct2 03 Tconnector8 01 Valvel 02 
Generator4 01 
14. NC Tconnector6 01 Valve 1 02 Generator4 01 Controller 01 
Tconnector4 02 Bsct2 01 
Table 7.3 List of Circuits for Spurious Brake Application 
The automatic construction of the tree is performed in a similar manner to the previous 
example, however in this case the variable state in the first circuit that is encountered is 
NC (no current). The main difference in the structure of operators which trace the 
variable states C (current) and NC (no current) in circuits is the type of gates that are 
featured, (see the two operators explained earlier in chapter 4). The method for the 
circuit expansion is the same in terms of the components. The first circuit encountered 
has the entry component Tconnector6 01 NC. Investigating the circuits shows that 
this event appears again on two circuits, circuits 1 and 14, therefore an amended circuit 
operator needs to be created that models the NC situation. The fault development 
required NC from both circuits. This can be achieved by the tree structure shown in 
figure 7.9. 
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AND 
NC from Circuit 1 
OR 
NC in common NC in non common 
components components 
NC from Circuit 14 
OR 
NC in conunon NC in non commn 
components components 
Figure 7.9 Manual Representation of the Tree Structure for the Circuit Operator 
The structure in figure 7.9 can be transposed into the structure that the circuit operator 
uses by taking out the common factor on both "AND" branches as seen in figure 7.10. 
OR 
NCin common components AND 
F- I 
NC in non common NC in non common 
components in circuitI components in circuit 14 
Figure 7.10 Circuit Operator Structure for Circuits with Common Entry 
Components 
The rest of the fault tree was constructed automatically by tracing events through the 
decision tables with no further problems to give the completed sub tree in figure 7.11. 
Chirant operator gate A k{ed gate for iiui 
OR collui oll coniponets 
AND GR4F CRF AND 
Valw2 Rowl AND OR OR 
NOT NOT AND BTIFO ANI) 
BT2FO 
VEISTUP VEISTD 
con9 Row1 Bsry1 ColO AND Bsry2 Colo 
F- 
II --i 
NOT NOT NOT NOT 
BTI FO BTIFC BT2FO BT2FC 
Figure 7.11 Application of Circuit Operator for Entry Component Tconnector 6 
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The Switch required some special attention during the modelling. The modelling for 
the switch in sub-system 3, figure 7.4, had not considered events SHD (switch down) 
and SHND (switch not down) to be mutually exclusive states. This is because they are 
both working states and not, as in other component models, a working state and a 
failed state. It is required to recognise these states as mutually exclusive to eliminate 
the minimal cut set that contains SHD together with SHND which is physically 
impossible. The output file containing the tree structure needed to be amended. Also 
to model spurious brake applications the top gate in the resulting fault tree has to 
include "NOT" the three causes of a genuine emergency brake application, so the top 
gate of the output file defining the fault tree structure is defined as follows: 
TOP AND 5O 61 Ti T4 T5 T6 
Tl OR 20 T2 T3 
T2 NOT () 1 SHND 
T3 NOT O1 SHD 
T4 NOT 01 PRP 
T5 NOT 01 DNNP 
T6 NOT () 1 TKTSUP 
The tree structure defined in the rest of the file is left unchanged. 
When the minimal cut sets were found and examined, they did not agree with the cut 
sets from the manually constructed fault tree. Therefore there was a problem in either 
the way in which the system had been modelled, or an error in one or more of the 
decision tables, or the circuit operator was still incorrect. The problem was identified 
by looking at the fault tree that had been produced and locating on the tree structure 
where the expected failures were being deleted by the Boolean algebra when finding 
the minimal cut sets. The problem was traced to the point where the circuit operator 
was applied for the entry components Tconnector6 01, Tconnector7 01 and 
Tconnector8 01. Entries for Valve 1 were incorrectly developed by the circuit 
operator. 
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Bpac! HP 
OR 
Bcyl Rowl ANI) 
AND 
NOT NOT 
AND Pipe Row! 
BDSOFF BDSON 
AND 
NOT NOT 
BIDS BLBC NOT 
PERUP Vl Rowl 
V2 Rowl Tcon9 Rowl Tcon6 Co10 Tcon7 Co10 Tconß Co10 AND 
Expanded from 
OR 
III 
1 
NOT NOT V1 Rowl 
AND GR4F 
VE 1 STI JP VE 1 S"II) 
CRF ANI) 
V2 Rowl AND OR OR 
NOT NOT AND BTI F() AND BT2FO VEISTCJP VE1STD 
Tcon9 Rawl Bsryl Ca10 AND Bsr Co10 ANI) 
NOT NOT NOT NOT 
BT1FO BT1FC BT2FO BT2FC 
Figure 7.12 Fault Tree to Highlight the Problem when the 
Circuit Operator is appli 
The relevant portion of the fault tree is reproduced in figure 7.12. The problem arises 
from the expansion of Valve 1 row 1 when applying the circuit operator. From the 
fault tree it is clear that when Boolean reduction takes place all failures that are 
expanded from Tcon6 Col() will be deleted losing the failures that would have been 
expanded from the identifiers Bsryl ColO and Bsry2 Col 0. This also applies when 
Tcon7 ColO and Tcon8 ColO are developed by applying the circuit operator. So the 
problem lies with the expansion of the repeated event Valve 1 row 1. The solution is 
provided by performing checks when applying the circuit operator for repeated and 
inconsistent events. Before any entries are added to the fault tree a check for repeated 
or inconsistent events needs to take place. All the gate identifiers that describe the 
component names and row numbers on that branch are checked against Valve l Row 1 
for a match. From figure 7.12 the entry in the fault tree from the "AND" gate labelled 
"expanded from V1 Row I" is a repeated event. Therefore the event should not have 
been added to the fault tree, so no entries are added to the fault tree when dealing with 
Valve 1 on circuits 1 and 14. 
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The fault tree is constructed again checking for repeated and inconsistent events when 
applying the circuit operators. When the new file is analysed by FaultTree+ and all 
working states are removed the minimal cut sets are : 
1. BRF 23. DC1FO TC2FO 
2. GR2F 24. TC 1 FO SHD 
3. GR4F 25. DC1FO SHD 
4. CRF 26. BC1FO SHD 
5. CKOP 27. BY1F SHD 
6. CKSTO 28. BT1FO SHD 
7. RY2F 29. BC 1 FO TC2FO 
8. CS1FO 30. SHND TC2F() 
9. GR1F 31. BY1F TC2FO 
10. TC1FO DC2FO 32. BTIFO TC2FO 
11. DC 1FO DC2FO 33. TC 1 FO BY2F 
12. BC1FO DC2FO 34. DCIFO BY2F 
13. SHND DC2FO 35. BC1FO BY2F 
14. BYIF DC2FO 36. SHND BY2F 
15. BT1FO DC2FO 37. BY1F BY2F 
16. TC1FO BC2FO 38. BT1FO BY2F 
17. DC1FO BC2FO 39. TC1FO BT2FO 
18. BC1FO BC2FO 40. DC1FO BT2FO 
19. SHND BC2FO 41. BC 1 FO BT2FO 
20. BY1F BC2FO 42. SHND BT2FO 
21. BT1FO BC2FO 43. BY1F BT2FO 
22. TC1FO TC2FO 44. BT1FO BT2FO 
These cut sets are of the right order and agree with the cut sets calculated from the 
manual construction of the tree. 
The failure codes that have not appeared before are defined below: 
BC1FO Brake Passenger Master Contacts Slow Failed Open 
BC2FO Brake Passenger Master Contacts Full Failed Open 
BRF Brake Passenger Master Relay Failed 
BT1FO Brake Safety Contacts Slow Failed Open 
BT2FO Brake Safety Contacts Full Failed Open 
BYIF Brake Safety Relay Slow Failed 
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BY2F Brake Safety Relay Full Failed 
CKSTO Circuit Breaker Stuck Open 
CRF Controller Failed 
CS 1 FO Brake Passenger Alarm Contacts Failed Open 
DC1FO Deadman Contacts Slow Failed Open 
DC2FO Deadman Contacts Full Failed Open 
GR 1F Generator 1 Fails 
GR2F Generator 2 Fails 
GR4F Generator 4 Fails 
RY2F Relay 2 Failed 
TC1FO Tripcock Contacts Slow Failed Open 
TC2FO Tripcock Contacts Full Failed Open 
7.6 Revisions to the Circuit Operator 
In the application of AFTCC to the train braking system a method has been produced 
to deal with the situation where the fault tree development encountered a component 
which appears on two circuits, with only one non-common component per circuit. For 
the fault tree construction process to be generally applicable it is necessary to consider 
more complex cases. As a hypothetical example, consider an entry component Valve 1 
02 C using the circuits for the top event "no brake application in an emergency". 
From the list of the circuits in table 7.2, it is seen that the entry component appears in 
six circuits, circuits 1,2,7,8,9,10. These circuits are listed below with component 
ordering rearranged for easier identification of the common components. 
1 Tcon6 O1 Valvel 02 Gen4 O1 Controller O1 Tcon4 O1 Bsctl Ol 
10 Tcon6 01 Valve1 02 Gen4 01 Controller 01 Tcon4 02 Bsct2 01 
2 Tcon7 01 Valve1 02 Gen4 01 Controller 01 Tcon4 01 Bsctl 02 
7 Tcon7 01 Valve 1 02 Gen4 01 Controller 01 Tcon4 02 Bsct2 02 
8 Tcon8 01 Valve 1 02 Gen4 01 Controller O1 Tcon4 01 B sct 1 03 
9 Tcon8 01 Valve1 02 Gen4 01 Controller 01 Tcon4 02 Bsct2 03 
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To build the fault tree for the above circuits with the common entry component Valve 
1 the first step is to find components that are common to all of the circuits. When 
searching for common components the only information that needs to be checked is the 
component name. In this case the common components are: Va1vel, Generator 4, 
Controller and Tconnector 4. As previously when applying the circuit operator an 
"AND" gate is added to the tree according to the operator tracing C (current). The 
common components are expanded in exactly the same manner as in the previous 
example. After expanding all of the common components an "OR" gate is added to the 
top "AND" gate and each of the circuits is dealt with in turn for the non-common 
components. If a circuit contains more than one non-common component, these 
components are combined by an "AND" gate and then each component is expanded 
from the "AND" gate. To make it clearer the tree structure for this example is shown 
in figure 7.13, none of the components have been expanded, they have just been 
labelled on the tree. 
C 
AND 
ValveI Gen4 Controller Tcon4 
OR 
AND 
Tcon6 Bsctl 
AND 
11 
Tcon6 Bm t2 
Figure 7.13 
AND 
Tcon7 Bsctl 
AND 
Tcon7 Bsct2 
AND 
I 
TconK Bsct 1 
Application of the Circuit Operator to an 
Example where an Entry Component lies on Six Circuits 
AND 
Tcon8 Bu: t2 
A more concise tree structure that contains exactly the same logic can be developed 
for the problem. The non-common components on each circuit are listed below: 
1 Tcon6 Bsctl 8 Tcon8 Bsctl 
2 Tcon7 Bsctl 9 Tcon8 Bsct2 
7 Tcon7 Bsct2 10 Tcon6 Bsct2 
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It can be seen that the component Bsctl is common to circuits 1,2 and 8, also the 
component Bsct2 is common to circuits 7,9 and 10. Using this knowledge the tree 
structure can be rewritten in the format contained in figure 7.14. 
Valve l 
c 
AND 
Gen4 Controller Tcon4 
OR 
Tcon6 
AND 
OR B sct l 
Tc on7 Tc on8 
Figure 7.14 Concise Tree Structure for the Fault Tree in Figure 7.13 
The new circuit operator for C (current) has been updated, now attention needs to be 
turned to the circuit operator for NC (no current). If the same example is considered 
the circuit operator for NC is dealt with in a similar manner to give the fault tree 
shown in figure 7.15. 
NC 
OR 
Valvel Gen4 Controller Tcon4 
AND 
OR 
Tcon6 Bsctl 
OR 
1 
-7 
Tcon6 Bsct2 
Figure 7.15 
OR 
Tcon7 Bsctl 
AND 
OR Bu t2 
Tc on6 Tcon7 Tc onx 
OR 
Tcon7 Bsc12 
OR 
Twn8 Bsct 1 
OR 
Tean8 Bsct2. 
Application of the Circuit Operator for NC to 
an Example where an Entry Component lies on Six Circuits 
As before none of the components have been expanded in figure 7.15 the diagram just 
shows the fault tree structure. 
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The general circuit operators that deal with multiple common entry components are 
shown in figures 7.16 and 7.17. 
C in Circuits 
1 
OR 
Entry component only 
common to one circuit 
Entry component common 
to more than one circuit 
AND 
C in components 
common to all circuits 
OR 
Deal with one circuit at a time 
and the non-common components 
AND 
for each 
Non-common components 
circuit on each circuit 
Figure 7.16 General Circuit Operator for Current 
At the end of each of the branches in figures 7.16 and 7.17 the appropriate basic circuit 
operator is applied from chapter 4 figures 4.11 and 4.12. 
178 
NC in Circuits 
OR 
1 
Entry component only Entry component common 
common to one circuit to more than one circuit 
OR 
NC in components AND 
common to all circuits 
Deal with one circuit at a time 
and the non-common components 
OR 
for each 
Non-common components 
circuit on each circuit 
Figure 7.17 General Circuit Operator for No Current 
7.7 Conclusion 
The two circuit operators for C (current) and NC (no current) have been modified to 
deal with the situation when an entry component lies on more than two different 
circuits. The new operators have been tested on the brake safety system and have 
created fault trees which when analysed produce the same minimal cut sets as the 
manually constructed trees. Advantages gained by applying the operators for circuits 
are: improved efficiency in the fault tree construction process, a better fault 
development structure to the tree and a reduction in the size of the automatically 
constructed fault trees. Smaller fault trees are quicker to analyse, and the improved 
fault development structure will enable errors in the trees to be detected in a shorter 
time. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions and Future Work 
8.1 Summary of Work 
The newly developed hybrid method which uses the best features from the decision 
table and the digraph approach to fault tree construction has been successfully 
demonstrated by its manual applications to railway safety systems. A computer 
program, AFTCC has been developed which implements this procedure. The program 
requires two input files, the topology file, that contains information about how each 
component in the system is connected and, the decision table library file which holds a 
decision table for each component encountered. AFTCC features algorithms to detect 
NFB and NFF control loops and circuits. Operators are applied by the code to 
develop the fault tree failure logic in each of these situations. The AFTCC program 
has been tested on three railway safety systems: 
1. Train Stop System 
2. Train Detection System 
3. Emergency Train Braking System 
Each system that the AFTCC code has been tested on has been progressively more 
complex and has therefore involved more intricate modelling. 
The Train Stop System did not contain any control loops or electrical circuits. 
Therefore the system was a test of the AFTCC's ability to construct a fault tree by 
following the causes through the decision tables for the components in the system. At 
each stage of the fault tree construction AFTCC uses checks for repeated or 
inconsistent events. When the automatically constructed fault tree was analysed by 
FaultTree+ the minimal cut sets that were produced agreed with the cut sets obtained 
for the manually constructed fault tree. 
The Train Detection System contained electrical circuits and so was a good test of the 
algorithms for circuit operators and its implementation in AFTCC. 
In this system two 
top events were analysed whose fault development tested the circuit operators for 
both 
current and no current situations. This system in addition to testing the circuit 
operators also tested the algorithms for the detection and classification of the control 
180 
loops and circuits from the topology graph constructed by AFTCC. When the two 
automatically constructed fault trees for the top events "red bulb off when there is a 
train in section" and "green bulb off when there is no train in the section" were 
analysed by FaultTree+ the produced minimal cut sets agreed with the cut sets from 
the manually constructed fault trees. 
In the analysis of the emergency train braking system a new problem was encountered. 
When the fault tree was being constructed by AFTCC an entry component was 
encountered which was common to more then one of the electrical circuits. The 
occurrence of this situation had not been taken into account by the circuit operators. 
Therefore the circuit operators were amended to deal correctly with the situation of 
the entry component being common to any number of electrical circuits. The amended 
operators were then tested on this system for two different top events producing 
minimal cut sets that agreed with the manually constructed fault trees. This system 
was a real system provided for analysis by London Underground Limited. 
As far as the AFTCC program has been tested it has always produced fault trees which 
when analysed by FaultTree+ have the same minimal cut sets as the manually 
constructed fault trees. 
8.2 Conclusions 
1. After an extensive critical literature review covering all the main methods for 
automatic fault tree construction, a new method was developed incorporating the best 
features from the digraph and decision table methods. These key features were: the 
ability to model any number of different variable states using the decision table method 
and detecting and classifying all control loops as either negative feedback or negative 
feedforward loops using the digraph method. 
2. The feasibility of the new approach has been demonstrated by its application to 
real railway safety systems provided by London Underground Ltd. The main 
advantages with the new approach are: 
i) There is no limitations on the number of different variable states that 
can be used. 
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ü) An algorithm has been implemented that detects electrical circuits and 
control loops in the systems. 
iii) Two new circuit operator has been developed one for tracing current 
and the other for tracing no current in a circuit. These operators are 
applied when a component on a circuit is encountered during fault tree 
construction. The operators have been extended to deal with the 
situation where components are common to more than one circuit. The 
advantage of producing circuit operators was to produce a more 
efficient means of developing a fault tree which has logical consistency. 
It also has the added advantage of significantly reducing the size of the 
fault trees. When systems with circuits have been analysed manually 
without applying the operator they result in many obsolete branches in 
the tree. 
3. Even through railway safety systems tend not to contain control loops, simple 
operators for NFF and NFB control loops have been incorporated into the AFTCC 
methodology. The reason for this is to demonstrated the potential for extending 
AFTCC to deal with systems from other industries where control loops are common, 
for example in the chemical industry. 
8.3 The use of Automatic Fault Tree Construction Codes 
Any automatic fault tree construction package including AFTCC should only be used 
by an analyst who has considerable experience in manual fault tree construction. The 
analyst should have a good understanding of the system to be analysed and some idea 
of which component failures may be minimal cut sets. Once the minimal cut sets have 
been produced the analyst should be in a position to check the cut sets for any that are 
non-minimal or would not cause the top event. 
The danger with the automation of fault tree construction is that inexperienced analysts 
will use the packages with out any real understanding of the systems that they are 
analysing. Also no manual check will be performed on the minimal cut sets to try and 
validate that they are correct. 
To date, confidence can't be placed in the output from automatic fault tree 
construction packages when applied to complex systems and a lot of knowledge gained 
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about the system during a fault tree study would be lost if the process is automated. It 
is however a good way of providing a check on the manually produced fault trees. 
8.4 Future Work 
1. The AFTCC program needs further validation and testing on more real railway 
safety systems by checking the cut sets that are produced from the automatically 
constructed fault trees with the cut sets from the manually constructed trees. Any 
discrepancies need to be examined and if there are errors in the AFTCC fault tree the 
causes of the errors need to he detected and corrected 
2. Once there is confidence in the results that the AFTCC program generates for 
railway safety systems the algorithm can be extended for application to systems from 
other industries, for example chemical control systems. The ability of the new method 
to identify and classify NFF and NFB control loops has been demonstrated in chapter 
4. Initially the NFF and NFB operators in AFTCC need to he tested on simple control 
loops. The building and testing of the AFTCC program is an iterative process with 
each system that the program is used on getting progressively more complex. Other 
problems for fault tree construction which would require attention if the code was to 
be applicable to chemical process systems are reverse flow and multiple nested control 
loops. 
3. To make the AFTCC program more user friendly it would require a front end 
to be attached to the program to make it run under windows. This would enhance the 
user environment. 
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